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Abstract
Vehicles have come a long way from being purely mechanical systems to systems
that consist of an internal network of more than 100 microcontrollers and systems
that communicate with external entities, such as other vehicles, road infrastructure,
the manufacturer’s cloud and external applications. This combination of resource
constraints, safety-criticality, large attack surface and the fact that millions of people
own and use them each day, makes securing vehicles particularly challenging as
security practices and methods need to be tailored to meet these requirements.
This thesis investigates how security demands should be structured to ease dis-
cussions and collaboration between the involved parties and how requirements
engineering can be accelerated by introducing generic security requirements. Prac-
titioners are also assisted in choosing appropriate techniques for securing vehicles
by identifying and categorising security and resilience techniques suitable for auto-
motive systems. Furthermore, three specic mechanisms for securing automotive
systems and providing resilience are designed and evaluated.
The rst part focuses on cyber security requirements and the identication of
suitable techniques based on three dierent approaches, namely (i) providing a
mapping to security levels based on a review of existing security standards and
recommendations; (ii) proposing a taxonomy for resilience techniques based on a
literature review; and (iii) combining security and resilience techniques to protect
automotive assets that have been subject to attacks.
The second part presents the design and evaluation of three techniques. First,
an extension for an existing freshness mechanism to protect the in-vehicle commu-
nication against replay attacks is presented and evaluated. Second, a trust model
for Vehicle-to-Vehicle communication is developed with respect to cyber resilience
to allow a vehicle to include trust in neighbouring vehicles in its decision-making
processes. Third, a framework is presented that enables vehicle manufacturers to
protect their eet by detecting anomalies and security attacks using vehicle trust and
the available data in the cloud.
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Vehicles have progressed from being purely mechanical, e. g., steam-powered, to
include electromechanical components, such as pumps, relays and sensors, and to
nally become mechatronic systems that make use of software to improve and create
new functionality. In the last decade vehicles, especially cars and heavy-duty vehicles
such as trucks, have started to evolve from being mechatronic systems to being
enhanced with functionality using software inside and outside the vehicle. In other
words, these automotive systems are evolving to a Cyber-Physical System (CPS) [1]
where a single vehicle is seen only as a part of the system, and new functionality is
achieved by software communicating to several entities such as other vehicles, road
infrastructure, the OEM and other service providers.
The technological progress in computation and communication paved the way
for a manifold of new concepts and trends that already inuenced and accelerated
the change of vehicles to become computers on wheels. The rst Internet-connected
applications can already be found in consumer vehicles, for example, services such as
automated emergency calls (eCall), remote unlock of the vehicle, map synchronisation
between the mobile app and the vehicle as well as remote updates of software inside
the vehicle.
But the Internet is not the only passage to communicate with other entities.
Research and industry introduced the concept of Cooperative Intelligent Transport
Systems (C-ITS) [2] where vehicles use Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) and Vehicle-to-
Infrastructure (V2I) communication to directly communicate with each other in order
to increase trac safety and eciency [3]. This direct communication enables the
vehicles to sense out-of-sight objects, e. g., receive warnings about road conditions
and information about approaching vehicles, and directly cooperate with other
vehicles when, for example, crossing an intersection.
Moving towards automated and even autonomous driving increases the functional
requirements on vehicles to withstand various trac situations in which vehicles may
not be able to completely aware of the situation. In addition, hardware or software
failures may occur and vehicles may be attacked by an individual or organisation.
The challenge when coping with all these situations is that autonomous vehicles
need to make all decisions autonomously without requiring manual intervention by




Contrary to this fast development of new functionality and increased connectivity
in the last two decades caused by the rapid advances in communication and computa-
tion, physical security has long been the centre of security concerns. Discussions on
the necessity of cyber security measures in vehicles accelerated within the research
community thanks to the research done by Koscher et al. [4] and Checkoway et
al. [5] in 2010 respectively 2011.
Outline. This thesis is structured as follows. Part I provides an overview of this thesis
and gives an introduction to security and resilience in automotive systems. Section 1
describes the motivation for this thesis and also highlights the characteristics of the
dierent types of communication and applications found in the domain. Section 2
presents high-level introductions to relevant areas to which this thesis contributes
and Section 3 gives details of the research questions this thesis is addressing and
connects them to the respective chapters. Section 4 provides details about the specic
contributions of this thesis. The overall ndings and contributions are then concluded
in Section 5. Part II and Part III contain the explicit research contributions. Part II
shows our work on dening security demands and ways to support practitioners in
choosing appropriate cyber security and resilience techniques and Part III covers the
design and evaluation of mechanisms that are proposed in this thesis.
1 Motivation
Functions and services for automotive systems can be divided into three types,
namely (i) in-vehicle functions; (ii) cooperative driving functions; and (iii) cloud-
based services. Figure 1 gives an overview of the characteristics of the components
including examples of applications. Focusing on the dierences shows that deploying
security mechanisms is not trivial when considering, for instance, the characteristics
and requirements of the communication in the in-vehicle network and the Vehicular
Ad-hoc NETworks (VANETs).
Considering the aforementioned trends and developments that automotive sys-
tems have or are undergoing highlights that cyber security and resilience measures
have become a necessity to protect drivers, passengers and everyone around this
environment from individuals and organisations with malicious intent.
In-vehicle. The internal network of a single vehicle (in-vehicle network) builds the
foundation for providing core functionalities, starting from being able to manually
drive the vehicle and control exterior lighting to more automated driving functions
such as Cruise Control (CC) and lane keeping, and eventually to reach autonomous
driving functionality. Yet, the vehicle also needs to provide comfort functions to
inform and entertain passengers, control interior lighting and oer connectivity.
The design and development of vehicles have long concentrated on building
safe vehicles and therefore lacked common security practices. The importance and
need for safe vehicles is also reected in the early introduction of crash tests to
evaluate vehicle safety and later with the release of the standard for functional safety
of Electrical and/or Electronic (E/E) systems in road vehicles, ISO 26262 [6]. Hence,
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Figure 1: An overview of an automotive system, examples of involved components,
typical characteristics and applications.
rather than security. A prominent example is the Controller Area Network (CAN)
bus [7] developed in 1983 which is still used in safety-critical segments of the network
in modern vehicles. CAN was not designed with security in mind and therefore
lacks mechanisms to ensure condentiality, integrity, availability, authenticity and
freshness of the network trac [8]. For this reason, the CAN bus has become a
common target of cyber attacks [8–12].
Furthermore, modern vehicles consist of a complex internal network comprising
of up to 150 resource-constrained microcontrollers, so-called Electronic Control
Units (ECUs) [13]. Clearly, not all of these ECUs are powerful enough to perform
cryptographic operations and still full the real-time requirements needed in auto-
motive systems, nor are they all critical for ensuring safety and security. However,
the lack of additional computational resources, limited network bandwidth and the
need for low energy consumption are reasons why well-established solutions for IT
systems may not be usable or have to be adapted for these systems. It also needs to
be noted that more computationally powerful ECUs also produce more heat which
needs to be reected in the hardware design. Besides, the costs for upgrading all
these ECUs for security purposes have a direct impact on the OEM’s revenue. For
these reasons, it is essential to (i) include security assessment and design in the
design process of vehicles and to not add security as an afterthought; and (ii) adapt
techniques to include the key requirements of automotive systems, such as safety
and timing constraints.
The lack of dened cyber security processes for Electrical and/or Electronic (E/E)
systems in vehicles was rst addressed by SAE J3061 [14], theCybersecurity Guidebook
for Cyber-Physical Vehicle Systems, which further led to the joint eort between
5
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SAE and ISO to create a standard for cyber security engineering and management
considering all stages of a vehicle’s lifecycle. ISO/SAE 21434 [15] provides a common
terminology for cyber security engineering and denes the requirements for cyber
security risk assessment as well as requirements spanning all stages from engineering,
production, operation, maintenance and decommissioning. At the time of writing
this thesis ISO 21434 was under development, but has been published in August 2021.
External interfaces to the in-vehicle network. Providing communication to
external entities outside of the vehicle is necessary for many reasons, such as to
provide access for diagnostics, to upgrade rmware, and to enable mobile phones
to connect to the infotainment system via Bluetooth. Researchers [5] have already
shown that attackers do not need to perform physical modications on the vehicle
anymore, as the diagnostic port (OBD-II), Bluetooth interface and CD media player
had vulnerabilities that made it possible to reprogram the rmware of an ECU and
subsequently read and send arbitrary messages on the internal bus. Long distance
communication via cellular networks has also shown to be insuciently secured in
the past [11].
Cooperative driving. V2V and V2I communication, in short Vehicle-to-Everything
(V2X), are seen as an enabling technology for VANETs to increase trac safety by
having vehicles and road infrastructure directly exchange Cooperative Awareness
Messages (CAMs) and Decentralized Environmental Notication Messages (DENMs).
In Europe, this communication and use cases for cooperative driving are dened
by the ETSI ITS committee.1 This type of communication is challenging from a
safety and security perspective as (i) vehicles within a VANET are highly mobile and
may thus communicate only for a few seconds with each other; (ii) messages need
to be cryptographically secured to ensure that the sending entities are authorised
and messages are authentic; and (iii) vehicles may need to react fast upon receiving
messages such as an emergency brake warning.
Today, attack scenarios [16,17] are mainly theoretical or simulated due to the fact
that VANET-enabled vehicles are not yet in serial production. There are, however,
already test sites across Europe investigating V2X communication [18]. Furthermore,
the information from authenticated messages received from legitimate vehicles may
also be incorrect due to inaccurate or faulty sensors, but also due to vehicles misin-
terpreting the current situation. Therefore, it is important to validate the received
information using trust or reputation models [19, 20] which include plausibility
checks for information as well as additional evaluations for specic events (data-
oriented trust) or ratings of a particular vehicle (entity-oriented trust) [21]. The need
for plausibility checks in VANETs is also identied by ETSI ITS TR 102 893 [22].
Cloud-based services. Many comfort functions require support from the server
backend of the OEM. Examples of such services are remote unlock, access to recent
trip statistics and charging status via a smartphone or web application and map/trip
synchronisation. Moreover, over-the-air updates and remote diagnostics are major
improvements for both customers and OEMs because vehicle software can be updated




workshop and remote diagnostics can help to order spare parts or schedule repairs
before being physically examined at the workshop.
Cloud services may also suer from security vulnerabilities on the server-side,
e.g., cross site scripting (XSS) and man-in-the-middle attacks [23–26]. From a security
perspective, remote updates and diagnostics oer new opportunities to identify
anomalies in vehicles and allow OEMs to quickly react to newly found vulnerabilities.
For instance, BMW was able to patch a security vulnerability where 2.2 million
vehicles were updated remotely over the air without the need for their customers to
visit a workshop [23]. In addition to the advantages of fast software deployment, the
data which is stored in the cloud and metadata of the communication can also be
useful for security analysis to identify attacks.
Cyber resilience. With the increasing automation of vehicle driving functions,
connectivity and consequently the potential eects caused by cyber attacks, a new
quality next to reliability, safety and security is needed, namely resilience, the ability
to endure and withstand cyber attacks. Unlike security techniques which typically
focus on detecting and preventing cyber attacks, resilience adds the requirement to
the system to maintain the intended operation, possibly with degraded functionality,
when anomalies like attacks and faults occur [27].
Providing cyber security and resilience to vehicles requires measures for all types
of communication within automotive systems. Only securing the vehicle itself, i. e.,
the communication within the in-vehicle network, is not sucient anymore as new
applications need connectivity to other vehicles and the cloud and thus increase the
attack surface tremendously (as shown by Miller and Valasek [11]). Furthermore,
utilising cryptographic solutions such as message authentication pose dierent
challenges depending on the type of communication used within the automotive
system. For example, cloud to vehicle communication via the Internet may be
implemented using TLS with X.509 certicates, and in contrast, V2V communication
additionally requires solutions for using temporary pseudonym certicates to oer
privacy and mechanisms to revoke them promptly.
2 Background
This section presents a high-level introduction to the focus areas to which this
thesis contributes, namely for Part II: methodologies to dene cyber security re-
quirements (Section 2.1); and the identication and categorisation of methods to
guide practitioners in selecting suitable cyber security and resilience techniques (Sec-
tion 2.2); for Part III: the protection of the in-vehicle communication with focus on
the CAN bus (Section 2.3); and vehicle trust and anomaly detection in VANETs (Sec-
tion 2.4). Figure 2 provides an overview of the thesis structure and refers to the
relevant background sections for each chapter in this thesis.
2.1 Cyber Security Requirements
Cyber security requirements are based on the assessment of the system during the
concept phase as dened in ISO 26262 and ISO 21434. In this section, a simplied
7
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Figure 2: Overview of the structure of this thesis including references to the relevant
background sections.
version of an in-vehicle network is described rst, then automotive-specic methods
for identifying and assessing security threats (TARA) are introduced including ways
for how security requirements are derived and formulated in proposed methods.
Thereafter, eorts to classify security and safety demands and methods to derive
security requirements are presented. This thesis does not propose a new TARA
technique, however, TARA needs to be considered when classifying security demands
and further formulate a mapping to generic security requirements.
The in-vehicle network comprising 100 or more ECUs fulls various driving
and comfort functions. Figure 3 shows the reference architecture developed during
the HoliSec project [28] showing a reduced version of an in-vehicle network of
a modern vehicle with gateways interconnecting various subnets using dierent
network technologies, such as CAN and Ethernet. To highlight the interaction
between various components, the Cruise Control (CC) is briey explained. The CC
function requires the Vehicle ECU to send the target speed to the Engine and Brake
ECUs to maintain the set speed, but also to send this information to the Driver Display
ECU to provide the driver with visual feedback via the dashboard. Given this already
simplied architecture of the in-vehicle network and possible use cases like the CC,
it is evident that a methodology for a threat analysis and risk assessment is required
to design and develop secure systems which consist of more than 100 components
communicating with each other in order to full automated driving functionality.
Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment (TARA). TARA is performed to identify
and evaluate threats to a system and the associated risks. The outcome of a TARA
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Figure 3: HoliSec reference architecture of a connected vehicle [29].
a threat or risk from happening. The automotive cyber security guidebook, i. e.,
SAE J3061 [14], splits TARA into three distinct phases; the threat analysis (threat
identication), risk assessment (threat classication), and risk analysis (threat ranking
based on risk level).
EVITA [30], HEAVENS [31] and SPMT [32] are automotive-specic frameworks
that focus on risk assessment and analysis. These three frameworks provide methods
for evaluating security threats by considering factors about the attack or threat, such
as the required expertise of the attacker, necessary tools, and window of opportunity,
and the impact of the threat, e. g., nancial, safety and privacy impact. The outcome
of such analyses is a classication of the identied threats showing their severity
and likelihood. Yet, the specic aspect they present diers to some degree: EVITA
and SPMT describe the risk of an attack using risk levels whereas HEAVENS results
in security levels describing the required level of protection for each threat/asset
combination. A detailed review of a variety of proposed TARA methods in regards
to the applicability in the automotive context can be found in Macher et al. [33].
Figure 4 illustrates the steps when analysing a system and performing a TARA
which results in a classication in form of levels. The item referred to in this gure
can be a group of ECUs or a single ECU responsible to provide a certain function
in the vehicle, e. g., braking and cruise control. A formal denition of item can be
found in ISO 26262, that is “[a] system or combination of systems [...] that implements
a function or part of a function at vehicle level” [34, p.16]. However, some threat
analysis techniques (e.g., [30, 31]) identify assets, i. e., “anything [with] value to the
organisation” [35], which are subject to security threats.
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Braking Tampering Restricted . . .
Speed Gauge Spoofing Standard . . .









Figure 4: Steps when analysing a system and performing a TARA resulting in a
classication.
Classication of security demands. There exist several dierent cyber security-
related frameworks for the automotive domain [30–32, 36] and standards for other
domains [37, 38] which classify the demands dierently, i. e., the number of levels
they suggest varies. The proposed levels range from four levels (none, low, medium,
high) to up to eight levels depending on the framework in use. It should be also
noted that a classication in levels can be used in a dierent context as well, for
example, the use of levels in Common Criteria [38] and TAL [36]. Common Criteria’s
Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) show the requirements needed to be fullled
when certifying the security of an IT system or product.
In addition to the varying number of risk and security levels in proposed frame-
works, e. g., EVITA [30] (automotive) and IEC 62443 [37] (industrial communication
networks), these two frameworks use a vector consisting of four respectively seven
elements describing the demands for specic risks or security properties. The lack of
consensus shown by the dierences in the way how security frameworks and stan-
dards classify cyber security demands or the implied risk demonstrates that security
is more complex and may need to be adapted for each domain. Safety standards from
the automotive [34], avionics [39] and railway [40] domains on the other hand agree
on having ve levels (including none/QM).
The alignment to the functional safety standard ISO 26262 when structuring
security demands is of particular interest in the automotive domain as it is widely
accepted and implemented in the organisations. Functional safety is dened as the
“absence of unreasonable risk due to hazards caused by malfunctioning behaviour of E/E
systems” [34, p.14]. This, however, is signicantly dierent to cyber security which
deals with intelligent individuals or organisations who can create complicated series
of events that would otherwise never occur at random with the aim to steal private
information, harm drivers and passengers, or disrupt our society.
Deriving security requirements. After assessing and rating the threats to the
automotive system, high-level security requirements or directives need to be dened
for each item respectively asset, aiming at eliminating or reducing the likelihood of
the identied threats to happen.
The recommended method for deriving cyber security requirements based on the
outcome of a TARA varies in each methodology. EVITA [30] and SPMT [32] both
suggest ranking the threats according to their associated risk level and to perform
an attack tree analysis where also the number of appearances of the sub-goals is
considered. Attack trees [41] have the ultimate goal of the attacker in the root node
and sub-goals, which are the necessary steps to achieve this goal, as leaf nodes. As
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for many analyses, it should be noted that the outcome of the attack tree analysis
also strongly depends on the level of detail with which the analysis is conducted.
HEAVENS [31] follows a dierent approach which is similar to ISO 26262 which starts
by dening high-level security requirements for each threat/asset pair and further
denes as part of the development phase technical security requirements followed
by concrete hardware and software security requirements. Clearly, these methods
require much expertise and discussions between the practitioners on how each risk
respectively threat is dealt with.
The vector representation describing the demands for certain risks or security
attributes some frameworks [30, 32] and standards [37, 42] propose, aims at further
assisting practitioners in choosing appropriate countermeasures for threats. NIST
SP 800-53B [43] and IEC 62443 [37] go a step further and map security controls and
mechanisms to security demands/levels. NIST FIPS PUB 199 [42] proposed already in
2004 to organise security demands in security categories, a vector consisting of three
elements, i. e., the security objectives condentiality, integrity and availability, each
describing the impact (none, low, moderate, high). NIST also developed SP 800-53 [44]
which identies security and privacy controls for information systems and organisa-
tions and categorises them in 20 families, for example, access control, and awareness
and training. In SP 800-53B [43] NIST additionally denes four baselines, namely the
privacy baseline and 3 security control baselines (low, moderate, high), which assign
security controls to these baselines. IEC 62443 [37], a network and system security
standard for industrial communication networks, also describes a vector compris-
ing of seven foundational requirements, and denes system requirements for each
foundational requirement by dierentiating between ve security levels including
none. This specic mapping to security requirements supports system architects and
designers already at an early stage, i. e., directly after dening the security demands
such as through TARA, about what requirements need to be implemented to reduce
the likelihood of certain threats.
The concept of bringing such a mapping of security controls to automotive
systems was also investigated by the Connected Vehicle Pilot Deployment Program
Phase 1 [45] project which used the CIA categories and levels from NIST FIPS 199.
However, they do not provide a xed mapping to the security controls dened in
NIST SP 800-53, partly due to the fact that many NIST SP 800-53 controls are on an
organisation-level.
Given the limitations and weaknesses of previous methods, we propose a
structure to describe the security demands for automotive systems. This
classication can be used to present the results of a TARA method such as
HEAVENS (Chapter A). Moreover, we continue with this classication and
identify suitable security requirements and mechanisms based on the pro-




2.2 Cyber Security and Resilience Techniques
Security is often referred to as focusing on the three fundamental attributes, i. e.,
condentiality, integrity and availability, whereas dependability is “the ability to
avoid service failures that are more frequent and more severe than acceptable” [46, p. 13].
Therefore, dependability includes next to safety also other attributes, i. e., availability,
reliability, integrity and maintainability [46]. Laprie [47] further elaborates on the
need in ubiquitous systems to maintain dependability in spite of continuous change,
which leads to the denition of resilience, namely “the persistence of dependability
when facing changes.” [47, p. 1]. From a security perspective, cyber resilience is
often referred to as the ability to withstand attacks, more precisely in the CyReV
project [27] resilience in the automotive context is dened as the “property of a system
with the ability to maintain its intended operation in a dependable and secure way,
possibly with degraded functionality, in the presence of faults and attacks”.
The relationship between resilience, security, dependability and safety is illus-
trated in Figure 5. The authors in [48] further dierentiate between resilience and
scalable resilience respectively long-term dependability and security to highlight that
changes, i. e., technological, functional and environmental, occur over time and thus
require the system to be capable to evolve. This emphasis on long-term needs is also
of signicant importance in the automotive domain, where vehicles are expected to
be operated for several years or even decades. Due to the relation between safety,
security and resilience, we refer to security when referring to techniques that directly
support one of the security attributes and we refer to cyber resilience for techniques











Figure 5: Relation between security, dependability and resilience attributes (adapted
from [48])
Safety and security interplay. The alignment of security and safety techniques
is not only crucial considering the importance of safety in the automotive domain,
it is also important due to the interplay between safety and security techniques.
Evaluating this interplay is not specically addressed in this thesis, but the proposed
methodology is aligned with ISO 26262 in order to ease such assessments during the
concept and development phases. Some techniques, for instance, may complement
each other, e. g., message counters to detect message loss (safety) and message
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counters to detect replay attacks (security). Yet, safety and security mechanisms
may also counteract one another if designed in isolation. For example, hardware
redundancy as a safety feature may be exploited by an attacker as injecting malicious
messages may result in both of the redundant systems believing that the other one
is active. In respect to the interplay of safety and security mechanisms, a review of
common security mechanisms and their implications to safety is provided in [49].
The authors review a selection of mechanisms and evaluate whether the identied
mechanisms have a negative impact on dependability. Out of the 17 mechanisms 3
were identied to have a negative impact, i. e., access control, authentication control
and encryption.
Categorisation. Eorts to identify and categorise security techniques have been
made in various domains, most notably for IT organisations and systems (e. g., [44]).
The common goal of these eorts is to support and guide system architects and
designers in choosing appropriate techniques for the task at hand. A structured way
to present security and resilience mechanisms and techniques is especially important
after dening necessary security (and safety) requirements as a result of a TARA
when generic requirements do not suciently cover the demands.
Techniques can be categorised in many ways. These categories are often based
on the threat or attack they protect against or the security attribute they enforce.
Choosing such a structure is natural when TARA methods already assess the security
demands for specic threat categories such as Microsoft STRIDE [50], which details
six threat types, i. e., spoong, tampering, repudiation, information disclosure, denial
of service, elevation of privilege. When following more exible methods such as
attack tree analysis it may, however, be benecial to provide a more general view on
the techniques suitable for the automotive domain.
Frameworks categorising resilience techniques in particular often identify three or
four strategies, yet emphasise dierent aspects. For example, NIST SP 800-160v2 [51]
proposes a vocabulary for strategies (anticipate, withstand, recover and adapt) and
further describes objectives and techniques to achieve organisation-wide cyber re-
silience. In comparison, Hukerikar and Engelmann [52] include three behavioural
strategy patterns, i. e., fault treatment, recovery and compensation, following a cate-
gorisation based on fault, error, failure whereas Ratasich et al. [48] split resilience
techniques into detection, recovery or mitigation and long-term dependability and
security thus following a categorisation based on the attack progress. Clearly, the
latter two approaches focus on supporting practitioners with a structure for selecting
specic techniques on a system level whereas NIST SP 800-160v2 concentrates on a
broader context, i. e., organization-wide cyber resilience.
With focus on the automotive domain, we identify and categorise security
mechanisms based on an analysis of existing security standards and guidelines
(Chapter B); and propose a taxonomy for resilience techniques as a result
of a literature study (Chapter C). Ultimately, we analyse published attacks
on automotive systems and propose a framework for designing secure and
resilient systems (Chapter D).
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2.3 In-vehicle Communication Security
Protecting the communication of the in-vehicle network from spoong and tam-
pering attacks requires message authentication. Due to the computational and
bandwidth limitations of the in-vehicle network, many solutions for CAN message
authentication have been proposed in literature [53–60]. The focus on CAN message
authentication techniques is due to the limitations and therefore challenges in CAN,
but also due to the fact that CAN is still used in some parts of the in-vehicle network
as it is used to connect legacy systems and it is cheaper compared to Ethernet. This
section gives details about the CAN bus and provides a brief introduction to message
authentication and freshness.
Controller Area Network. CAN was initially developed by Robert Bosch GmbH
in 1983 and later standardised in ISO 11898 [7]. The classical CAN bus allows bit
rates up to 1 Mbit/s and a payload of 8 Bytes, however, adaptations exist that lift
the bandwidth limitation by allowing higher bit rates and larger payload sizes, e.g.,
CAN FD. CAN was not developed with security in mind, CAN itself lacks basic
security concepts, such as condentiality, integrity, availability, authenticity and
non-repudiation: Condentiality cannot be ensured as CAN is a network bus where
all messages are being broadcast and thus received by all entities connected to the
bus. Condentiality in CAN can be only achieved by message encryption on higher
layers. Integrity is only provided by a checksum, which is not sucient for protecting
against attacks. Availability cannot be ensured as connected ECUs cannot be blocked
from transmitting erroneous or high-priority messages. Authenticity is not provided
by CAN since the senders of messages are unknown and able to send messages with
any message identier. Non-repudiation measures are also not included as they are
typically combined with message authentication techniques [8].
A CAN base frame includes a 19 bit header which contains a start-of-frame bit,
an 11 bit identier, 3 control bits and 4 bits to describe the data length of the payload.
The payload consists of up to 8 bytes and is followed by a 15 bit CRC, a delimiter, an
acknowledgement bit and its delimiter and ends with 7 bits end-of-frame (EOF). The
expected data in the payload, e. g., current speed and brake states, is solely described
by the identier eld as the header does not contain any additional information about
the sender of the frame.
Message Authentication Codes. Taking the small payload size of CAN frames
into account it is evident that Message Authentication Codes (MACs) to ensure the
authenticity of messages need to be truncated. Choosing the length of the truncated
MAC depends on the required assurance against guessing attacks. The probability
of a successful guessing attack is 2lenMAC per verication attempt assuming the
attacker randomly chooses a MAC. NIST SP 800-38B [61] describes CMAC, a MAC
algorithm that is based on a symmetric key block cipher. NIST SP 800-38B discusses
the selection of the MAC length in Appendix A.2 and emphasises to take the tradeo
between more robust and thus longer MACs and the performance and storage impact
into account. In general, it can be noted that the necessary length greatly depends
on the verication process, e. g., how often the verication process is allowed to fail
due to a MAC mismatch and the timeframe in which the message is accepted. For
this reason, it may be feasible to reduce the length of the MAC below 64 bit in cases
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when the verication process is monitored by an Intrusion Detection System (IDS)
and the validity of a message is short, e. g., only for a few seconds, as more recent
messages are received.
It also needs to be decided whether to send the truncated MAC either (i) together
with the data in one CAN frame or (ii) send a second CAN frame containing only the
MAC. The former has the disadvantage that legacy ECUs which do not verify the
authenticity of the frame need to be updated as the payload of a specic identier, or
signal, has changed. The latter approach considers this case and ensures that legacy
ECUs do not need to be modied, yet a second identier for each of the dened
frames is needed to link the received MAC to its corresponding data frame. From a
realtime-perspective, the delay caused by the need to wait for the second CAN frame
carrying the MAC needs to be considered as well.
Freshness. Providing freshness for authenticated messages is important in order to
be able to detect and prevent replay attacks. Freshness can be implemented in three
dierent ways; by including (i) a timestamp, (ii) a counter, or (iii) a random nonce in
each message when generating the MAC. Due to the bandwidth limitations of CAN,
it is not feasible to include the entire counter or nonce with each message. Using a
timestamp is in most cases not feasible as there is no synchronised global time due
to bandwidth and ECU resource limitations. Hence, it is necessary to transmit only a
truncated counter value and provide other means for synchronisation of the counter
or nonce in cases an ECU gets out of sync. Most proposed message authentication
solutions [53,54,56–59,62] for the CAN bus focus on aspects such as key distribution,
backwards compatibility, hardware and bandwidth limitations. They do not directly
address the challenge of synchronising freshness counters.
Existing work on providing freshness to authenticated messages either propose
to periodically synchronise the counter [55, 60] (e. g., every 50 ms [55]), follow a
hardware-based approach [63] and thus requiring modications of the CAN trans-
ceiver, or misuse header elds to accommodate a counter [64].
With these limitations in mind, we analyse an existing freshness solution for
authenticated messages (i. e., AUTOSAR SecOC Prole 3) and propose an
extension to overcome these identied limitations (Chapter E).
2.4 Vehicle Trust in VANETs
VANETs consist of vehicles directly communicating with each other (V2V) and to
infrastructure (V2I) like Roadside Units (RSUs). This type of short-range commu-
nication paves the way for new use cases that aim at increasing trac safety and
eciency [65] for two main reasons, (i) vehicles are able to receive information about
objects and warnings which they cannot measure or detect with their own sensors
(detection of out-of-sight objects); and (ii) interact with each other in a cooperative
way to increase trac eciency, such as platooning and cooperative intersections.
This section introduces the two technologies that can be used for V2X communica-
tion and gives a concise overview of trust and reputation models for cooperative
vehicles as well as intrusion detection and the challenges still remaining.
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V2X technologies. There are two distinct technologies for enabling V2X (V2V
and V2I) communication, namely Cooperative-ITS (C-ITS) and Cellular-V2X (C-
V2X). The former is based on IEEE 802.11-2016 OCB mode, previously known as
IEEE 802.11p, and species the access layer for an ad hoc network (VANET) operated
in the 5 GHz frequency band in ETSI ITS-G5 [66]. The upper layers are dened
in ETSI ITS specications in Europe and IEEE 1609 in the US. C-V2X, which is
specied by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP), on the other hand, extends
cellular technologies, i. e., LTE and 5G, to accommodate V2X communication. 3GPP
denes the “traditional” cellular network (Uu) and short-range communication (PC5)
allowing direct communication between vehicles and RSUs. The security aspects of
these specications are reviewed in detail by Yoshizawa and Preneel [67]. In general,
it can be noted that both technologies, C-ITS and C-V2X, rely on the upper layers to
implement security mechanisms to protect the short distance communication.
ETSI TS 102 940 [68] species the security architecture for ITS and links to the rele-
vant specications that describe authentication and condentiality requirements, and
how certicates should be managed and veried in detail. ETSI ITS TR 102 893 [22]
recommends complementing cryptographic measures with additional plausibility
checks to verify that the received information is valid. Such plausibility checks have
been proposed in literature in various ways, often referred to as trust or reputation
models. Such models can be categorised into three groups, namely entity-oriented
trust, data-orient trust and combined trust models [21]. Entity-oriented trust concen-
trates on modelling the trust in the surrounding vehicles. Data-oriented trust focuses
on expressing the trust in certain information, e. g., a slippery road ahead warning
message, received from several vehicles. Combined trust uses a trust model for evalu-
ating the trust in peer vehicles by considering also its peer’s trust evaluation [21].
Vehicle trust. Entity-oriented trust in the context of VANETs can be measured by
participating vehicles through (i) validation of information with their own sensors
or based on a model, and (ii) evaluating the compliance to interaction protocols
and behaviour when performing cooperative actions. The validation of information
in regards to correctness and accuracy is important for the own vehicle, further
named ego vehicle, especially during cooperative scenarios like platooning where
the vehicles need to heavily rely on the reported data. Vehicles can validate this
information either with their own sensors, e. g., camera, radar and lidar, if the vehicle
in question is captured by these sensors or they can rely on a non-linear lter applied
only on the reported information, such as Kalman lters [69] and particle lters [70],
to identify and approximate temporary inaccuracies of the reported information. The
evaluation of the behaviour during cooperative scenarios is also vital for automated
vehicles when making decisions about to what extent they cooperate with a certain
vehicle. Such evaluations can mainly be performed by observing the cooperation of
the vehicle in question with other vehicles and by the ego vehicle after cooperating
with it. Furthermore, the results of such trust assessments can be either binary (trust
or distrust) or more detailed using a trust rating, index or score, e. g., a numerical
value within range [0,1].
Challenges in establishing trust. The challenges in evaluating the trust of vehicles
are for the most part due to the nature of VANETs. Communication in VANETs is
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typically temporary and can last from a few seconds, when a faster vehicle passes the
ego vehicle, to hours, when platooning. Therefore, it is important that entity-oriented
trust can be established quickly after encountering a vehicle. Moreover, a vehicle
has limited resources to compute and store the results of these trust evaluations for
every vehicle it encounters. For this reason, some solutions also propose ways to
share trust evaluations with other vehicles. Examples of such techniques range from
exchanging trust scores in the VANET [71, 72], using the infrastructure respectively
the cloud to request and aggregate trust opinions [73, 74], to using blockchain to
maintain a ledger of reported trust scores [75]. Privacy concerns and the use of
pseudonym certicates which are regularly changed to maintain the privacy of a
driver/vehicle are also challenging for deploying a trust model. For building trust or
request historical trust scores using infrastructure, it is needed to identify the vehicles
and therefore solutions involving certicate authorities who issue the pseudonym
certicates to the vehicles would be needed to receive the correct trust scores. In
addition to the aforementioned challenges, Hussain et al. [20] also identify the need
for incentives for participating in such trust evaluations as well as auditing them.
Trust models. Modelling trust in surrounding vehicles is important for increasing
resilience to inaccuracies in reported information and faults caused by other vehicles,
as automated vehicles can include this information in their decision-making. Trust
evaluations and their resulting trust scores can be used to identify malicious vehi-
cles that drop or manipulate messages they forward or generate, and vehicles that
behave dierently in certain driving situations, e. g., when the road is slippery, or
during cooperative driving scenarios. Many proposed models [71, 73, 76, 77] focus on
identifying malicious behaviour by evaluating the validity of event messages and/or
network behaviour such as message drop rate and packet forward delay. Interested
readers may refer to Hussain et al. [20] for a detailed review of existing trust manage-
ment schemes. Other solutions modelling the vehicle dynamics or validating sensor
data [70,78,79], e. g., by using sensor fusion, concentrate on vehicle driving behaviour
and correctness of the provided sensor information. The information gained from
such solutions is also important from a cyber security and resilience stand since
maliciously behaving vehicles and vehicles experiencing software or hardware faults
may also show an altered, not expected behaviour.
Intrusion detection. The aim of proposed solutions investigating anomalies and
intrusions caused by vehicles in VANETs varies depending on the focus of the re-
search. Trust-centred solutions concentrate on increasing the awareness of automated
and autonomous vehicles in order to increase resilience towards attacks and faults.
Security-focused research concentrating on IDSs on the other hand deals mainly
with detecting attacks and consequently raising an alert. IDSs for VANETs, however,
focus, similar to trust-based solutions, on network-related characteristics and ways
to distribute this knowledge. Sharma and Kaul [80] provide a survey on IDSs in
VANETs and also conclude that many IDSs consider only one or two dierent attacks
and that there is a need for a more generalised IDS which is able to detect a variety
of attacks.
In summary, combining the dierent approaches that evaluate trust in individual
vehicles can potentially enable new ways to detect anomalies caused by attackers or
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random software or hardware faults based on (i) the participation in the VANET as a
routing node (e. g., dropping or forwarding manipulated packets); (ii) the correctness
of information about events (e. g., manipulated or wrong warning messages); (iii) the
accuracy of reported sensor data (e. g., speed, acceleration, geographic location, and
heading); and (iv) the behaviour during cooperative scenarios (e. g., platooning).
We propose a trust model which, in contrast to previous work, combines the
evaluation of the behaviour of surrounding vehicles and their cooperation
with other vehicles (Chapters F and G). Furthermore, we suggest a framework
for identifying anomalies using such a trust evaluation and combine it with
an analysis of cloud data in order to detect such anomalies in a vehicle eet
(Chapter H).
3 Thesis Objectives
This thesis investigates how to design secure automotive systems, i. e., by studying
security and resilience techniques, securing the in-vehicle communication, and by
assessing the information received in the VANET and the behaviour of other vehicles.
By not only focusing on security but also including resilience, we take the capabilities
and needs of future vehicles, which drive autonomously, into account. This thesis
particularly concentrates on the following research questions:
RQ1 How to express security demands and requirements when designing and devel-
oping automotive systems? Can specic security requirements be generalised
to cover basic security needs?
RQ2 What are suitable security and resilience techniques for automotive systems?
How can these techniques be organised to aid practitioners in selecting them?
RQ3 How to protect communication in the in-vehicle network? What are the limi-
tations and design considerations when introducing freshness in authenticated
messages and how can we overcome them?
RQ4 How can deviations from the intended functionality of a vehicle be detected
even when it is compromised and thus unreliable when assessing its own state?
RQ1. Describing the demands for security in form of levels or classes is important
for communicating the overall security needs of an item, i. e., a function, device or a
group of functions, with all parties involved in the design and continued maintenance
of a vehicle. RQ1 also emphasises the need for investigating what this categorisation
should look like and whether specic security requirements can be solely derived
based on this classication. This thesis investigates a structure for representing
security demands in the automotive domain based on a study on existing standards
and frameworks also from other domains. In addition, generic security requirements
and mechanisms have been identied and mapped to the proposed classication.
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RQ2. During the design and development of automotive systems it is of utmost impor-
tance that practitioners are able to choose appropriate techniques and mechanisms to
build systems that withstand and react to attacks accordingly. This thesis addresses
RQ2 from three dierent angles, by focusing rst only on security, then on resilience
techniques and ultimately on combining these techniques in one framework.
RQ3. The freshness of messages is particularly important when protecting against
replay attacks. Identifying that the received message is old and thus not valid
anymore is vital when safety-related signals are exchanged on the internal network,
e.g., sending a previously recorded brake signal could cause serious harm. Hence,
authenticated messages need to include a counter, nonce, or timestamp. Since ECUs
likely do not have a synchronised time, it is necessary to use counter-based solutions.
These solutions, however, have the disadvantage that either the entire counter value
or nonce has to be transmitted with each message or a synchronisation of the message
counter needs to be in place. The work presented in this thesis focuses on the use of
counter synchronisation which works with networks that have already high load
and low bandwidth, such as CAN.
RQ4. Information received via V2V communication is cryptographically secured
by means of message authentication. However, vehicles may provide inaccurate
or faulty information due to internal randomly occurring faults which the vehicle
may not be aware of. Furthermore, the vehicle and its rmware may have been
subject to manipulation by an unauthorised entity, such as the owner, driver, or an
attacker, which causes malicious, unintended or unwanted behaviour. Identifying
such anomalies and attacks is important for resilient vehicles as it allows them to
include this knowledge in their decision-making process and to mitigate and recover
from ongoing attacks.
Based on these research questions, the remaining chapters in this thesis are split
into Part II Generic Security Requirements and Identication of Suitable Techniques
dealing with the identication of security and resilience techniques; and Part III De-
sign and Evaluation of Security and Resilience Techniques presenting specic security
and resilience methods. The mapping of the research questions to the respective
chapters in this thesis is shown in Table 1.
Table 1: Research questions addressed in each chapter.
II. Generic security requirements and
identication of suitable techniques
III. Design and evaluation of
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In brief, Chapter A presents the challenges in the automotive domain and
investigates how security demands and security levels should be structured to allow
a better understanding between dierent entities within and outside the organisation.
Chapters B, C and D each identify suitable mechanisms and techniques to provide
cyber security and/or resilience for vehicles using dierent approaches, which are
(i) an analysis of standards and guidelines, (ii) a literature study and (iii) techniques
based on the analysis of disclosed automotive attacks. Chapter E analyses an
existing solution that provides freshness to authenticated messages to detect replay
attacks and further proposes an extension to overcome the identied limitations
when synchronising the freshness value. Chapter F presents the system architecture
of a cooperative, V2X-enabled vehicle and an overview of the research performed
with it. This architecture is also used in Chapter G to develop a trust model to
enable the automated vehicle to make decisions by including the evaluation of V2V
communication. Chapter H denes a framework for anomaly detection in a eet of
vehicles by combining the peer evaluation using vehicle trust with the subsequent
analysis in the cloud.
4 Thesis Contributions
This thesis contributes to the research questions raised in Section 3 addressing the
needs for security and resilience in automotive systems involving functions using the
in-vehicle network, VANET and the cloud. The structure of the following chapters
of this thesis and the research questions they address are described in Table 1.
4.1 Generic Security Requirements and Identification of Suit-
able Techniques
To identify and subsequently categorise security and resilience techniques, it is
essential to understand the specic challenges in automotive systems and how
security demands in form of security levels can be structured. The identication
and categorisation of security and resilience techniques is needed to allow designers
to choose and make an informed decision from a set of mechanisms applicable to
automotive systems. Chapter A presents a general overview of the challenges in the
automotive domain and how to express and represent security demands. Chapter B
identies generic security requirements and explores how these can be mapped
to security levels resulting from a TARA. In Chapter C, we perform a literature
study and propose a taxonomy for resilience mechanisms for automotive systems.
Chapter D subsequently combines security and resilience mechanisms based on a
detailed analysis of disclosed attacks.
Chapter A: Open Problems when Mapping Automotive Security Levels to
System Requirements [81]
Communicating safety demands and requirements is well established in the automo-
tive domain; mainly due to the broad acceptance of ISO 26262 [6]. Therefore, existing
research has focused on ways how to extend or align these existing methods from the
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safety domain with approaches from the security domain. Methods, e. g., [30, 31, 82],
concentrate on security assessments that are aligned to the Hazard Analysis and Risk
Assessment (HARA), a method to identify and categorise hazards.
This chapter provides an analysis of standards and frameworks for the automo-
tive and other industrial domains concerning their methodology on how security
respectively safety is classied. Describing the security demands in form of classes
or levels is necessary to place an emphasis on the need for security measures for
a certain function or ECU. We begin by highlighting the challenges that the auto-
motive domain faces when designing and developing secure systems. Second, we
study how selected standards and frameworks structure the chosen classier for their
corresponding domain. Third, we propose a structure for automotive security levels
that considers the identied challenges which are specic to the automotive domain.
The structure is a vector consisting of six elements where each element describes the
demands for a specic security attribute, i. e., authenticity, integrity, non-repudiation,
condentiality, availability and authorisation, using 5 levels.
Statement of contributions. This is a joint work with my supervisor Tomas
Olovsson. I contributed as the lead for the idea, performing the analysis and writing
of the manuscript.
Chapter B: Towards a Standardized Mapping from Automotive Security
Levels to Security Mechanisms [83]
Proposed techniques for threat assessment, specically TARA, focus on ways to eval-
uate the risk or need for protection and therefore require to manually derive security
requirements for each item that is being assessed (e. g., [30–32, 82]). Standards and
frameworks from other domains have also looked into identifying suitable security
mechanisms and directly linking them to the security demands in order to provide
designers with the minimal requirements for the item under assessment. Examples
of such mappings are NIST SP 800-53 [44], with focus on information systems, and
IEC 62443 [37] which concentrates on industrial communication networks.
In this work, we continue at the point of having performed a TARA resulting in a
set of Security Levels (SLs) for each identied asset, which can be a function, a vehicle
ECU, or even a network segment. The proposed framework guides designers and
engineers in identifying necessary security mechanisms to be implemented based on
a mapping from SLs to a list of mandatory security mechanisms. We have identied
appropriate security mechanisms suitable for automotive systems and assigned them
to particular SLs to provide a strict rule-set that is required to full basic security de-
mands. This approach allows designers to focus on application-specic requirements,
supports them to identify conicts and dependencies between safety and security
requirements in an early stage of development and provides a common ground when
communicating security requirements between dierent actors involved in the de-
velopment. Furthermore, the framework has been veried together with a vehicle
manufacturer based on a use case showing how this framework can be applied.
Statement of contributions. This is a joint work with my supervisor Tomas




Chapter C: REMIND: A Framework for the Resilient Design of Automotive
Systems [84]
Resilience of automotive systems is required in order to cope with diverse and newly
emerging attacks that make use of the advances in communication and functionality.
Automotive systems need to maintain the intended functionality, even if degraded,
to ensure the safety of the passengers and the surrounding environment. Research
in identifying and categorising resilience techniques has been performed in areas
such as cloud computing [52], fog computing [85] and cyber-physical systems [48].
In this work, we review and analyse scientic literature on resilience techniques,
fault tolerance, and dependability. As a result, we present the REMIND resilience
framework supporting the design of resilient vehicles by (i) identifying techniques for
attack detection, mitigation, recovery and resilience endurance; (ii) organising these
techniques into a taxonomy to guide designers in choosing the needed technique for
the task at hand; (iii) providing guidelines describing how the proposed taxonomy
can be applied against common security threats; and (iv) discussing the trade-os
when implementing techniques identied in REMIND.
Statement of contributions. This is a joint work with the co-authors. I
contributed as the lead for the idea, performed the literature review, was the lead
for designing the taxonomy for resilient techniques (REMIND) and collaborated
with all other authors. Rodi Jolak was primarily responsible for the guidelines for
using REMIND, which are presented in Appendix C.A. Kim Strandberg contributed
particularly to the attack model and asset identication.
Chapter D: Resilient Shield: Reinforcing the Resilience of Vehicles Against
Security Threats [86]
Existing work on securing vehicles focuses on providing frameworks that help
designers and developers in identifying the necessary mechanisms to mitigate various
attack scenarios. Microsoft STRIDE [50], for instance, provides a tool for threat
modelling, HEAVENS [31] supports developers in dening security objectives based
on their proposed TARA and other work, such as Sommer et al. [87] focus on a
taxonomy for attacks against automotive systems.
This chapter combines security and resilience techniques needed in automotive
systems in one framework. For the proposed framework, we apply the SPMT method-
ology on systematically identied attacks in order to derive security guidelines as
well as detailed directives focusing on security and resilience. We further map the
potential threat actors to the assets exposed by each attack and show which security
and resilience techniques can be deployed to mitigate them. The resulting framework,
named Resilient Shield, builds the base for designing secure and resilient systems,
yet allows to be easily extended in the presence of novel attacks.
Statement of contributions. This is a joint work with the main and co-authors.
Kim Strandberg contributed as lead with the idea. My contributions are the shared
eort with the main author to nd and review attacks. I was the lead for the initial
attack assessment, assignment of mitigation techniques and automotive assets. We




4.2 Design and Evaluation of Security and Resilience Techniques
This thesis includes three mechanisms to provide security and resilience for automo-
tive systems. Chapter E investigates the shortcomings of a proposed solution for
counter-based message authentication in the in-vehicle communication and shows
how to overcome them. Chapter F describes the vehicle architecture of a cooperative,
V2X-enabled vehicle and presents the evaluation results when tested in the eld.
Based on this architecture, Chapter G details a trust model which allows automated
vehicles to include the reliability of the information received via V2V communication
in their decision-making. Chapter H takes trust evaluations one step further and
investigates how they can be used in combination with data in the cloud to detect
and identify anomalies in vehicles on a eet level.
Chapter E: Extending AUTOSAR’s Counter-based Solution for Freshness of
Authenticated Messages in Vehicles [88]
To protect against replay attacks, it is needed to ensure that the messages sent on the
network are newly generated. This security property called freshness can be achieved
by adding a timestamp, nonce, or counter when authenticating messages. AUTOSAR,
an open system platform for vehicles, includes two so-called SecOC Proles that
provide freshness; one uses a single counter and the other one, SecOC Prole 3,
describes the structure for a counter and means to synchronise it between ECUs.
The synchronisation of the counter or Freshness Value (FV) is necessary in order to
avoid sending the complete FV with each message as the CAN bus is already highly
utilised. Proposed solutions for counter-based message authentication solutions
designed for the CAN bus either require specic hardware [63], propose periodic
synchronisations [55, 60], misuse other elds in the CAN frame [64], lack details on
how a synchronisation can be achieved [89], or leave the resynchronisation to the
underlying protocol [90].
In this work, we focus on SecOC Prole 3 and analyse its usability and ability to
synchronise the FV. We discuss possible designs and limitations for such a mech-
anism deployed in vehicles and consequently propose an extension that mitigates
the identied shortcomings. Our novel approach allows faster resynchronisation
and requires fewer synchronisation messages to be transmitted. Furthermore, the
proposed extension has been implemented on a testbed and evaluated in terms of
exibility, time for resynchronisation and additional bus load with favourable results.
Statement of contributions. This is a joint work with Christian Sandberg and
my supervisor Tomas Olovsson. I contributed as the lead for the idea, performing
the analysis and writing of the manuscript.
Chapter F: Team Halmstad Approach to Cooperative Driving in the Grand
Cooperative Driving Challenge 2016 [91]
Cooperative driving enables the sensing of out-of-sight objects, e. g., receive road
warnings, and allows vehicles to solve tasks more eciently by interacting with
each other. This work provides an overview of the control and communication
system developed in the course of the Grand Cooperative Driving Challenge 2016
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with the focus on design choices made to full the competition’s requirements, and
post-competition evaluations. The competition particularly focused on evaluating
two scenarios, i. e., a cooperative lane merge due to road work on the left lane, and a
cooperative intersection.
In this chapter, we present our implementation of a Cooperative Adaptive Cruise
Control (CACC), our solution for communication and logging, and our approach for
high-level decision making.
Statement of contributions. This is a joint work with all authors. I contributed
with the design and implementation of the perception and sensor fusion module and
the trust system and equally contributed with two other authors in the design and
implementation of the high-level system control. In addition, I contributed to the
design of the vehicle architecture.
Chapter G: Modelling the Level of Trust in a Cooperative Automated Vehicle
Control System [92]
Cooperative scenarios can increase safety and can lead to an increased eciency
in power or fuel consumption, e. g., when platooning [3]. Relying completely on
cryptographic solutions that provide authenticity, integrity and, when needed, con-
dentiality, however, is not sucient when processing information received from
other vehicles. It is required to ensure that the received information is reliable, as
the safety of the passengers is at risk. The need for a trust-based evaluation for
decision-making has been also identied in literature [20, 21].
In this chapter, we explore and propose how to include trust or the reputation
of other vehicles in the decision-making process of an automated vehicle when
performing cooperative actions. We present a trust model which includes four trust
scores or indices in its decision-making, namely the trust (i) in the ego vehicle,
(ii) in the vehicle in front, (iii) in surrounding vehicles and (iv) in the environment.
Furthermore, we demonstrate how and why the trust indices change using data of
real V2V interactions from the Grand Cooperative Driving Challenge (GCDC) 2016.
Statement of contributions. This is a joint work with my Master thesis super-
visor Cristofer Englund. We contributed equally to the idea and I was lead for the
design and implementation of the trust system and writing of the manuscript.
Chapter H: V2C: A Trust-Based Vehicle to Cloud Anomaly Detection Frame-
work for Automotive Systems [93]
Vehicle trust is primarily proposed in literature to overcome the diculty of rely-
ing on information received via V2V communication when interacting with other
automated vehicles. Related work also identied the potential of vehicle trust in
combination with intrusion detection, however, these solutions are either focusing
on collaborating with trusted vehicles and including the results in the own vehicle’s
decision-making [94] or only consider packet header information in their intrusion
detection system [95, 96].
This chapter proposes an anomaly detection framework that utilises the trust
scores computed by individual vehicles based on V2V interactions by combining
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them with a subsequent analysis in the cloud. The presented V2C Anomaly Detection
framework consists of four modules dividing the tasks into (i) individual assessments
of neighbouring vehicles resulting in a trust score; (ii) aggregation of these individual
assessments to one trust score per vehicle; (iii) detection of anomalies or changes in
the trust score over time; (iv) further analysis using data available in the cloud to also
detect similar anomalies in a vehicle eet. The advantage of using trust evaluations
for detecting anomalies is twofold. First, these vehicle assessments are, unlike IDSs,
performed by other vehicles and not by the system itself which is important because
the vehicle itself may not be aware of the fault or the IDS may also be compromised.
Second, this framework is scalable as the computational costs for observing the
trust score for each vehicle and triggering a detailed analysis only when changes
in the score are detected, requires less resources than triggering a comprehensive
analysis with each newly uploaded event to the cloud. For each module comprising
this framework we dene their requirements, show how the identied threats can
be detected, provide detailed discussions about suitable techniques and propose
modications if necessary. Furthermore, we identify attack scenarios which such a
framework can detect and discuss its applicability in a detailed discussion based on a
use case.
Statement of contributions. This is a joint work with my supervisors Tomas
Olovsson and Magnus Almgren. I contributed as the lead for the idea, development
of the framework and writing of the manuscript.
5 Conclusion
Cyber security and resilience have become a necessity for automated vehicles as
their capabilities and connectivity increased tremendously in the past years making
them attractive targets for attackers due to their inuence on our society and the
data they produce. This thesis concentrates on several aspects necessary to secure
these vehicles, i. e., guide practitioners to derive requirements and choose appropri-
ate techniques, and help with the design of specic techniques suited for vehicles.
Furthermore, by expanding our research to include also cyber resilience adds the
emphasis that systems need to be able to recongure and recover by themselves in
the presence of faults and attacks. The following are the main contributions of this
thesis with respect to the research questions dened in Section 3.
Chapters A, B, C and D focus on how to dene generic requirements and the
identication of suitable techniques and thereby contribute to RQ1 and RQ2. In
detail, Chapter A explores the unique challenges when securing vehicles and how
security demands should be structured in order to provide practitioners from dierent
organisations with a common language for describing security needs. Chapter B
continues with using the proposed structure for classifying security demands in form
of security levels, identies generic security requirements and suggests a mapping
based on these demands. Chapter C provides a taxonomy for resilience techniques
and performs a literature study to identify techniques suitable for the automotive
domain. Chapter D analyses disclosed attacks on vehicles to aid practitioners in
selecting resilience and security techniques based on automotive assets.
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Chapters E, F, G and H concentrate on the design and evaluation of specic
security or resilience techniques, i. e., RQ3 and RQ4. Chapter E concentrates on
securing the in-vehicle communication by extending an existing freshness mechanism
for authenticated messages to allow more exibility and a faster resynchronisation
when only truncated freshness values are exchanged. Chapter F describes the
system architecture of an experimental cooperative vehicle which is further used
in Chapter G to evaluate the proposed trust model which is applied to the vehicle
itself and the vehicles it interacts with to improve resilience when driving. ChapterH
presents a framework making use of vehicle trust, which is based on evaluating
the communication and interaction with other vehicles, to detect anomalies and
consequently trigger an analysis in the cloud using also the available cloud data in
order to (i) nd vehicles in the eet with similar behaviour; and (ii) to identify the
cause of the anomaly which can be a failure or an attack.
Interesting challenges and research questions as future work include further
investigations on how to design and develop resilient vehicles. Cyber resilience
in the automotive context is particularly interesting as it requires an even closer
integration of security and safety as well as challenges involving the evolvability of
a system and its self-awareness.
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Open Problems when Map-
ping Automotive Security Lev-
els to System Requirements
Adapted version that appeared in VEHITS 2018
T. Rosenstaer, T. Olovsson
Abstract. Securing the vehicle has become an important matter in theautomotive industry. The communication of vehicles increases, they com-
municate with each other and to the infrastructure, they will be remotely diag-
nosed and provide the users with third-party applications. Given these areas
of application, it is evident that a security standard for the automotive domain
that considers security from the beginning of the development phase to the
operational and maintenance phases is needed. Proposed security models in
the automotive domain describe how to derive dierent security levels that
indicate the demand on security, but do not further provide methods that map
these levels to predened system requirements nor security mechanisms. We
continue at this point and describe open problems that need to be addressed in a
prospective security framework for the automotive domain. Based on a study of
several safety and security standards from other areas as well as suggested auto-
motive security models, we propose an appropriate representation of security
levels which is similar to, and will work in parallel with traditional safety, and
a method to perform the mapping to a set of predened system requirements,
design rules and security mechanisms.

Open Problems when Mapping
Automotive Security Levels to System
Requirements
1 Introduction
New technologies and functionalities are constantly introduced to vehicles. Vehicle-
to-Vehicle (V2V) and Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I) communication enables vehicles
to share information with each other and send warnings, e. g., about roadworks and
trac jams. Remote diagnostics is performed by vehicle manufacturers and licensed
repair shops, and platforms for third-party applications in vehicles are also provided.
As a consequence of this ongoing transition, a security standard is crucial in order to
secure vehicles against modications, hacks, and espionage.
The exposure of serious vulnerabilities underlines the need for security in the au-
tomotive domain. The attack surface of modern vehicles was analysed by [Checkoway
et al., 2011] and they demonstrated vulnerabilities in the Tire-Pressure Monitoring
System, media-player, OBD-II port, and Bluetooth. Furthermore, [Miller and Valasek,
2014] provide a survey of attack surfaces of several vehicle models and [Yan, 2015]
presents vulnerabilities in connected vehicles using dierent attack vectors.
A systematic approach dealing with the aforementioned security threats is neces-
sary, and in addition, an automotive security standard is needed to harmonise the
hardware and software security requirements between the vehicle manufacturers and
the suppliers. This becomes evident when vehicle manufacturers get more dependent
on their suppliers since the complexity of third-party modules is increasing and the
modules are required to be reliable and secure. A security framework which also
contains a mapping to system requirements and design rules containing guidelines
describing how these demands can be fullled, increases the eciency during the
development and testing due to the xed structure and guidance, as well.
The need for such a security standard has also been identied by the industry,
which initiated the ISO/SAE AWI 21434 Road Vehicles – Cybersecurity engineering.
This work item is ongoing and currently under development. Proposed security
models, such as EVITA [Henniger et al., 2009] and HEAVENS [Islam et al., 2016],
describe methods from identifying threats to classifying them into security levels.
Both models focus on the identication of risks and threats, and how to classify them.
HEAVENS describes methods to derive application specic requirements, but does
not perform a mapping to predened requirements nor security mechanisms that
are required for each security level. EVITA on the other hand lists the results of
their risk analysis in [Ruddle et al., 2009], but does not provide a mapping to generic
security requirements based on the security level.
Information security is concerned with condentiality, integrity and availabil-
ity, which will be later extended according to STRIDE [ISO 15408, 2009, Microsoft
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Corporation, 2005]. We dene security levels similar to [Islam et al., 2016]. Security
levels represent the necessity and extent for security measures in a specic function
or module. The factors taken into account when deriving the security levels depend
on the underlying security model that considers the severity of potential attacks,
required expertise to perform the attack, or the impact for the involved parties in case
of the attack. We split security requirements in two groups, system requirements
and application specic requirements. System requirements are generic security
requirements that need to be fullled for a certain security level and describe design
rules or security functions. Application specic requirements are the result of a
threat analysis and include individual requirements that are not covered by system
requirements. Security mechanisms are methods to full a requirement, for instance
the choice of encryption algorithms to provide condentiality of information, or use
of access control lists to restrict the data ow in the in-vehicle network.
In this paper, we survey proposed security models and acclaimed standards in
the area of safety and security, we investigate how these standards or models classify
safety and security, and how they perform the transition to system requirements.
Our contributions in this paper are the following:
• A study on safety and security standards, along with proposed security models
for the automotive domain.
• Propose methods for how to move forward from unique requirements of
individual systems and identied security levels to a set of mandatory system
requirements, design rules and security mechanisms and
• show that such requirements should be based on the security level of the
function to be implemented.
• We show the benets with having such a framework in place when dealing
with third-party developed functionality.
• We show the challenges and complexity of dening such a framework.
2 Background and Related Work
The dierence between safety and security is that safety is about handling malfunc-
tioning behaviour that is caused by random errors. Security threats are caused by
an attacker who intentionally wants to modify the system, harm involved people,
or gather information. It may be also the case that the owner, who has physical
access and unlimited time, slips in the role of an attacker in order to perform unau-
thorised modications on the vehicle. The skills of attackers may vary from limited
to advanced depending on his knowledge, purpose, and equipment. For these rea-
sons, security involves complex countermeasures. An attacker who has successfully
exploited a vulnerability of one vehicle is able to apply the same method to all vehi-
cles of that specic model or even to all vehicles of that manufacturer or supplier
depending on the kind of vulnerability [SAE J3061, 2016].
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The large attack surface in vehicular security is another dierence to safety.
Performing Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment (HARA) on functional safety
requires a narrower focus compared to assessing the security of a system. The
security assessment of a system requires one to cope with a larger attack surface. For
instance, a vehicle that is able to communicate with its infrastructure and cooperate
with other vehicles can not only be attacked locally, it can be attacked through this
communication channel as well. Moreover, vehicles have Internet access which
additionally increases the attack surface. Having a built-in mobile communication
unit also enables attacks via SMS and other phone services. In addition to the wireless
communication, Checkoway et al. showed other attack vectors, such as an attack
through the media-player [ENISA, 2016, Checkoway et al., 2011].
Looking at the dierent areas shows that safety has been adapted to the specic
needs for this area. [ISO 26262, 2011] is the standard for functional safety of road
vehicles, [RTCA DO-178, 2011] and [RCTA DO-254, 2000] (software and hardware)
are customised for the aeronautics domain, and the railway domain is described in
CENELEC EN 50126, CENELEC EN 50128, and CENELEC EN 50128. [Blanquart et al.,
2012] perform a comparison of the criticality categories across safety standards in
dierent domains, including the aforementioned standards and the corresponding
safety standards for nuclear facilities and space systems. They highlight how these
domains dier from each other in terms of structure and guidance throughout the
development process.
Security standards exist in many areas, such as programming, industrial automa-
tion, and system and device security. The [SEI CERT C, 2016] Coding Standard, for
instance, denes rules for specic programming languages, in this case for C, and
uses a classication in levels to indicate the impact of not addressing a certain rule.
SEI CERT C shows how certain programming traits have to be implemented in order
to be reliable, secure and safe. By following these rules, undened behaviour that
may lead to vulnerabilities will to a large extent be eliminated. The standard ranks
each rule with an example and its priority and level. A combination of severity,
likelihood and remediation costs results in such a level ranging from 1 to 3. The
priorities are directly mapped to the levels.
[NIST SP 800-53r4, 2013] is a catalogue of security controls and assessment
procedures for information systems. The security controls are split in 18 families,
such as Access Control, Incident Response, and Identication and Authentication.
Consequently, each family comprises security controls mapped to priority and impact
levels (low, medium, high). Security controls are nested, the lowest priority level has
to be implemented rst and controls with higher priority have to be implemented in
addition to the controls with a lower priority level.
Security models for the automotive domain have been proposed by various
researchers. [Burton et al., 2012] suggest a method that extends ISO 26262 with
security analysis. A combined safety and security development lifecycle is presented
by Schmittner et al. in [Schmittner and Ma, 2014] and [Schmittner et al., 2015].
Burton et al. and Schmittner et al. both focus on the dierences between safety and
security and how to combine them, but they do not discuss how predened system
requirements or design rules for security can be dened. Common Criteria [ISO
15408, 2009] is a standard for evaluating security properties of systems and devices.
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The similarities of ISO 26262 and Common Criteria are discussed in [Schmittner and
Ma, 2014]. The authors describe the relationship between the Automotive Safety
Integrity Levels (ASILs) from ISO 26262 and the Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs)
from Common Criteria according to the strictness and degree of formalism. The
SAHARA method presented by [Macher et al., 2015] combines the existing HARA
known from ISO 26262 with a security assessing method considering the needed
resources and know-how. Macher et al. do not describe a method to derive system
requirements based on the resulting security level. The EVITA [Henniger et al., 2009]
and HEAVENS [Islam et al., 2016] models describe the procedure on how to derive
security levels and how these can be used for requirement engineering, however,
they do not perform a mapping to system requirements as we propose.
Guidelines for cybersecurity with respect to the automotive domain are [SAE
J3061, 2016] and [ENISA, 2016]. Both guidelines provide good practice examples
and recommendations, whereas ENISA limits the scope by excluding autonomous
vehicles and V2V communication in their guideline. Another dierence is that J3061
sets the focus on the necessary processes and their implementation, while ENISA
describes the typical architecture of smart vehicles and possible threats and attacks.
J3061 lists Threat, Vulnerabilities, and implementation Risks Analysis (TVRA), which
is a threat and risk assessment method developed by ETSI in TS 102 165-1 [ETSI, TS,
2011]. According to J3061, this model is not suited for control and data networks of
vehicles, as it was developed specically for telecommunications networks. These
two guidelines for cybersecurity address important subjects, but do not discuss
methods for mapping to system requirements nor mechanisms.
3 The Complexity in Automotive Security
Lifetime. The automotive domain diers in many ways from other areas. A vehicle
has a lifetime of about 150.000 to 300.000 km [Hawkins et al., 2012]. During this
time, the vehicle has to be safe, secure, rmware needs to be updated, the owner may
change, and vehicle parts or modules need to be replaced. Discovering a security
vulnerability in the vehicle requires a fast reaction and update distribution to the
vehicles. Once a severe security problem has been identied, over-the-air updates
provide ecient means for distribution as they are much faster than a recall of a
certain vehicle model or vehicles with a specic component from a supplier. In
addition, over-the-air updates are needed because security requirements 20 years
from now are likely to be dierent from what is designed today, since the expected
lifetime from design of security functionality to the expected end of the vehicle
lifetime can be as much as 20 – 25 years.
Interplay between safety and security. The safety of the passengers has to be
retained in all situations. Fault detection mechanisms have to be designed in such a
way that they cannot be exploited by an attacker. For example, the use of redundant
modules for increased safety, may open up for attacks where both modules believe
the other one is active while it is the attacker who sends the messages.
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Compliance to standards. One specic challenge for heavy duty vehicles is the
required compliance to [SAE J1939, 2013]. This standard species the exact content
of frames that have to be transmitted within the in-vehicle network. To comply, the
frames may not be changed and thus encryption mechanisms may not be used. This
restriction limits the set of suitable security mechanisms.
Compliance between manufacturers and suppliers. The suppliers will provide
modules with more functionalities and may also need to maintain the security of their
products. Manufacturers integrate software, and hardware modules from third-party
developers and in-house developed modules into a vehicle and thus need to ensure
the security and safety of all modules individually and combined. A well-dened
framework with strict system requirements for security functions and mechanisms to
be used, would simplify the requirement specications and communications between
these two parties.
Maintenance. Authorised workshops need to be able to diagnose the vehicle and
replace modules in case of a failure. For this reason, they need to, for instance, be
able to handle the change of security keys in an oine and online environment.
Authorised devices may also need to be revoked in case of theft.
Alignment with ISO 26262. The harmonisation/alignment with the functional
safety standard for road vehicles [ISO 26262, 2011] is important when introducing
a new framework for automotive security. ISO 26262 has a high acceptance in the
automotive domain and would, for this reason, signicantly reduce the time required
for introducing such a security framework, because of the already known processes.
The question is to which extent it should be harmonised. Strong harmonisation has
the advantage of easier integration due to known processes, but it may not be ideal
for security due to the fundamental dierences to safety.
Guidance. The necessary level of guidance has to be dened. Providing a strict
guidance for each requirement may not be feasible or optimal for certain cases. The
developers may, for certain security requirements, nd other countermeasures that
are more suitable. On the other hand, sparse guidance leads to overhead when
evaluating security of third-party components and individual solutions may not
correspond to best practices.
We address these problems by investigating how standards and other security
models handle guidance and propose a method able to cope with the problems listed
above.
4 Standards and Models
In this section, we describe standards, models, and approaches that inuence the
design of safety and security by assigning levels according to a dened scheme. They
are all well-known and accepted in their domain or applicable for the automotive
area. The insights into how these standards allocate safety or security levels and
how they perform the mapping to requirements are further used for our suggested
framework. The related standards and models being described in detail are [ISO
26262, 2011], [RTCA DO-178, 2011], EVITA [Henniger et al., 2009], HEAVENS [Islam
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et al., 2016], Trust Assurance Levels [Kiening et al., 2013], and [IEC 62443, 2013].
First, we describe the purpose of the standards and models followed by a discus-
sion on the number of levels their analysis results in. Next, we discuss the impact
of the levels in the design and development of the system and investigate how the
standards or models address the relation between requirements and allocated levels.
Do they provide strict information about the requirements necessary for each level or
is the mapping between the allocated levels and the requirements without guidance?
4.1 Safety Standards
ISO 26262 applies HARA for a system without safety measures by taking the severity,
exposure, and the controllability into account. A hazard is dened by ISO 26262
as malfunctioning behaviour that potentially causes harm. After identifying the
levels for each class, such as severity and controllability, they are mapped according
to a predened matrix to the ASIL levels. The ASIL levels comprise QM , A, B, C,
and D , where QM corresponds to Quality Management, i.e., a non-safety relevant
event which does not require any further safety consideration in the design and
development of the system. Events classied as ASIL D, the highest level, require
the highest demand regarding risk reduction. In case a system failure causes several
hazards, the highest occurring ASIL rating has to be applied [ISO 26262, 2011].
Next, a safety goal is dened for each hazardous event. The safety goals are subse-
quently associated with a functional safety concept, which states how the safety goal
can be achieved. The next step is to formulate a technical safety concept describing
how the functionality is going to be implemented by hardware and software on the
system level. The software and hardware safety requirements describe the specic
requirements, which will be implemented. The requirements inherit their ASIL level
from their safety goal respectively their parent requirement [ISO 26262, 2011].
ISO 26262 provides guidelines and requirements for each level on system, hard-
ware, software, production, and operation level. In addition to the specied require-
ments for each ASIL level, this standard also provides three levels of recommenda-
tions, no recommendation (◦), recommended (+), and highly recommended (++).
The method independent parallel redundancy as a mechanism for error handling at
the software architectural level is recommended for ASIL C and highly recommended
for ASIL D [ISO 26262, 2011].
DO-178 is the safety standard for the aeronautics domain, its categories are called
Development Assurance Levels (DAL). The DALs are representing the eects of
a failure condition, e. g., catastrophic or hazardous. The ve DALs range from A,
the most demanding level, to E, which is the equivalent to ASIL QM . A top-level
function is mapped to the Function DAL (FDAL) according to a table that associates
the failure condition class and the quantitative safety requirement (failures per hour)
with the DAL. These top-level functions are decomposed to sub-functions, which are
further decomposed to items. It may be the case that a top-level function is divided
into more than one sub-function, where one of the sub-functions has a lower or the
same DAL as the top-level function. DO-178 also provides guidance, but not to the
same extent as ISO 26262 [Blanquart et al., 2012, RTCA DO-178, 2011, RCTA DO-254,
2000].
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4.2 Security Models in the automotive domain
The HEAVENS and EVITA projects dene models to derive security levels. [Henniger
et al., 2009] describe a model developed in the EVITA project. [Islam et al., 2016]
propose an ISO 26262 compliant model as part of the HEAVENS project. Both models
specify how to identify threats and classify them into security levels.
Henniger et al. use attack trees based on use cases as base for the following
requirements analysis. The root of the attack tree is the goal of the attack. The
sub-levels contain sub-goals that can lead to the goal of the parent node.
A risk assessment is performed for each potential attack. The mapping of the three
components, severity (vector), probability of a successful attack, and controllability,
is derived from a predened table which leads to a security risk level. This level is
not associated to a single value, it is a 4-component vector describing the security
risk level for the elements of the severity vector. The levels for each element are in
the range [0,7], where 0 represents no risk and 6 the highest risk. Level 7 and 7+ are
used for safety-critical threats with controllability C ≥ 3 and severity high [Henniger
et al., 2009].
The authors further discuss how the security risk levels can be used to prioritise
security requirements. Requirements resulting from the developed use cases and risk
assessment are listed in [Ruddle et al., 2009]. Henniger et al. highlight that not only
the highest rating should be considered, the number of occurrences in the attack
trees has to be considered as well. A lower risk that is seen in several attack trees
may have the same importance as a level 5 or higher risk that appears only once in
the attack tree [Henniger et al., 2009].
The HEAVENS risk assessment model suggested by Islam et al. describes the
workow for identifying assets and threats (threat analysis), and a method describ-
ing how to perform the risk assessment. Islam et al. apply Microsoft’s STRIDE
model [Microsoft Corporation, 2005] to identify the asset/threat pairs.
The result of the risk assessment is the security level, which is a combination of
the threat level and the impact level. The levels for the resulting security level areQM ,
low, medium, high, critical. Islam et al. highlight the parallels to ISO 26262. The
functional safety requirements derived from the safety goals in ISO 26262 have the
same property as the high-level security requirements originating in the asset/threat
pair and their corresponding security level. Both are high-level requirements that
are independent from the implementation. These requirements are consequently
divided into technical security requirements on system level, which further result in
hardware and software security requirements.
4.3 Trust Assurance Levels for V2X communication
The purpose of the Trust Assurance Levels is to classify the security of Vehicle-to-
Everything (V2X) communication nodes. [Kiening et al., 2013] provide the minimum
requirements for each Trust Assurance Level (TAL) and discuss the benets of cer-
tifying V2X nodes and how to perform the verication of security. The mapping
of the TAL is performed according to a predened table. This table contains the
minimum requirements and a description of security implications for each level.
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The proposed levels are nested and range from 0 to 4. A node with TAL 0 does not
have any security measures. With an increasing TAL, the core V2X communication
modules and other relevant modules of the node need to be secured. For instance,
TAL 4 requires all involved modules to be protected. Moreover, the authors map the
TALs to the EALs of Common Criteria [Kiening et al., 2013].
4.4 Cyber Security Standard - IEC 62443
[IEC 62443, 2013] is a group of security standards for Industrial Automation and
Control Systems. Part 3 describes the system security requirements and security
levels. The security levels range from 0 to 4 and are further split into Target Security
Levels (SL-T), Achieved SLs (SL-A), and Capability SLs (SL-C). A security level of 0
corresponds to no specic requirements for security and level 4 implies the highest
demand on security. SL-T is derived from a consequence analysis of a particular
system, called zone, and describes the desired security level. During the iterative
design phase SL-A and SL-T are compared with each other after every cycle. Compo-
nents and systems need to provide the SL-C that indicates its capability in regards
to the dened security levels. In case that SL-C does not meet the required SL-T,
compensating countermeasures have to be implemented [IEC 62443, 2013].
The high-level requirements are named Foundational Requirements (FRs) and
consist of seven elements, e. g., system integrity, data condentiality, and use control.
These FRs are consequently broken down into System Requirements (SRs) and Re-
quirement Enhancements (REs). The security level for a specic zone or component
does not consist of a single value, it is a 7-component vector describing the security
level for each FR. A table in [IEC 62443, 2013] maps the SRs and REs to the security
level of each FR.
Equation A.1 shows the composition of the Security Levels (SLs) in IEC 62443.
Each component listed in this vector refers to a FR. An example shown in IEC
62443-3-3 is the SL-T of a basic process control system zone. It is specied that this
zone requires a SL of 3 for the FRs Restricted data ow and Resource availability. In
contrast, measures to provide Data condentiality are not required, as the SL is 0.
Table A.1 provides an overview of the reviewed standards and models. It high-
lights the dierences between safety and security. Functional safety standards have
ve dierent levels whereas the automotive security models, such as EVITA and
HEAVENS, use a more complex representation of security or risk levels. IEC 62443,
developed for the security of industrial automation and control systems, classies
security as a 7-component vector with a range of ve levels for each element and
diers compared to ISO 26262 with respect to how it relates the SLs to requirements.
SL =
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5. Proposed Security Levels and Mapping
Table A.1: Overview of the reviewed standards in respect to their classication
approach.
Standard/Framework Area # Levels Vector size Predef. SRs
ISO 26262 Safety 5 1 ( )a
DO-178 Safety 5 1 –
IEC 62443 Security 5 7
TAL Security 5 1
EVITA Security 8 4 –
HEAVENS Security 5 1b –
a ISO 26262 provides recommendations for specic methods depending on the SL.
b HEAVENS associates each threat/asset pair with a SL.
5 Proposed Security Levels and Mapping
Our previous discussion about the problems of implementing security in vehicular
systems followed by a survey of standards and models, are the base for the following
suggestion for the number and representation of security levels, and the mapping
to system requirements, design rules and security mechanisms. Investigating how
established standards and proposed security models dene a classication in form of
Security Levels (SLs) is important for suggesting an automotive security framework.
Additionally, we discuss how to evaluate or even certify the security compliance
of a module, and how well our proposed framework is aligned with ISO 26262. We
want to highlight that the suggested solutions are a proposal based on the review
of several standards and models from safety or other security domains and should
provide a recommendation to future research.
5.1 Number of Security Levels
The decision on the number of SLs and the mapping to system requirements strongly
depends on the underlying model for risk/threat assessment. Models dier in their
composition and weights for parameters, such as expertise to perform the attack,
opportunity, and impact level.
Both functional safety standards, ISO 26262 and DO-178, use ve levels to classify
safety, but security models propose dierent solutions. The TALs with the focus
on V2X communication security use ve levels. Two automotive security models
propose a more complex classication of security or risk levels. EVITA focusses on
the risk of security relevant attacks by representing the risk as a 4-component vector
and HEAVENS associates the SLs with a specic asset/threat pair.
Following the HEAVENS approach by using its classication of SLs leads to one
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level in the range of 0 to 4 for each threat/asset pair, meaning that the threat violat-
ing condentiality of an individual asset ranges between these levels. Continuing
with dening high-level requirements and technical security requirements for each
threat/asset pair would only result in more overhead. Instead, we recommend the
use of system requirements, which describe the necessary security measures for each
type of threat and security attribute and thus provide the developer already with
necessary requirements that need to be fullled depending on the SL.
The classication of SLs needs to provide sucient categories to have a distinct
separation of the required security measures. Having a wide range of SLs may lead
to an overly detailed guidance, which may be inecient due to the high granularity
of requirements and the diculty to distinguish between the SLs.
Since security needs to address many dierent aspects or attributes, such as the
authenticity of messages and their origin, system integrity, and data condentiality, it
is reasonable to use a vector dening the SL for each component representing one of
these areas. The SL of each component is in the range of 0 to 4. Such an approach is
described in IEC 62443 and seems to be appropriate for the automotive domain as well,
as the representation as a single value may lead to imbalanced security measures. For
certain modules or subsystems, it might be necessary to provide data condentiality,
whereas data integrity might be of greatest importance for many other subsystems,
hence, it is beneting to distinguish between such attributes and assign them SLs
individually. In addition, a vector representation eases the communication between
the parties, as a vector already combines the demanded level of security for each
attribute.
Furthermore, we suggest to distinguish between target, achieved and capability
SL, as described in IEC 61442. Modules provided by suppliers, or in-house developed
modules should be classied according to their security capability (SL-C). This may
lead to a more ecient reuse of developed modules, as they are clearly marked with
the SL they are capable of. This approach also simplies the design of the system,
since modules and systems can be labelled with their target SL (SL-T) that states the
necessary system requirements and design rules.
Describing security as a vector instead of a single value is dierent to ISO 26262,
nevertheless, we believe that it is unavoidable to present security as a structure de-
scribing several attributes. As an example, SL(auth.) = 1 may require a verication
of the new rmware when performing an upgrade, whereas SL(auth.) = 3 may
require a rmware verication at every start-up and SL(auth.) = 4 may addition-
ally require the authenticity of messages sent and received within this particular
subsystem. IEC 62443 and other security models also use a vector or other similar
approaches and thus support our choice.
5.2 Mapping to Security Requirements and Mechanisms
There are dierent ways to map SLs to system requirements and security mechanisms.
One option is to perform a binary mapping of the SLs, e. g., a system requirement has
to or does not have to be fullled. An alternative is the introduction of recommenda-
tions in combination to the binary mapping, which is a closer approach to ISO 26262.
The presentation of the requirements for certain SLs, is another important aspect.
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Table A.2: Binary mapping of security levels to system requirements and require-
ment enhancements.
FR 1 0 1 2 3 4
none low medium high critical
SR 1 • • • •
SR 2 • • •
RE 2.1 • •
RE 2.2 •
SR 3 • • •
. . .
ISO 26262 lists the requirements and recommendations in separate documents,
e. g., description for system, hardware and software level. IEC 62443 on the other
hand provides a compact overview of the required security measures. The System
Requirements (SRs) and Requirement Enhancements (REs) of a Foundational Re-
quirement (FR) are mapped to the SLs. The demands for fullling a SL of a FR is
reected in the required SRs and REs. For lower levels, it is sucient to only full
a few requirements, but in order to provide the highest SL, one must full all SRs
and REs. This way, it is ensured that also modules or subsystems with lower SLs
provide basic methods to ensure a specic security attribute. Table A.2 illustrates the
structure of this approach. It shows which SRs and REs of FR 1 are required for each
SL. For instance, SL 1 requires only SR 1, whereas SL 2 requires SR 1, SR 2, and SR 3.
Higher levels demand also the RE 2.1 respectively RE 2.1 and RE 2.2.
The FRs and their associated SRs and REs shown in Table A.2 still need to be
dened. One approach is to use the FRs of IEC 62443 (see Equation A.1) as a base and
adjust the SRs and REs by incorporating automotive specic requirements which are
described in Section 3, e. g., the possibility to exchange vehicle parts in an oine
environment (oine distribution of cryptographic keys) and oine diagnostics in a
workshop (see Section 3). Another approach we propose is to combine the structure
of IEC 62443 with HEAVENS – the FRs are the security attributes, which are mapped
to Microsoft’s STRIDE model [Islam et al., 2016, Microsoft Corporation, 2005]. This
leads to a 6-component vector for each asset, as shown in Equation A.2. This example
shows the security demands for each element, e. g., the demands for integrity are
high, whereas there are no demands on condentiality. Additionally, SRs and REs for
each FR have to be dened and mapped to the SLs.
With this approach, it is possible to incorporate design rules in the SRs as well.
Plausible design rules may be the physical isolation of critical networks, multi-factor
authentication of diagnostic devices or other modules with a critical SL, or the
composition of modules with dierent SLs in one control unit.
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A mapping to specic security mechanisms can be performed through recom-
mendations. The challenge when introducing such a mapping is its dynamics. The
mapping changes over time as cryptographic algorithms may be considered as broken
or existing hardware may have sucient processing capabilities to solve the cryp-
tographic problem on which the mechanism is built upon. Such recommendations
support the developers in choosing mechanisms that satisfy a certain SL. They can
be represented as a list of requirements associated with certain mechanisms. This
method requires an individual identier or a version number for each mapping to a
security mechanism in order to provide a seamless documentation of how the SRs
have been addressed.
Tools for the secure implementation of software are the [SEI CERT C, 2016]
Coding Standard and the [MISRA C:2012, 2013] Guideline, both give guidance and
provide rules to develop software that is safe, secure, and reliable. ISO 26262, for
instance, recommends the use of MISRA C. We propose to comply with such a secure
coding standard for any SL greater than 0, as basic vulnerabilities inherited from
programming languages or the wrong use of it can be limited this way.
We believe that a vector representation allows the combination of demands from
dierent disciplines, such as safety. Adding the ASIL levels from ISO 26262 to the
vector is benecial when discussing and deploying the requirements for a module or
subsystem, as the requirements of both areas have to be implemented in the very
same module or feature. Providing a vector or table as illustrated in Table A.3 is thus
useful for the software architects and developers to see if required safety mechanisms
interfere with security requirements or vice versa. We propose such a combined
presentation of both, safety and security demands, as it is necessary in order to full
the necessary requirements.
5.3 Evaluation and Certification
Providing evidence about how the SL has been achieved is necessary for the vehicle
manufacturers in order to rely on the security capabilities of modules oered by
suppliers. Common Criteria, a standard for IT security evaluation, species methods
and requirements for each Evaluation Assurance Level. Schmittner et al. perform
in [Schmittner and Ma, 2014] a mapping of the levels dened in Common Criteria
and the ASIL levels from ISO 26262. [Wooderson and Ward, 2017] describe how the
assessment as in Common Criteria can be applied for cybersecurity in vehicular sys-
tems. They further discuss the benets and disadvantages of an internal assessment
and an independent certication body.
52
6. Conclusion
Table A.3: Combined presentation of security and functional safety levels.
0 1 2 3 4












We suggest, that evidence for compliance in form of documents, such as the
attack tree analysis or the threat analysis and an overview how the identied threats
have been addressed, is sucient for lower SLs. However, components requiring a
SL of high (3) or critical (4) need to provide a more detailed documentation on how
the security measures are taken into account.
As the SLs consist of a vector, it is possible to dene the level of detail for the
required documentation for each element (FR) of the vector. This way, it is ensured
that no unnecessary overhead for documentation has to be performed.
6 Conclusion
With the increasing functionality of modern vehicles, it is essential to have a stan-
dardised security framework for vehicles that species the development lifecycle
as well as System Requirements (SRs). A standard, such as ISO 26262 for functional
safety of road vehicles, is needed so that all involved parties, e. g., manufacturer and
suppliers, share the same understanding for automotive security.
We provide a study on several safety and security standards from dierent do-
mains and discuss specic problems that have to be solved before a similar security
standard can be introduced in the automotive domain. Based on this, we suggest a
representation of Security Levels (SLs), how to map them to SRs, and discuss how
the security compliance of systems and modules with a certain SL can be proven.
The number of SLs found to be suitable is ve. Having ve SLs not only har-
monises with ISO 26262, it allows also a sucient guidance through specifying
system requirements and suitable security mechanisms. A higher number of levels
leads to a stricter guidance and would only increase the complexity of the mapping to
requirements. However, as shown in IEC 62443 and two automotive security models,
security needs to address dierent attributes or categories, e. g., condentiality and
integrity. For this reason, we propose to dene one SL for each category and conse-
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quently use a vector for representation. Due to the use of a vector, we also suggest
to include safety as one element in order to provide a matrix that presents all safety
and security demands, as safety measures may interfere with security. Furthermore,
we propose the use of a capability SL (SL-C), similar to IEC 62443, to be used as a
classier for the security of third-party modules and all in-house developed modules.
Providing guidance in the process of mapping SLs to system requirements as
part of a security framework has benets, such as a common understanding of the
required security for each level, and the compliance of products from suppliers.
Adding recommendations for how to implement certain SRs by providing suitable
mechanisms, further guides the developer. It has to be highlighted that such recom-
mendations need to be continuously maintained and updated as security mechanisms
might have to be revised due to published exploitation methods.
The evaluation and compliance of components is important for the vehicle man-
ufacturer. During the concept and design phase it has to be known what the system
or subsystems need to be capable of and what components provided by suppliers are
capable of. For lower SLs, we believe that the documentation of the threat analysis
and attack tree analysis together with documented proof providing information how
these security requirements have been handled, is sucient. For the SL high and
critical, we propose to adapt Common Criteria according to the specic needs in the
automotive domain.
In future work, the detailed security requirements and mechanisms have to be
identied, evaluated for their applicability in the automotive domain, and mapped
to SLs. Additionally, it is necessary to include this proposed structure in a security
framework that is suitable for this domain.
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Towards a Standardized Map-
ping from Automotive Secu-
rity Levels to Security Mech-
anisms
Adapted version that appeared in ITS-C 2018
T. Rosenstaer, T. Olovsson
Abstract. Modern vehicles are becoming targets and need to be securedthroughout their lifetime. There exist several risk assessment models
which can be used to derive security levels that describe to what extent com-
ponents, functions and messages (signals), need to be protected. These models
provide methods to gather application-specic security requirements based on
identied threat and item combinations that need to be coped with. However, a
standardised mapping between security levels and required mandatory security
mechanisms and design rules is currently missing. We address this problem
rst by suggesting that the risk assessment process should result in ve security
levels, similar to the functional safety standard ISO 26262. Second, we identify
suitable security mechanisms and design rules for automotive system design
and associate them with appropriate security levels. Our proposed methodology
is as much as possible aligned with ISO 26262 and we believe that it should
therefore be realistic to deploy in existing organisations.

Towards a Standardized Mapping from
Automotive Security Levels to Security
Mechanisms
1 Introduction
Computer and network security became more and more important as the number
of interconnected devices spread. We now face similar challenges in the ongoing
transition towards the Internet of things, industry 4.0 and smart connected vehicles.
Constraints, such as low computational power, low energy consumption and real-time
reaction, are major challenges that limit the range of applicable security mechanisms
and design rules. Back in 2011, Checkoway et al. provided a detailed analysis of the
attack surface of vehicles including attacks via the Tire Pressure Monitoring System
and the media player [1]. Furthermore, Miller and Valasek have demonstrated several
vulnerabilities that lead to attacks against vehicles that could be performed remotely
in 2015 [2].
There is currently no standard similar to the functional safety standard
ISO 26262 [3] for security in the automotive domain. The ISO work item ISO/SAE
AWI 21434 Road Vehicles – Cybersecurity engineering is currently under development
and is planned to address threat modeling and risk assessment. Proposed security
models, such as Microsoft’s STRIDE threat model [4], SAE J3061 [5] and the HEAV-
ENS model [6], describe how to identify items that need to be secured, perform the
threat analysis and result in security levels for components and functions in a vehicle.
HEAVENS additionally describes a method for deriving item specic requirements.
Currently missing in proposed models is how to select required security mechanisms
for each component and function based on the security level when following the risk
assessment process. In this paper, we address this problem by rst suggesting that
the risk assessment process should result in ve security levels, similar to the Auto-
motive Safety Integrity Levels (ASILs) and, when needed, a set of specic security
requirements for that particular function. Figure B.1 provides an overview and puts
our work into context.
We believe the proposed methodology can show the way towards a possible future
automotive security standard similar to ISO 26262 used in automotive safety. The
proposed methodology is realistic to deploy in existing organizations, as it is aligned
with safety design methodologies which are already in place. In addition, having
distinct requirements for security design allows the classication of components,
including third-party designs, and enables us to know how robust and secure the
design is and to what extend it can be trusted by other components.
We emphasize that we are focusing on mechanisms to be deployed in vehicles
rather than traditional information systems, which is covered by the ISO 27000
family [7].
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Item Threat Knowledge . . .
Braking Spoong Standard . . .
Braking Tampering Restricted . . .
Speed Spoong Standard . . .









Analysis of the system according to a security model, e. g., HEAV-
ENS, STRIDE, EVITA, or NIST FIPS PUB 199 for information systems
Selection of security mechanisms
SL 1 SL 2 SL 3 SL 4
Logical Separation • • •
Message Auth. • •
Message Integrity • • • •




Hardware Security Software Security
Requirements Requirements
Figure B.1: Overview of the steps from performing Threat Analysis and Risk As-
sessment (TARA) to requirement engineering.
The contributions of this paper are as follows:
• We propose a set of suitable mandatory security mechanisms and design rules
for the automotive domain.
• We suggest a framework for mandatory security mechanisms that should be
required for specic security levels.
• We motivate the proposed method with an automotive use case.
2 Background and Related Work
The Cybersecurity Guidebook for Cyber-Physical Vehicle Systems, SAE J3061 [5],
provides guidance for threat identication and assessment, and guidance for security
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in the development process. HEAVENS [6] and EVITA [8] are two Threat Analysis
and Risk Assessment (TARA) models also referred to in SAE J3061, which result in
security levels and methods for how to specify security requirements for identied
threats. Later in this paper, we apply the HEAVENS model to our automotive use
case, to identify security relevant items, i.e., functions, components and messages
(signals), and classify their security needs. The resulting security levels constitute
of six elements representing the security attributes mitigating the STRIDE threats:
integrity, authenticity, non-repudiation, condentiality, availability, and authorization.
IEC 62443 [9], a security standard for industrial communication networks, per-
forms a similar mapping between system requirements and security levels. IEC 62443
is not entirely applicable for the automotive domain due to the focus on the human
operation of industrial automation systems.
The NIST FIPS PUB 199 [10], Standards for Security Categorization of Federal
Information and Information Systems, describes a security classication for infor-
mation systems using condentiality, integrity, and availability with each having
three levels, low, moderate and high. Additionally, the NIST special publication
SP 800-53 [11], Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and
Organizations, contains security mechanisms for information systems. The work in
the Connected Vehicles Pilot Development Phase 1 - Security Management Operating
Concept – New York City [12] follows both, the NIST FIPS PUB 199 and NIST SP
800-53, and identies safety and privacy requirements for specic usage scenarios
and further divides these requirements in information ow and device classes. As
many of the NIST SP 800-53 security controls are not appropriate for the automo-
tive domain, the identied security requirements in this project do not cover the
requirements for the automotive domain in depth.
The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) has started a task
force on cybersecurity and over-the-air issues in [13]. The version from 27/11/2017
consists of a reference architecture, a list of security principles and security controls
to mitigate certain threats. We have taken security mechanisms and requirements
from all these works into account when selecting relevant mechanisms applicable
for the automotive domain.
3 Security Mechanisms and Design Rules
Security mechanisms are used to mitigate threats and to minimize the risk of security
attributes of an item being violated. Table B.1 shows the mapping between the
STRIDE threats and the corresponding security attributes, including an explanation
from HEAVENS [6, p.6]. In Table B.1 we additionally associate the STRIDE threats
with item types to emphasize the threats violating the security attributes related to
these types. For example, mechanisms that mitigate all types of threats are necessary
in order to properly protect messages or signals – the information ow.
The benets of having a direct relation between STRIDE and security attributes is
that any threat assessment model can be used to derive required mandatory security
requirements provided a mapping to STRIDE exists. For example, a mapping of
the CIA model in [10] to STRIDE is also possible, however, the desired granular-
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Table B.1: Mapping of STRIDE threats to security attributes and types of items that
need to be protected: information ow, message (msg), rmware (fw),
and hardware (hw)
STRIDE Threat [4] Security Attribute*
(from [5], [6])
Explanation [6] Item Type
Spoong Authenticity Attackers pretend to be
someone or something else
MSG, FW, HW
Tampering Integrity Attackers change data in
transit or in a data store
MSG, FW, HW
Repudiation Non-repudiation Attackers perform actions
that cannot be traced back
to them
MSG, FW, HW
Information disclosure Condentiality Attackers get access to data
(e. g., in transit or in a data
store)
MSG, FW
Denial of Service Availability Attackers interrupt a sys-
tem’s legitimate operation
MSG, FW
Elevation of privilege Authorization Attackers perform actions
they are not authorized to
perform
MSG, FW, HW
* Unlike SAE J3061 [5], we include the attribute freshness in non-repudiation and omit privacy, as we
believe that privacy needs to be addressed separately.
ity decreases due to the aggregation of security attributes. A proposed mapping
between security levels and identied mechanisms is provided in Table B.2. For
some identied design rules and mechanisms, it is favorable to divide them into
dierent classes represented as numbers instead of dots in the table describing the
requirements in more detail. For instance, the requirement AU.3 Verify authenticity of
rmware/functions on start has class 1 on demand verication of modules and a stricter
class 2 secure boot. Furthermore, we highlight that these security mechanisms are
mandatory, nevertheless, a mechanism may be disregarded when properly argued.
The following sections describe the six security attributes and list the correspond-
ing security mechanisms and design rules. The security levels the mechanisms are
associated with range from 0 to 4, where level 0 demands no security and level 1
and upwards require increased security needs.
3.1 Integrity
Integrity is a property that ensures that data, like messages and rmware, have
not been altered due to random errors during transmission or by a malicious node.
Message Authentication Codes (MACs) can be used to verify the integrity of data.
We propose the use of MACs with securely stored pre-shared keys as the required
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minimum to provide message integrity. Verifying the integrity of software during
boot or when upgrading also requires the use of cryptographic hashes along with
secret keys. In order to decrease the time overhead the verication of the rmware
takes, the rmware may be partitioned into modules and the verication of the
integrity may only be performed for modules currently needed.
IN.1 Message Authentication Code (MAC) with pre-shared key.
IN.2 Cryptographic hash function with pre-shared key to verify rmware integrity
when upgrading.
IN.3 Cryptographic hash function with pre-shared key to verify rmware or function
integrity on boot.
IN.4 Physical protection against tampering.
IN.5 Detection of physical tampering.
3.2 Authenticity
Authenticity guarantees the origin of data, thus mitigates the possibility to spoof
data, i.e., messages and rmware. MACs combined with authentication of nodes
and session keys can be used to provide authenticity and integrity of messages.
Authenticity of rmware received via over-the-air updates or through a diagnostics
device may be achieved with digital signatures and physically unclonable functions
may be used to ensure the authenticity of hardware the Electronic Control Unit (ECU)
communicates with.
AU.1 Message Authentication Codes (MACs) with session keys to provide message
integrity and authenticity.
AU.2 Verify authenticity of rmware when upgrading using digital signatures.
AU.3 Verify authenticity of rmware/functions on boot using digital signatures.
AU.4 Verify authenticity of hardware, e. g., ECUs and diagnostics devices.
3.3 Non-repudiation
In order to cope with repudiation of messages, it is necessary to include counters
or timestamps in messages to be authenticated to guarantee freshness. Moreover, it
is needed to store logs as evidence of performed transactions and the use of digital
signatures to provide proof about the source of the message.
NR.1 Freshness mechanism, e. g., adding a counter or timestamp to message to be
authenticated.
NR.2 Audit logging.
NR.3 Use of digital signatures for messages (signals).
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3.4 Confidentiality
Encryption provides condentiality of data. Some microcontrollers can include
embedded Hardware Security Modules (HSMs) to provide hardware accelerated
encryption and a secure storage of cryptographic keys. Hardware acceleration can be
crucial when transmitting and receiving time-critical authenticated and/or encrypted
messages. In case decryption is only required for rmware updates, it might be
sucient to rely on software-based methods. Some ECUs might also not have the
resources to decrypt the rmware and to perform the update. In such cases it has to
be decided whether it is sucient that the gateway ECU decrypts and veries the
rmware update.
CO.1 Encryption of messages when transmitted over the network.
CO.2 Encryption of rmware when transmitted over the network.
3.5 Availability
Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks can target the network and computational resources
of an ECU. The eectiveness of DoS attacks aiming at the network strongly depend
on the network architecture. The Controller Area Network (CAN) bus, for instance,
is due to its nature highly vulnerable to DoS attacks (see [1]), whereas Flexray
(ISO 17458-1:2013) is based on time-triggered control for accessing the physical
medium. As example, this time-triggered control approach already limits the extent
of the attack to the time slots the compromised node is allowed to send. Other targets
of DoS attacks can be memory and I/O resources. Watchdog timers can protect
against some DoS attacks targeting the computational resources.
AV.1 Limiting access to network resources - Quality of Service (QoS).
AV.2 Use of watchdog timers.
3.6 Authorization and Access Control
Authorization to perform certain tasks or to send specic messages can be enforced
individually or by introducing roles on many levels, e. g., network, host, and function-
level. Restricting communication between ECUs can be controlled by separating
the ECUs into dierent domains and connecting these domains via gateways that
use whitelists. A more radical approach is complete isolation of a specic network
segment, which may be feasible in only a few cases. Host-based access control on the
other hand can be used to restrict the types of messages and their frequency an ECU
is allowed to send. Examples of logical separation are encryption of network trac,
use of Virtual Local Area Networks (VLANs) and virtualization techniques using
hypervisors or containers. Domain isolation on the other hand, requires separated
physical networks, total isolation from other functions and processes, dedicated
memory, and guaranteed computational resources.
AC.1 Whitelisting of messages (signals) on gateways.
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AC.2 Whitelisting of messages (signals) on ECUs.
AC.3 Access control on function level.
AC.4 Detection and logging of intrusions.
AC.5 Logical separation.
AC.6 Domain isolation.
Table B.2: Mapping between security mechanisms and security levels.
SL 1 SL 2 SL 3 SL 4
Integrity
IN.1 [MSG] Message Authentication Code (MAC) with pre-shared key • • •
IN.2 [FW] Verify cryptographic hash of rmware when upgrading • • • •
IN.3 [FW] Verify cryptographic hash of rmware/functions on boot • •
IN.4 [HW] Physical protection against tampering • •
IN.5 [HW] Detection of physical tampering • • • •
Authenticity
AU.1 [MSG] Message Authentication Code (MAC) with session key • •
AU.2 [FW] Verify authenticity of rmware when upgrading using digital signaturesa 1 1 2 2
AU.3 [FW] Verify authenticity of rmware/functions on boot using digital signaturesa 1 2
AU.4 [HW] Verify hardware authenticity •
Non-repudiation
NR.1 [MSG] Freshness using counter or timestamp in authenticated message • •
NR.2 [MSG] Audit logging • •
NR.3 [MSG] Use of digital signatures for messages (signals) •
Condentiality
CO.1 [MSG] Encryption of messages • •
CO.2 [FW] Encryption of rmware during transmissiona 1 2
Availability
AV.1 [MSG] Limited network access – Quality of Service • •




AC.1 [MSG] Whitelisting of messages (signals) on gateways • • • •
AC.2 [MSG] Whitelisting of messages (signals) on nodes • •
AC.3 [MSG] Access control on function level • •
AC.4 [MSG] Deployment of Intrusion Detection Systems • •
AC.5 [MSG, FW, HW] Logical separationa 1 1 2
AC.6 [MSG, FW, HW] Domain isolation • •
Other
requirementsb
OR.1 Fail in known state
OR.2 Information Input Validation
OR.3 Operate with least set of privileges that are necessary
OR.4 Compliance to secure coding guidelines
OR.5 Secure Logging
a The numbers imply the class of a mechanism – higher numbers imply higher demands.
b These requirements have not been mapped to security levels as they are either required by laws and
regulations, should be considered when developing secure systems or strongly depend on the application.
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3.7 Other Requirements
Some security design rules or guidelines have to be fullled regardless of the se-
curity level due to compliance with laws and regulations or strongly depend on
the application rather than a specic security level. Compliance to safe and secure
coding guidelines, such as MISRA C Guidelines [14] or SEI CERT C Coding Stan-
dard [15], are the base for safe, secure and reliable software. More design rules are
for instance least privilege and fail-safe defaults, which have been already listed by
Saltzer and Schroeder back in 1975 in [16]. Logging of errors is essential when deploy-
ing Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs), additionally, all violations risen by security
mechanisms should be logged. We strongly recommend to take the requirements
below into consideration when designing the system.
OR.1 Fail in known state (safe defaults).
OR.2 Input Validation.
OR.3 Operate with least set of privileges that are necessary.
OR.4 Compliance to secure coding guidelines.
OR.5 Secure logging of errors, data modication and updates.
4 Use Case and Aack Model
The reference architecture for the automotive system we will use in our discussion
is shown in Figure B.2 and was developed in the HoliSec project [17]. It illustrates a
highly simplied version of ECUs and their functionality where the Vehicle ECU is
responsible for the park brake status, warning light and gear requests. The OBD-II
port is provided by the Edge Node GW which further interconnects networks to the
Infotainment unit, CAN bus ECUs, Ethernet nodes, and the Driver Control unit. The
Driver Control unit additionally interconnects sensors, such as radar and cameras,
the Vehicle ECU, and the Driver Display.
4.1 Use Case
Figure B.3a illustrates the functions involved when implementing Cruise Control (CC)
functionality and what messages (signals) these functions exchange. Function Cruise
Control is located in the Vehicle ECU. It receives target speeds from the driver and
sends a VehicleSpeedCommand to the function Speed Control which is responsible
for maintaining the target speed and therefore also listens to VehicleSpeed broadcasts
from the Vehicle Speed function. In order to maintain the target speed, Speed Control
always broadcasts a BrakeCommand on the CAN bus. Function Braking listens to
BrakeCommand and VehicleSpeed to determine the best braking strategy to be applied
to the engine and, if needed, also engages the foundational brakes. Function Braking
broadcasts BrakeEngagedPercentage to inform other functions, such as Light Control,
about its actions.
68




























 VLAN 1 - high prio.
 VLAN 2 - low prio. 




Figure B.2: HoliSec reference architecture of an in-vehicle network.
Furthermore, Figure B.3a shows the security levels obtained from a HEAVENS
TARA analysis, additionally, we added the security demands on the messages to the
source component that is broadcasting information. The results from applying threat
assessment techniques may vary for this example, however, the use case is used for
illustration purposes to discuss possible security mechanisms in an environment
consisting of dierent functions with dierent security levels communicating with
each other. The security levels shown correspond to the abbreviations of the security
attributes from Section 3: SL = [AU, IN,NR,CO,AV,AC].
4.2 Possible Aacks
There are many ways to attack this system, for example injection of faulty or wrong
messages and modications on the functions themselves. We will focus on the two
target functions Speed Control and Braking to motivate the results of the TARA
analysis and the resulting security levels shown in Figure B.3a. A modication or
injection of faulty/wrong VehicleSpeedCommands or VehicleSpeed messages can cause
the Speed Control to think that the vehicle is driving at low speed which results
in a high acceleration. Modications of the Speed Control function in the ECU can
lead to dangerous situations if the BrakeCommand or the maximum acceleration are
being altered. An attack on the Braking function is also dangerous if messages the
function listens to are modied which entails a wrong brake behavior and may cause
an accident. Moreover, modications of the function itself can have severe outcomes.
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(a) Function view and resulting security lev-
















































(b) Required security mechanisms per Function.




Once each function has a security classication, it is possible to nd the mandatory
security mechanisms according to Table B.2. The required mandatory security
mechanisms for this use case are illustrated in Figure B.3b, which shows the required
mechanisms as boxes in each function.
It can be seen that functions with security levels up to level 2 only need to fulll
basic security requirements, such as verifying the rmware integrity when upgrading,
whereas the functions Speed Control and Braking have higher security demands.
4.4 Applying the Framework
Mechanisms need to be deployed on the ECU and on the network or bus. Mechanism
AC.1 Whitelisting on gateways needs to be deployed on the Edge Node GW and the
Driver Control since they act as gateway between the Vehicle ECU and the Engine
ECU. Also note that, if the source function requires AU.1 MAC with session key, the
receiving nodes need to fulll AU.1 for these messages. AV.1 Limited network access
requires a change in the underlying network technology, as CAN itself does not
provide means to limit the network trac per sender. In this case one may argue
that alternative security measures on the gateway, such as rewall-like functionality
to handle DoS attacks or physical separation, in combination with IN.4, IN.5, AU.2
and AU.3 are sucient for this specic case. Another example is mechanism AC.5
Logical separation, it may be sucient to use VLANs for class 1, class 2 on the other
hand requires other virtualization techniques that are aecting all other functions
realized on the same ECU.
Combining items inside one ECU or even within one subnet requires the ag-
gregation of security levels by choosing the highest occurring security level for
each element in the vectors. Nevertheless, it is up to the system designer to choose
the level of aggregation that provides the best trade-o between detail and perfor-
mance/hardware requirements.
5 Discussion
This is a rst attempt towards a mapping between security levels and required
security mechanisms for the automotive domain. We strongly believe that having a
standardized and mandatory way to select required security mechanisms based on
the security level of the component is the next step in vehicular security. There exist
many models for how to assess threats which result in a security classication of
components, and we continue at this point and identify suitable security mechanisms
for each security level.
Strict rules are necessary since many parties are involved in the design and
development process. Vehicle manufacturers develop some parts of the vehicular
system in-house, but many components are provided by suppliers. We believe
that such a strict rule-set is necessary in order to not leave the responsibility for
developing secure systems to the individual developers or to third-party developers.
With this framework in place, all involved parties know the minimum security
71
B. Towards a Standardized Mapping from Security Levels to Mechanisms
measures that need to be implemented and all designers are already provided with
basic protection against a large number of threats. Additionally, designers may also
add extra application specic requirements that are not covered by the required
mechanisms. The decision of not implementing a certain mechanism may arise, due
to other restrictions, such as cost and energy consumption. In such a case the choice
of using alternative methods needs to be properly justied.
Moreover, this framework enables system designers to easily obtain an overview
of the required mechanisms for each item in a bigger system context, making it
possible to see dependencies between items, safety-critical or not, at an early stage.
We are aware that our proposed security mechanisms need to be dened in more
detail, e. g., requirements on the Hardware Security Module, key derivation methods,
encryption algorithms, and key lengths, and that the assigned security levels may
need to be adapted, however, we are convinced that a framework similar to what
we propose needs to be in place for automotive security. In addition, we show with
the Cruise Control (CC) use case how this framework should be applied and we
have validated the usefulness and correctness of the identied mechanisms and their
corresponding security levels with a large vehicle manufacturer.
6 Conclusion
Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment (TARA) is commonly used to derive security
levels which indicate the security demands for components. Current models, such as
HEAVENS [6], describe methods to obtain security requirements, however, they do
not provide a direct mapping from security levels to security mechanisms and design
rules which reduce the feasibility and impact of an attack. In this paper, we have
identied appropriate security mechanisms applicable for the automotive domain
and consequently associated these mechanisms with security levels that describe
the demand for security. Having such a framework in place increases the eciency
and transparency when deriving security requirements for an automotive system,
as current approaches place the task of deciding which security mechanisms to
implement on the individual designers. We have additionally motivated the proposed
mapping with an automotive use case which has been veried with a large vehicle
manufacturer.
We have listed the identied mandatory security mechanisms required for specic
security levels in Table B.2. Some components may require stricter rules in order
to fulll the demand on security but having a framework like we propose in place
covers already basic security requirements that must be implemented.
The interaction between vehicle manufacturers and third-party developers of
modules and ECUs benets from such a framework as well, since all involved parties
will have the same expectations of what has to be implemented for each component.
We believe that this framework is a rst step towards a standardized mapping to
security mechanisms. Such a framework is necessary, as it makes security design
easier for system designers, developers, suppliers and all other involved parties. In
addition, it prevents individual developers from making poor security design choices
since the components have to provide the required security mechanisms.
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6. Conclusion
In future work, this framework needs to be validated with more use cases and
security mechanisms have to be specied in more detail. However, a task such as
dening the specic algorithms to be used has to be performed by standardization
organization in form of regularly updated recommendations.
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Abstract. In the past years, great eort has been spent on enhancing thesecurity and safety of vehicular systems. Current advances in information
and communication technology have increased the complexity of these systems
and lead to extended functionalities towards self-driving and more connectivity.
Unfortunately, these advances open the door for diverse and newly emerging
attacks that hamper the security and, thus, the safety of vehicular systems.
In this paper, we contribute to supporting the design of resilient automotive
systems. We review and analyse scientic literature on resilience techniques,
fault tolerance, and dependability. As a result, we present the REMIND resilience
framework providing techniques for attack detection, mitigation, recovery, and
resilience endurance. Moreover, we provide guidelines on how the REMIND
framework can be used against common security threats and attacks and further
discuss the trade-os when applying these guidelines.

REMIND: A Framework for the Resilient
Design of Automotive Systems
1 Introduction
In the past years great eort has been spent in publishing guidelines and standards for
security frameworks specic to their domains and in identifying security principles.
Examples range from the NIST guideline for cybersecurity in smart grids [1], the
cybersecurity guideline for ships [2], cybersecurity guidelines for the automotive
domain [3–5] and the upcoming ISO/SAE standard for cybersecurity engineering for
road vehicles, namely ISO 21434 [6].
Resilience is the next step towards reliable, dependable and secure vehicular
systems. Vehicles need to be able to mitigate faults, errors, attacks and intrusions
that would ultimately result in failures in order to withstand safety and security
threats from their environment. We dene automotive resilience as the “property
of a system with the ability to maintain its intended operation in a dependable and
secure way, possibly with degraded functionality, in the presence of faults and attacks.”
This denition is inspired by Laprie’s denition [7] and the denition of network
resilience by Sterbenz et al. [8]; however, the chosen denition highlights that faults
or changes, e.g., functional and environmental (see [7]), can also be originated by an
attacker whose aim is to disrupt the system.
Resilience can be obtained in many dierent ways and on dierent levels, i. e.,
hardware, software or (sub)-system level. Today’s internal architecture of vehicles is
quite complex and can be distributed over more than hundred so-called Electronic
Control Units (ECUs). However, we are currently in a transition towards a more
centralized architecture where functions will be concentrated on much fewer and
more powerful ECUs [9]. These central ECUs are connected to sensors, actuators,
external communication media and to some extent to smaller legacy subsystems.
Such a centralized architecture enables vehicle OEMs not only to perform more
resource intensive operations needed for autonomous driving, but also allows to
introduce new designs and technologies needed to secure and protect these highly
connected and autonomous vehicles. Virtualization is seen as one key technology
enabling the isolation of vehicle functions from each other along with the possibility
to dynamically assign hardware resources. Introducing resilience to such a centralized
automotive system requires the deployment of techniques and principles in all layers
and components of the system, ranging from the vehicle itself, the connected IT
infrastructure, road infrastructure and the communication to other vehicles.
Motivation. The increasing complexity towards autonomous driving combined
with the interconnectedness of vehicles, e. g., vehicle-to-vehicle and vehicle-to-
infrastructure communication, and the continuous development of functions require
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vehicles to react and adapt to changes and attacks independently. The automotive
domain is distinct from other domains as it is a safety and real-time critical sys-
tem operated by millions of individuals each day. Furthermore, security and safety
techniques need to be aligned and extended with resilience techniques in order to
strengthen vehicles’ capabilities to withstand impending threats.
Contributions. This paper provides a framework to design resilient automotive
systems. First, we systematically identify relevant automotive resilience techniques
proposed in the literature with the goal to provide a full picture of available tools and
techniques. We also organize these techniques into a taxonomy, which comprises
the categories of Detection, Mitigation, Recovery, and Endurance (REMIND). These
categories represent high-level strategies that can help designers understand the
purpose of each technique. Further, it can be benecial to combine techniques from
dierent strategies to achieve multiple layers of security. The selection of the right
technique for the task at hand is further supported by associating the resilience
techniques to the classes of automotive assets they are appropriate for. Additionally,
we elaborate on the trade-os (i.e., pros and cons) that are associated with each of
the techniques, e.g., with respect to performance and other qualities. In summary,
we provide a multi-dimensional decision support framework (built in a bottom-up
fashion from the analysis of the literature) that can lead designers to the informed
and optimal selection of a suitable set of resilience techniques to be implemented in
an automotive system.
2 Methodology
By means of a systematic literature survey, we identify research papers that discuss
techniques that are suitable to provide automotive resilience. We consider existing
work related to resilience, fault tolerance and dependability. We also analyze the
papers describing each technique to understand (i) the assets that can benet from
the technique, (ii) the risks that are mentioned as being mitigated by the techniques,
and (iii) any pros/cons associated with the use of such technique.
We identied relevant research papers by searching the Scopus database1. A
search string was intended to nd relevant publications that carried out a review of
suitable techniques. Therefore, we formulated the search string to include survey
or literature review, and relevant topics, such as resilience, survivability, attack
recovery, error handling or fault tolerance, as well as the keywords software, system
or network. We excluded the keywords FPGA, memory, wireless, SDN and hardware
to limit the search result to publications focusing on system architecture, software
design or physical networks. Furthermore, we considered only publications written
in English and published after 2010 in the areas of computer science and engineering.
We manually screened the 200 most relevant publications returned by Scopus and
found eight additional research publications, which were added to our result set.
Ultimately, we retained and analyzed 12 publications which are shown in Table C.1.
1https://www.scopus.com/
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Table C.1: Publications that provide an overview or collection of relevant techniques.
Discipline Existing Work Domain
Resilience
Chang2015 [10] Cloud Computing
Hukerikar2017 [11] High Performance Computing
NIST 800-160v2 [12] Systems Engineering
Ratasich2019 [13] Cyber-Physical Systems
Sterbenz2010 [8, 14] Networks
Security Segovia2019 [15] SCADA systems
Dependability Bakhshi2019 [16] Fog Computing
Fault Tolerance
Egwutuoha2013 [17] High Performance Computing
Kumari2018 [18] Cloud Computing
Mukwevho2018 [19] Cloud Computing
Slåtten2013 [20] Software Engineering
Wanner2012 [21] Vehicle Controller
3 Aack Model and Assets
The four strategies in the REMIND framework are, as shown in Figure C.1, further
rened in patterns and techniques. A collection of these techniques specic for
automotive systems is described in Section 4 and has been identied based on existing
research in other domains and areas (see Table C.1). We additionally describe the
trade-os of these techniques in Appendix C.A and point to relevant publications
in Appendix C.B. In the remainder of this section we describe the assets, security
threats and attacks of automotive systems.
We consider four asset types, namely Hardware, Software, Network/Communi-
cation and Data Storage. The attacker aims to compromise these assets via various
attack vectors, whereas the defender, i.e. the vehicle, aims to cope with these attacks
via resilience techniques. We consider skilled attackers as well as novice hackers
(e. g., script kiddies) and further give examples from an asset, threat and attacker
perspective.
Hardware. Can be broken down to ECUs, Sensors and Actuators. An ECU can vary
in complexity depending on its objective, from a specic limited task to a multitude
of tasks. The former can relate to the processing of a sensor signal and the latter an
infotainment-system with lots of applications. Sensors can give information about
speed, temperature and obstacle distance and identication where the Actuators turn
input from these sensors (via an ECU) into actions, such as braking, steering and
engine control.
Attack example. Tampering with existing hardware or installing malicious hardware
into the vehicle can act as mediators to gain complete vehicle control. Input signals
from sensors may be manipulated to cause an unwanted behavior.
Software. Can be in transit, at rest or running. In transit can relate to software
provisioning systems, such as over-the-air or workshop updates and the latter two
to software installed or running in ECUs.
Attack example. Software vulnerabilities might be exploited, e. g., via a privilege
escalation attack which enables ECUs to be re-programmed with additional function-
alities, such as adding remote access to the system.
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Network/Communication. Can be broken down to internal and external commu-
nication. Examples for internal communication are CAN, FlexRay, LIN, MOST and
Automotive Ethernet and for external communication Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, and V2X as
well as external interfaces such as OBD-II, debug ports (e. g., JTAG) and CD player.
Attack example. The attacker can try to inject malicious data, through a device
connected to an in-vehicle bus aecting the internal communication. Furthermore,
modication of V2X data from other vehicles as well as malicious roadside units (e. g.,
vehicle positioning or trac condition data) could aect system functions.
Data Storage. Can potentially be sensitive data, such as cryptographic keys, forensics
logs, system information (e. g., from software libraries, OS and applications) and
reports about the vehicle and the driver.
Attack example. The attacker can exploit secret keys used for sensitive diagnostics
to disable rewalls. Logs and report data might be manipulated or removed to hide
forensic evidence of the crime. Furthermore, information about the system can reveal
vulnerabilities which might be exploited.
Attackers typically exploit the above-mentioned assets in any order to achieve
their goal, e. g., uploading malicious software to the vehicle by rst compromising the
cryptographic keys to get access to the memory and consequently upload a modied
rmware containing malicious code. This can give elevated privileges and extended
functionality which could cause inconsistencies or disruption of the system.
More examples of assets and related security threats and attacks can be found in
Table C.2.
4 REMIND Automotive Resilience Framework
We have developed the REMIND framework shown in Figure C.1 to provide system
designers and developers with a categorization of suitable resilience mechanisms
including the identication of the assets they protect. The structure of the layers
is chosen similarly to the work in Hukerikar et al. [11], where the bottom layer
is divided into strategies and the mid layer is split into patterns that provide more
details about the way the strategies can be realized. We refer to relevant solutions
for automotive systems in the top layer and further link to the survey papers and
reviews that identify specic techniques for their domain in the description listed
below.
The four REMIND strategies for providing resilience for vehicular systems are:
• Detection. Faults, attacks and other anomalies need to be detected by the
system in order to take reactive measures to avoid a failure.
• Mitigation. Once an anomaly is detected and located, mitigation techniques
need to be triggered to keep the system operational. These techniques may
result in a non-optimal system state.
• Recovery. Transitioning back to the desired, i. e., optimum state, is the aim of
recovery.
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C. REMIND: A Framework for the Resilient Design of Automotive Systems
• Endurance. The focus is set on lasting resilience in contrast to recovery &
mitigation strategies which aim at taking immediate measures.
The remaining part of this section details the strategies and describes the patterns
and corresponding techniques.
4.1 Detection
The monitoring and detection capabilities of a system can be limited due to various
factors, such as computational resources, energy consumption, and the complexity
of functions and network architecture. The move to a more centralized architecture,
however, paves the way for more extensive monitoring.
4.1.1 Specification-based Detection
Malicious or abnormal behavior is detected using a specication that describes the
behavior of signals or communication patterns. Domain knowledge is needed to
create the specications.
• Signature-based Detection [13]. Signatures are constructed to describe known
attack behavior. By design, these techniques suer from detecting new attacks
and zero-day vulnerabilities. However, they typically achieve a low false
positive rate [22].
• Runtime Verication [13, 20]. A monitor observes the system at runtime to
verify the correctness of the execution. Formal specication languages, e. g.,
Signal Temporal Logic [23], have been developed to describe the normal system
behavior which is matched against a trace during execution.
• Falsication-based Analysis [13]. It extends STL by including a quantitative
semantics allowing the return of real values rather than Boolean values.
• Verication of Safety-Properties [13]. The formal verication of safety properties
has become increasingly complex due to the added functionality in modern
vehicles. Exhaustive verication techniques, as listed and argued by Ratasich
et al. [13], are currently limited to small scale models.
• Specication-based Anomaly Detection. Normal behavior, according to a set of
rules, is dened using this technique. An alert is sent when a violation of these
rules is detected [22].
4.1.2 Anomaly-based Detection
Anomaly- or behavior-based detection techniques are based on comparing behavior
with a model of normal behavior. Alerts are raised when a deviation is detected [24].
• Statistical Techniques [13]. A statistical model describing the system or a
specic process is designed in order to detect anomalies. Events are considered
anomalies when the probability of their occurrence is below a certain threshold
according to the model.
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C. REMIND: A Framework for the Resilient Design of Automotive Systems
• Machine Learning/Data Mining [13]. These techniques typically do not require
domain knowledge. A model, such as Bayesian networks, neural networks
and support vector machines, learns through training data how to classify
observations in normal and abnormal classes.
• Information-theoretic Detection [13]. The entropy of information can be used to
detect anomalies, as a change of the entropy above a certain threshold may be
caused by an attack, e. g., masquerading attack [13, 29].
• Localization. Finding the source of the attack may be required to take appro-
priate actions. Network-based Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) can be used
to limit the location to a specic subnet, however, solutions identifying the
particular ECU are needed (e. g., [30]).
4.1.3 Prediction of Faults and Attacks
First, the system needs to identify the presence of an attacker. The next actions are
attack projection and attack intention recognition which aim at identifying the next
steps and the ultimate goal of the attacker. Attack or intrusion prediction can be used
to foresee when and where an attack will take place [31].
Adversaries mounting simpler attacks on a single vehicle, such as DoS attacks
on the CAN bus, may be dicult to predict as the attack consists of fewer steps.
However, large-scale attacks requiring the attacker to go through several stages may
be predicted by this technique.
4.1.4 Redundancy
Redundancy is twofold, as it can support both detection and mitigation. It is important
to highlight that purely redundant systems suer from the same design faults and
vulnerabilities. Thus, diversity is combined with redundancy to overcome this issue.
• HW/SW Redundancy [11–13, 15, 17–20]. Redundancy combined with a voter
allows to mask system failures. The voter compares the results of a number of
independently executed software and/or hardware modules and selects, for
instance, the majority [32]. Repeating the computation n times on the same
hardware can be used to detect random faults.
• Sensor/Data Fusion [13]. Data from dierent origins may be fused to compen-
sate inaccuracies or temporary sensor failures. Sensor fusion, e. g., extended
Kalman lter [60] and particle lter [33], can be used to describe the non-linear
relationship between sensors. For example, the motion of a vehicle can be
described with measurements from the wheel speed sensor, GPS location and
data received from other vehicles.
• Agreement/Voting [11, 13, 17, 20]. Redundant components are required for this
technique. Voting can be realized in two ways, i. e., exact voting and inex-
act voting, where the latter allows a variation of the result within a certain
range [32].
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• N-version Design [11–13, 17, 19]. N versions of a software with the same re-
quirements are developed by N independent teams resulting in a diverse set of
functionally equivalent software components that fulll the same specication.
These versions are executed concurrently and a voter decides based on the
majority or calculates, for instance, the median or average of the results [34].
• Recovery Blocks [11,19,20]. Similar to n-version design, n versions of a software
component exist; however, only one version is executed at a time. After the
active version is executed, a common acceptance test decides whether the
result is accepted. In case the result is rejected, the subsequent version is
executed and evaluated [34, 35].
• N self-checking [17]. This technique is a combination of n-version design
and recovery blocks. It requires at least two diverse versions with their own
acceptance test. When the active component fails its acceptance test, the
subsequent component takes over [35].
• N-variant Systems. Multi-variant execution automatically diversies software
and monitors the output of at least two variants to detect and mitigate at-
tacks [36].
• Replacement of Cold/Hot Spares [13]. Concurrent and sequential execution of
redundant software components is costly in terms of energy consumption and
computational resources. Therefore, the introduction of cold or hot spares,
such as in N self-checking, have been found to be a viable alternative [13].
4.2 Mitigation
After detecting an attack or anomaly, the system needs to react to reduce the impact
of the attack. Some mitigation techniques may require the transition to a non-optimal
state.
4.2.1 Adaptive Response
We focus on techniques that adapt the response of a function or sub-system in order
to maintain its intended functionality.
• Retry [18,19]. Performing the same computation with new measurements if the
rst computation resulted in an undesired system state or in an error. Retry
can mitigate a replay attack.
• Model-based Response and State Estimation [15,21]. System models, e. g., Kalman
lter for state estimation [60, 61], or parameter estimation techniques, like
regression analysis, are not only a temporary solution to mitigate attacks, such
as replay and masquerading attacks, they can also be used to alert the system
and log important information for forensics [46].
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4.2.2 Runtime Enforcement
Runtime enforcement is an extension of runtime verication where the system also
reacts to violations [25].
4.2.3 Reconfiguration and Reparameterization
The system protects itself by adapting parameters when an attack is detected. We
distinguish between reconguration and migration in the way that migration focuses
on relocating functionality whereas reconguration changes system or application
parameters.
• Reinitialization [11]. Temporary faults and attacks can be addressed with this
technique. However, permanent faults or reoccurring attacks cannot be miti-
gated by restoring the system or a function to its initial state. Reinitialization
can be seen as checkpoint recovery with the checkpoint being the initial state
of the system or function.
• Reparameterization [13]. Is similar to reinitialization, however, the system
conguration is dynamically adjusted to the situation. As Ratasich et al. [13]
point out, reparameterization typically results in a non-optimal state.
• Graceful Degradation / Limp Mode [13, 15]. Given the extended automated dri-
ving functions of future vehicles, it is of utmost importance to implement more
sophisticated solutions that ensure the passengers safety when key compo-
nents in the vehicle fail or are subject to attacks. These techniques are similar
to reparameterization, but focus on safety and should be seen as a last resort.
Modern vehicles already have a so-called limp mode implemented, which is
triggered when the vehicle detects major technical problems [62].
• Isolation [11,13]. Restricting access or completely isolating system components
in the presence of an error or intrusion can limit the impact on the entire
system and its performance.
• Restructure [11]. Restructuring components within a sub-system aims at pro-
viding resilience through reconguration of aected components. Segovia et
al. [15] explore software reection as means to mitigate attacks.
• Dynamic Deployment of Policies [15]. Security or other policies can be applied
dynamically based on the type of attack, e. g., DoS or masquerading, that is
detected.
• Rescue Workow [18, 19]. A workow can be used to describe tasks with
their dependencies to each other. The idea behind rescue workows is to
dynamically adjust the structure of the workow when an error or intrusion
aects a specic task. Existing cloud solutions may need to be adapted for
automotive systems.
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4.3 Recovery
Recovery techniques intend to bring the system back to an optimal state.
4.3.1 Migration
These techniques are mainly originating from high performance computing and cloud
systems. As future automotive systems move towards a centralized architecture,
virtualization and service-oriented architectures are becoming more relevant.
• Relocation/Migration [13, 19]. Virtualization such as hypervisor and container-
based solutions allow a fast migration and relocalization to other nodes in the
vehicular network.
• Preemptive Migration [18, 19]. Continuous monitoring and analysis of the
system can be used to relocate software functions or services before a fault
occurs.
4.3.2 Checkpointing & Rollback
A checkpoint or snapshot describes the system state at a specic point in time. By
design, recovery does not prevent the same attacks from happening again.
• Re-instantiation/Restart [11, 13, 17, 19]. When an intrusion is detected, the af-
fected component can be re-instantiated or restarted to recover to a known,
error and attack free, state. This technique can be combined with reparameter-
ization to avoid the same anomaly to happen again [13].
• Checkpoint Recovery [11, 17–20]. Snapshots can be created in two ways:
checkpoint-based and log-based. Egwutuoha et al. [17] highlight the com-
plexity of taking checkpoints in a distributed system, as these checkpoints
need to be consistent.
• Software Rejuvenation [11, 19]. This technique carries out periodic restarts or
reinitializations of the system to maintain a known, error-free state.
4.3.3 Rollforward actions
These techniques aim at bringing the system to a stable state immediately before
the error or attack was detected. As in rollback, the recovery is based on using
checkpoint-based or log-based recovery [11].
• Exception Handling [11]. From a model-driven engineering view, Rollforward
can be performed using exception handling. Slåtten et al. [20] highlight that
this solution can be only applied to anticipated events.
4.4 Endurance
Resilience needs to be ensured over the entire lifetime of a vehicle. The preced-
ing techniques center around providing immediate response when anomalies are
detected.
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4.4.1 Self-*
Self-* or self-X techniques cover solutions and research directions focusing on how to
introduce autonomy into the system. This pattern is especially important for future
vehicles as the environment is and will change frequently, new vulnerabilities will
be found, new attempts to attack vehicles and their infrastructure will be developed,
and new technologies will appear. Also, considering the lifetime of cars, which is
around 10–15 years, it is evident that automotive systems need to adapt to a certain
extent autonomously.
4.4.2 Verification and Validation
Due to the increasing functionality and interconnectedness of modern vehicles it
is required to update software components via over-the-air updates in order to x
vulnerabilities and bugs or upgrade vehicle functions. This is especially challenging
as each vehicle model can be further congured, resulting in a manifold of possible
vehicle congurations.
4.4.3 Robustness
Articial intelligence, especially machine learning, is a key technology for au-
tonomous driving and decision making, as the system needs to be able to handle
previously unseen situations [13].
4.4.4 Forensics
Providing evidence of intrusions even after a crash is important for taking appropriate
countermeasures.
• Secure Logging. Hoppe et al. [54] express the need for forensic solutions in
vehicles. Non-safety-critical events, such as updates, component failures and
other malfunctions, need to be logged and stored securely for a prospective
analysis. The authors also discuss in great detail which information and how
this information can be stored in vehicles.
• Attack Analysis. Nilsson and Larson [57] specify requirements for forensic
analyses of the in-vehicle network. It is also important to analyze attacks dis-
closed by researchers, such as Checkoway et al. [63] and Miller and Valasek [64],
as well as attacks logged by the vehicle manufacturers in order to take appro-
priate actions.
5 Related Work
Making vehicles safe and secure has traditionally been the main focus in research.
For instance, methods to combine safety and security [65] and how to assess an
automotive system and/or derive security requirements and mechanisms have been
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proposed [66–68]. Le et al. [69] provide a survey on security and privacy in automo-
tive systems and further provide an overview of suitable security mechanisms.
One of the rst structured collections of principles for cyber resilience is the
Cyber Resiliency Engineering Framework [70] by MITRE in 2011 which got further
incorporated in NIST SP 800-160v2 [12]. Other work describing principles for re-
silience have been either concentrating on other domains, i. e., high performance
computing, cyber-physical systems, or networks, or they focused particularly on
dependability or fault tolerance. Table C.1 provides an overview of relevant publi-
cations, which provide a comprehensive overview or collection of techniques, and
categorizes them according to their discipline and the area they are focusing on.
The reviewed publications classify the identied techniques in dierent ways.
Hukerikar et al. [11] divide them into strategies, i. e., fault treatment, recovery, and
compensation, whereas Ratasich et al. [13] organize them according to their ability,
i. e., detection and diagnosis, recovery or mitigation, and long-term dependability
and security. Work focusing on fault tolerance either split the identied techniques
in reactive and proactive measures [18, 19] or classify them according to their ability,
e. g., error handling and recovery [17, 20].
With the developed REMIND framework, we contribute to supporting the re-
silience of automotive systems by: (i) identifying techniques for attack detection,
mitigation, recovery, and resilience endurance; (ii) organizing the techniques into a
taxonomy to guide designers when selecting resilience techniques; (iii) providing
guidelines on how the REMIND framework can be used against common security
threats and attacks; and (iv) discussing the trade-os when applying the techniques
that are highlighted in this framework.
In addition to the identied techniques in Figure C.1, we point to implementations
relevant for or specic to the automotive domain in Appendix C.B.
6 Conclusion
The reviewed work shows the current research eorts towards making systems
resilient to attacks and faults in related domains. We present a novel structure
for categorizing resilience techniques in the form of the REMIND framework with
the aim to lead designers in making informed decisions when choosing resilience
techniques. We build upon the existing work and set the focus on the limitations of
automotive systems and their challenges. The REMIND techniques have been chosen
considering automotive assets and related attacks which are described in Section 3
and further linked to the guidelines and trade-o analysis in Appendix C.A.
Future work includes the validation of the REMIND framework in regard to
studying its applicability in industry in more depth. Furthermore, specic solutions
for the identied techniques that consider the unique properties of automotive
vehicles can be explored. Especially, the role of software-dened networking and its
contribution to resilience can be investigated.
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In this section, we report in Table C.3 resilience techniques that can be used against
common security threats and attacks. We also describe the trade-os when imple-
menting these techniques.








• Statistical Techniques [13]
• Machine Learning/Data
Mining [13]
• Localization (e. g., [30])
• Sensor/Data Fusion [13]
• Less computation is required.
• No domain knowledge is
needed. It handles multivariate
and non-linear data.
• Identies the exclusive part
causing the fault or attack.
• Calculates a value of trust of
the data sources derived from
the normalization factor.
• Very sensitive to outliers,
imprecise detection, and in-
creased complexity when mod-
elling non-linear data.
• Requires training. Impre-
cise prediction: false positives
and false negatives. Time
penalty and resource consump-
tion (power, processing, and
storage).
• Often applied oine. The pre-
cision of the localization is de-
pendent on both, the number
of observed parameters and the
set frequency for probing moni-
tored resources.
• Imprecise detection: false pos-
itives and negatives. It also in-
troduces time penalty (increase
in execution time) and space
penalty (increase in resource us-
age).
Mitigation
• Hardware Redundancy [11–13,
15, 17–20]
• Enables osetting the eects
of faults and attacks, and allows
the progress of the system with-
out loss of functionality.
• Time penalty (increase in exe-
cution time) and resource con-
sumption (increase in required
resources). Hardware costs in-
dependent of whether attacks
occur. Also, the design and ver-
ication of replicas requires an
eort.
Recovery
• Relocation/Migration [13, 19]
• Maintain system functionality
in an operational state as it was
before the fault or attack.
• May cause a degraded sys-
tem, with less functionality, re-
sources, and performance.
Table C.3 – Continued on next page
100
C.A. REMIND Resilience Guidelines








• Enables systems to adapt their
behavior when a fault or at-
tack occurs in their environ-
ment, thus allowing a continu-
ous operation of these systems.





• Signature-based Detection [13]
• Runtime Verication [13, 20]
• A precisely calibrated signa-
ture eectively identies abnor-
mal events during software exe-
cution.
• Well-established and ecient
technique to verify the correct-
ness of software execution and
monitor the behavior of the sys-
tem.
• Does not work when design-
ers and 3rd party suppliers (e.g.,
intellectual property providers)
are not trusted. It cannot han-
dle zero-day attacks and, thus,
often used in combination with
anomaly-based techniques lead-
ing to an increased resource con-
sumption and time penalty.
• Limited coverage. The used
monitoring algorithms usually
handle a single execution trace
which limits the scope of the
verication.
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• Software Redundancy [11–13,
15, 17–20]
• N-Version Design [11–13, 17,
19]
• Agreement/Voting [11, 13, 17,
20]
• Recovery Blocks [11, 19, 20]
• N self-checking [17]
• Helps to contain and exclude
malicious behavior (i.e., reduces
likelihood of harm). Enable
restoration in case of disruption.
Enhances the availability of crit-
ical capabilities.
• Helps to mitigate the impact
of failures when a risk is intro-
duced to system design or con-
guration.
• Typically combined with re-
dundancy. Can be used to select,
for instance, the average or me-
dian of the results provided by
the redundant sources.
• Uses dierent implementa-
tions of the same design spec-
ication to provide tolerance of
design faults.
• Provides mitigation by creat-
ing N versions of the same soft-
ware, each with its own accep-
tance test. The version that
passes its own acceptance test is
selected through an acceptance
voting system.
• Resource consumption. It
demands the protection of re-
dundant resources. It can de-
grade over time as congura-
tions are updated or connectiv-
ity changes. It is often applied
with diversity techniques which
increases complexity and leads
to scalability issues.
• Requires much eort for de-
signing, implementation, test-
ing, and validation of the N in-
dependent versions.
• Attackers may exploit the vot-
ing process in order to force the
system to a degraded mode.
• Requires extra verication and
validation eort and, thus, more
resource consumption. It might
be dicult to create alternative
software implementations with-
out any correlation between the
various versions.
• Causes an increase in required
resources and execution time.
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• Preemptive Migration [18, 19]
• Checkpoint Recovery [11, 17–
20]
• Software Rejuvenation [11, 19]
• Prevents failures from impact-
ing running parallel applica-
tions by enabling the migration
of running software from one
virtual machine to another in
real-time.
• Helps the system to resume
its operation in a state free of
the eects of the fault or attack.
Frequent checkpointing reduces
the amount of lost work.
• Helps avoiding the costs of fail-
ures from software degradation,
as periodic (graceful) restarts of
the software component allow
the release and re-allocation of
memory, thus, operation in a
clean state.
• Lack of standardized metrics
for measuring and evaluating
the health and interfaces be-
tween system components.
• Overhead in relation to the size
and frequency of created check-
points. Creating a checkpoint,
for instance, requires interrupt-
ing the normal operation of a
system to record the checkpoint.
Moreover, it requires storage re-
sources to store the checkpoint.
The created checkpoints might
potentially contain an error or
intrusion that has not been de-
tected yet. Globally consistent
checkpoints are not trivial to
obtain in a distributed system,
due to e. g., variation of the local
clock, parallel computation and
possible dierent system states.
• Requires shutting the software
down and restarting it periodi-
cally which causes the software
to be unavailable for the dura-
tion of the restart. It is often a





• Secure Logging (e. g., [54–
56])
• Enables systems to recognize
their own state and to contin-
uously adapt to change, evolu-
tion, system interference, envi-
ronment dynamics, and uncer-
tainty. It optimizes resilience,
quality of service, and supports
system dynamics and openness.
It also helps to reduce uncer-
tainties and identify inconsis-
tencies.
• Prevents modifying the logs by
using e.g., chained hashes. It
enables storing security-related
events containing information
about e.g., ash operations, ex-
ternal interactions, and power
downtime. This information
helps to reconstruct events,
detect intrusions and identify
problems.
• Automatically maintaining co-
herent specications that cap-
ture and monitor security is a
challenging task. Complexity,
scalability, and diculty in deal-
ing with uncertainties and inac-
curacies. The determination of
relevant dependencies in a com-
plex system is also challenging.
• Resource consumption and
time penalty. Moreover, miss-
ing authentication and lack of
cryptographic means to ensure
data integrity can limit the po-
tential of the logging.
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Detection (e. g., [22])
• Localization (e. g., [30])
• Verication of Safety-Proper-
ties [13]
• Helps detecting anomalies in
the system’s behavior by report-
ing the specic deviation that
has been observed.
• Identies the exclusive part
causing the fault or attack.
• Ensures that the system does
not evolve in unsafe state start-
ing from some initial condi-
tions.
• Needs of resources for detec-
tion and processing of collected
information (e.g., costly intelli-
gent sensors). Domain knowl-
edge is required to specify nor-
mal behavior. Specications
need to be adapted for each spe-
cic vehicle conguration other-
wise risk of high false positives
or negatives.
• Requires additional resources.
• It is limited to small scale sys-
tems.
Mitigation
• Isolation [11, 13]
• Restructure [11]
• It provides a remedy to enable
the system to continue its oper-
ation by osetting the eect of
the attack. Also, it prevents loss
of functionality.
• Helps to mitigate incorrectness
in the interactions between the
components or subsystems by
excluding the aected part from
interacting with the rest of the
system, and maintaining system
functionality.
• Introduces a time penalty
and an increase in required re-
sources (e.g., replica modules
that are used to compensate
for isolating the aected com-
ponent of the system).
• May cause an operation of
the system in a degraded con-
dition which inuences its per-
formance and incurs additional
time overhead to the system.
Recovery
• Relocation/Migration [13, 19]
• Re-instantiation/Restart [11,
13, 17, 19]
• Maintain system functionality
in an operational state as it was
before the fault or attack.
• Helps to restore the system to
its initial state when the impact
of the attack can not be handled
in another manner. It guaran-
tees that the impact of the attack
is completely removed.
• May cause a degradation in the
operation of the system which
inuences the performance and
functionality thereof.
• Restoring the system to its ini-
tial state causes lost data, such
as privacy related data (e. g., lo-
cation, speed, driving behavior)
and workshop data (e. g., vehi-
cle health, engine data and emis-
sions). The impact of the lost
data depends on the type of data
and the current need for it. In
addition, the re-instantiation of
safety-critical functions may re-
quire the vehicle to be in stand-
still.
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• Self-adaptation [49, 50]
• Ensures a secure, reliable, and
predictable communication be-
tween system components and
between the system and its en-
vironment. Supports and main-
tains an acceptable level of ser-
vice despite the occurrence of
faults and other factors that af-
fect normal operations. Seam-
lessly adapts to dierent net-
work loads and reacts to secu-
rity threats and other distur-
bances in the environment.









• Helps to detect anomalies
by analyzing available audit
logs and records (e.g., entropy
measures) and comparing these
records with dened normal be-
haviors. More records enhance
the precision of the detection.
• Provides an indication (i.e., a
robustness degree) to what ex-
tent temporal logic properties
are from satisfying or violating
a specication.
• Time penalty for processing
audit records. More records at
disposal increases the process-
ing time and complexity. On
the other hand, a low number
of records leads to an imprecise
detection with more false posi-
tives and false negatives.
• Imprecise detection: false posi-
tives and false negatives
Mitigation
• Rescue Workow [18, 19]
(adaptation may be necessary)
• Dynamic Deployment of
Policies [15]
• Enables the system to continue
operation after the failure of the
task until it is unable to proceed
without amending the fault or
attack. Already nished tasks
do not need re-execution, thus
saving time and resources.
• Takes the dynamic and chang-
ing nature of attacks into ac-
count. Deploys dierent de-
fense policies depending on the
attack, for example, it can mod-
ify the executed actions while
the attack is going on.
• It may lead to a decrease in
the quality of service. Time
penalty might be caused by re-
computing and migrating the
tasks which cause the problem.
• Leads to performance over-
head. Moreover, it always
requires runtime permissions
which may not be present when
running normally. Complexity.
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• Helps the system to resume
its operation in a state free of
the eects of the fault or attack.
Frequent checkpointing reduces
the amount of lost work.
• Helps to restore the system to
its initial state when the impact
of the attack can not be handled
in another manner. It guaran-
tees that the impact of the attack
is completely removed.
• Overhead in relation to the size
and frequency of created check-
points. Creating a checkpoint,
for instance, requires interrupt-
ing the normal operation of a
system to record the checkpoint.
Moreover, it requires storage re-
sources to store the checkpoint.
The created checkpoints might
potentially contain an error or
intrusion that has not been de-
tected yet. Globally consistent
checkpoints are not trivial to
obtain in a distributed system,
due to e. g., variation of the local
clock, parallel computation and
possible dierent system states.
• Restoring the system to its ini-
tial state causes lost data, such
as privacy related data (e. g., lo-
cation, speed, driving behavior)
and workshop data (e. g., vehi-
cle health, engine data and emis-
sions). The impact of the lost
data depends on the type of data
and the current need for it. In
addition, the re-instantiation of
safety-critical functions may re-
quire the vehicle to be in stand-
still.
Endurance
• Secure Logging (e. g., [54–56])
• Prevents modifying the logs by
using e.g., chained hashes. It
enables storing security-related
events containing information
about e.g., ash operations, ex-
ternal interactions, and power
downtime. This information
helps to reconstruct events,
detect intrusions and identify
problems.
• Resource consumption and
time penalty. Moreover, it re-
quires authentication and cryp-
tographic means to ensure data
integrity and condentiality.
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• Signature-based Detection [13]
• Verication of Safety-Proper-
ties [13]
• A precisely calibrated signa-
ture eectively identies abnor-
mal events during software exe-
cution.
• Ensures that the system does
not evolve in unsafe state start-
ing from some initial condi-
tions.
• Does not work when design-
ers and intellectual property
providers are not trusted. It can-
not handle zero-day attacks and,
thus, often used with Anomaly-
based techniques leading to a in-
creased resource consumption
and time penalty.




• Isolation [11, 13]
• Graceful Degradation [13, 15]
• Enables adaptation by switch-
ing the conguration parame-
ters of the compromised compo-
nent to another conguration.
• It provides a remedy to enable
the system to continue its oper-
ation by osetting the eect of
the attack. Also, it prevents loss
of functionality.
• Prevents a catastrophic fail-
ure of the system. It enables
a system to continue function-
ing even after parts of the sys-
tem have been compromised. It
shuts down less critical func-
tions to allocate the resources to
more critical functions to main-
tain availability.
• Decreases the quality of ser-
vice.
• Introduces a time penalty
and an increase in required re-
sources (e.g., replica modules
that are used to compensate
for isolating the aected com-
ponent of the system).
• Causes a degradation in the
performance of the operations
and services of the system.
Recovery
• Relocation/Migration [13, 19]
• Software Rejuvenation [11, 19]
• Reinitialization [11]
• Maintain system functionality
in an operational state as it was
before the fault or attack.
• Helps avoiding the costs of fail-
ures from software degradation,
as periodic (graceful) restarts of
the software component allow
the release and re-allocation of
memory, thus, operation in a
clean state.
• Applied in conditions in which
the mitigation is deemed impos-
sible. Restores or pristine resets
the system to its initial state.
• May cause an operation of
the system in a degraded con-
dition which inuences its per-
formance.
• Requires shutting the software
down and restarting it periodi-
cally which causes the software
to be unavailable for the dura-
tion of the restart. It is often a
slow process requiring an extra
overhead.
• Causes loss of work, and ac-
cordingly leads to a waste of re-
sources.
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• Attack Analysis / Reconstruc-
tion (e. g., [57, 58])
• Helps to enhance resilience
by systematically and empiri-
cally analyzing attacks as well
as used technologies (potential
entry point, e.g., Bluetooth and
WiFi) that interact with the ex-
ternal environment.
• Resource consumption and
analysis eort.
Asset Attack
Data Storage Unauthorized Read/Manipulation
Detection
• Signature-based Detection [13]
• Specication-based Anomaly
Detection (e. g., [22])
• A precisely calibrated signa-
ture eectively identies abnor-
mal events during software exe-
cution.
• Helps detecting anomalies in
the system’s behavior by report-
ing the specic deviation that
has been observed.
• Does not work when design-
ers and intellectual property
providers are not trusted. It can-
not handle zero-day attacks and,
thus, often used with Anomaly-
based techniques leading to a in-
creased resource consumption
and time penalty.
• Needs of resources for detec-
tion and processing of collected
information (e.g., costly intelli-
gent sensors). Domain knowl-
edge is required to specify nor-
mal behavior. Specications
need to be adapted for each spe-
cic vehicle conguration other-
wise risk of high false positives
or negatives.
Mitigation
• Redundancy [11–13, 15, 17–20]
• Isolation [11, 13]
• It enables data backup and re-
store by replicating information
and data sources.
• It provides a remedy to enable
the system to continue its oper-
ation by osetting the eect of
the attack. Also, it prevents loss
of functionality.
• Requires extra resources for
data storage.
• Introduces a time penalty
and an increase in required re-
sources (e.g., replica modules
that are used to compensate
for isolating the aected com-
ponent of the system).
Recovery
• Dynamic Deployment of Poli-
cies [15]
• Takes the dynamic and chang-
ing nature of attacks into ac-
count. Deploys dierent de-
fense policies depending on the
attack, for example, it can mod-
ify the executed actions while
the attack is going on.
• Leads to performance over-
head. Requires runtime permis-
sions which may not be present
when running normally. Com-
plexity.
Table C.3 – Continued on next page
108
C.B. Proposed Automotive Solutions






• Secure Logging (e. g., [54])
• Attack Analysis / Reconstruc-
tion (e. g., [57, 58])
• Prevents modifying the logs by
using e.g., chained hashes. It
enables storing security-related
events containing information
about e.g., ash operations, ex-
ternal interactions, and power
downtime. This information
helps to reconstruct events,
detect intrusions and identify
problems.
• Helps to enhance resilience
by systematically and empiri-
cally analyzing attacks as well
as used technologies (potential
entry point, e.g., Bluetooth and
WiFi) that interact with the ex-
ternal environment.
• Resource consumption and
time penalty. Moreover, miss-
ing authentication and lack of
cryptographic means to ensure
data integrity can limit the po-
tential of the logging.
• resource consumption and
analysis eort.
C.B Proposed Automotive Solutions
In Table C.4 we provide a description of the solutions referred to in Figure C.1. This
overview of specic solutions should be considered as a starting point for interested
readers and is by no means complete.







Heernan et al. [26] use the automotive functional safety standard
ISO 26262 as a guide to derive logical formulae. They demonstrate
the feasibility of their proposed runtime verication monitor with
an automotive gearbox control system as use case.
Specication-based
Anomaly Detection
Müter et al. [22] describe eight detection sensors that are applica-
ble for the internal network of automotive systems. Six of these
sensors are specication-based, e. g., the frequency of specic





Nowdehi et al. [27] propose an IDS that learns about the automo-
tive system by learning from samples of normal trac without
requiring a model denition.
Machine Learning Hanselmann et al. [28] propose CANet an unsupervised IDS for
the automotive CAN bus. The anomaly score is calculated using
the error between the reconstructed signal and the true signal
value.
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Müter et al. [29] design an entropy-based IDSs for automotive
systems with experimental results using data from a vehicle’s
CAN-Body network.
Localization Cho and Shin [30] present a scheme identifying the attacking ECU
based on ngerprinting the voltage measurements on the CAN
bus for each ECU. We see great opportunities in the localization
of attacks when considering a centralized vehicle architecture
combined with virtualisation techniques. This allows us to get




Attack Prediction Husák et al [31] perform a survey about current attack projection
and prediction techniques in cybersecurity.
Redundancy Diversity
Techniques
Baudry and Monperrus provide in their survey [71] an overview
of dierent software diversity techniques.
Adaptive Software
Diversity
Höller et al. [37] introduce an adaptive dynamic software diver-
sity method. The diversication control receives error information
from the decision mechanism and randomizes specic parame-
ters during execution. Their experimental use cases demonstrate







Cómbita et al. provide a survey on response and reconguration
techniques for cyber-physical control systems. Controllers or
other systems that can be modelled as a control loop can be, for
instance, adjusted to have another module in the feedback loop
that compares the actual feedback from the control loop with a
simulated/modelled response of what is expected.
Runtime En-
forcement
Safety Guard Wu et al. [44] show how so-called safety guards can be applied to







Dagan et al. [38] provide an architectural design on how to ex-
tend limp modes so that they can be additionally used in a cyber
security context. A safe-mode manager sends out triggering mes-
sages that cause the ECUs to transition to a limp mode when
cyber-breaches are detected.
Ishigooka et al. [39] propose a graceful degradation design process
for autonomous vehicles with focus on safety.
Reschkka et al. [40] explore how skills and ability graphs can be
used for modelling, on-line monitoring and supporting decision
making of driving functions.
Restructure Segovia et al. [15] set the focus of their survey on software re-
ection as mitigation technique for SCADA systems. Software
reection enables the system itself to examine and change its
execution behaviour at runtime, which allows, for instance, the
system to take actions when an attack is detected. The drawbacks
currently seen in software reection are the performance over-
head, the increased execution time and the extended permissions
required by software reection.
Table C.4 – Continued on next page
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Rubio-Hernan et al. [41] propose an architecture for CPS that
combines feedback control loops with programmable network-





Jiang et al. [42] propose a hypervisor that meets real-time require-
ments.
Other relocation techniques are microservices [72]. Pekka and




Engelmann et al. [73] describe a pre-emptive migration technique
which uses a feedback-loop for observing health parameters to
detect behaviour indicating a fault. This solution was developed
for high performance computing and its applicability for the au-






Romangnoli et al. [74] describe a method to decide when it is safe
to reload the software of a CPS.
ENDURANCE
Self-* Continuous Change Möstl et al. [47] identify in their work the challenges of continuous
change and evolution of CPS and propose two frameworks for self-
aware systems centring around self-modelling, self-conguration
and self-monitoring. The controlling concurrent change (CCC)
framework is concerned with how to deal with changes in soft-
ware components during the lifetime of a CPS. The authors high-
light that the well-established V-model currently used is not de-
signed for continuous change and therefore parts of the integra-
tion testing and system validation and verication need to be
moved to the system itself. The proposed framework includes an
automated integration process for new or updated functions that
addresses safety, security, availability and real-time requirements.
The structure and workow of the proposed framework is further
described using an automotive use case. The second framework
concentrates on optimising performance, power consumption and




Challenges in V&V De Lemos [53] discuss research challenges of verication and
validation for self-adaptive systems at runtime.
Robustness Adversarial Attacks
on DNN
Yuan et al. [59] give an overview of current adversarial attack and
defence techniques for deep learning.
Forensics Secure Logging Lee et al. [55] describe T-Box a secure logging solution for automo-
tive systems that makes use of the trusted execution environment
in ARM TrustZone.
Table C.4 – Continued on next page
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Table C.4 – Continued from previous page
Pattern Technique Solution
Mansor et al. [56] propose a framework to log vehicle data, such
as diagnostic transmission codes, via the mobile phone and store
it on a secure cloud storage.
Attack Analysis /
Reconstruction
Nilsson and Larson [57] discuss the requirements for conducting
forensic investigations on the in-vehicle network.
Bortles et al. [58] present which types of data may be retained
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Abstract. Vehicles have become complex computer systems with multiplecommunication interfaces. In the future, vehicles will have even more con-
nections to e.g., infrastructure, pedestrian smartphones, cloud, road-side-units
and the Internet. External and physical interfaces, as well as internal communi-
cation buses have shown to have potential to be exploited for attack purposes.
As a consequence, there is an increase in regulations which demand compliance
with vehicle cyber resilience requirements. However, there is currently no clear
guidance on how to comply with these regulations from a technical perspective.
To address this issue, we have performed a comprehensive threat and risk analy-
sis based on published attacks against vehicles from the past 10 years, from
which we further derive necessary security and resilience techniques. The work
is done using the SPMT methodology where we identify vital vehicle assets,
threat actors, their motivations and objectives, and develop a comprehensive
threat model. Moreover, we develop a comprehensive attack model by analyzing
the identied threats and attacks. These attacks are ltered and categorized
based on attack type, probability, and consequence criteria. Additionally, we per-
form an exhaustive mapping between asset, attack, threat actor, threat category,
and required mitigation mechanism for each attack, resulting in a presentation
of a secure and resilient vehicle design. Ultimately, we present the Resilient
Shield a novel and imperative framework to justify and ensure security and
resilience within the automotive domain.

Resilient Shield: Reinforcing the
Resilience of Vehicles Against Security
Threats
1 Introduction
The complexity of vehicles is increasing. Consequently, vulnerabilities which might
be exploited increase as well. Attacks to vehicular systems can be realized: (i) in-
directly via compromised devices e.g., phones, dongles, or workshop computers
connected to vehicle interfaces; (ii) directly via physical interfaces e.g., debug ports
and the OBD-II connector; and (iii) remotely via various malicious sources, such as
rogue access points and compromised servers. It has been demonstrated that vehicle
cyber attacks e.g., physical attacks [1] and remote attacks [2] are potential threats
that have to be taken seriously. As a case in point, Miller and Valasek [3] performed
a successful remote attack on a Jeep Cherokee via the Internet taking control of its
primary functions by exploiting an open port via a cellular channel, an attack that
led to a recall of 1.4 million vehicles. In [4], researchers managed to get remote access
to the CAN bus of a BMW by compromising its infotainment system, allowing them
to execute arbitrary diagnostic requests. Vulnerabilities in phone applications paired
to vehicles have been exploited by adversaries to track vehicles, unlock the doors
and to start their ignitions [5–7].
Motivation. Securing a vehicle as an afterthought is cumbersome, considering both
the complexity which constantly increases and the existing dependencies on current
architectural design. Hence, it is imperative to consider security during the vehicle’s
complete life cycle from idea to cessation.
There are increased requirements towards ensuring a resilient vehicle design, in
a way that a vehicle should be able to withstand various types of cyber attacks,
malfunctioning units, and other external disturbances. Consequently, the resilient
design should be able to prevent, detect, and respond to cyber attacks, something
which is also in line with the UNECE regulation [8] and the upcoming standard
for automotive cyber security ISO 21434 [9]. In short, prevention is accomplished
with security controls, detection by identifying faults and attacks, and response are
mechanisms related to handling the detected anomalies with the ability to restore and
maintain operation. However, there is currently no clear guidance how to comply
with the aforementioned regulations and standards from a technical perspective. The
start, predict, mitigate, and test (SPMT ) is a systematic approach for identication
and mitigation of vulnerabilities in vehicles [10]. The aim of SPMT is to ultimately
enhance the security of vehicles through their entire life cycle. In this paper, we use
and extend the SPMT methodology to establish an in-depth resilient design model
with imperative mitigation mechanisms.
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Contributions. By applying the SPMT methodology, we performed a comprehensive
threat and risk analysis of 52 published attacks against vehicles from the past 10
years. 37 of these attacks were considered signicant due to their high risk and
were thus further mitigated with imperative security and resilience techniques. In
this process, we have developed a threat model for securing vehicles by identifying
vital vehicle assets and the related potential threat actors, their motivations and
objectives. Moreover, we have developed a comprehensive attack model created from
the analysis of the identied threats and attacks, further ltered and categorized
based on attack type and risk criteria related to the probability and consequences of
the attack. We present a comprehensive summery of the result from applying the
SPMT methodology, an exhaustive mapping between asset, attack, threat actor, threat
category and resilience mechanism for each attack. Ultimately, we dene necessary
security and resilience enhancements for vehicles, the Resilient Shield, which also
validates the eectiveness of the methodology. To the best of our knowledge, our
result is both novel and imperative to justify and ensure security and resilience within
the automotive domain.
2 Related Work
Good practices for security of smart cars [11], Cyber security and Resilience of smart
cars [12], and The Cyber security guidebook for cyber physical vehicle systems,
SAE J3061 [13], provide guidelines regarding threat and risk assessment. EVITA [14]
proposed a method for security, safety, and risk analysis of in-vehicle networks,
whereas HEAVENS [15] proposed a security model based on security objectives from
EVITA and security attributes from Microsoft STRIDE [16]. Rosenstatter et al. [17]
continue with the result from an analysis such as HEAVENS and map the identied
security demands to security mechanisms. However, this mapping focuses only on
securing the in-vehicle network.
The SPMT methodology builds on existing methods, models and security prin-
ciples that are applicable to dierent phases in a vehicle’s life cycle. By adapting
and incorporating relevant parts suitable for the vehicular domain, a comprehensive
security and safety enhancement is achieved. Consequently, the SPMT methodology
covers the vehicles entire life cycle, something which cannot be achieved with exist-
ing methodologies [10]. SPMT adopts Microsoft’s STRIDE categorization [16] which
enables a mapping of attacks to a category with associated security attributes. Thus,
mitigation mechanisms can be considered for the attribute and consequently mitigate
more than one attack. Additionally in SPMT, a reduction analysis is performed for
critical threats by creating attack trees to connect the vulnerability with the threat,
i.e., an attacker wanders from a leaf node (condition) to the root of the tree (attacker
objective). Consequently, the closer to the root a countermeasure is placed, the more
conditions are mitigated. Moreover, some conditions can be attained by more than
one attack, hence a countermeasure can mitigate several attacks.
The REMIND framework [18] for vehicular systems provides a taxonomy for
resilience techniques identied from a review of existing work. In this paper we take
advantage of previous knowledge and new results by applying the SPMT methodology.




We use the aforementioned SPMT model to perform a comprehensive threat modelling
and risk assessment of published attacks to further map these threats and attacks to
imperative security and resilience mechanisms.
The SPMT methodology has 4 phases: Start, Predict, Mitigate and Test. In this
paper, we perform the rst three phases on a Target Of Evaluation (ToE) and analyze
security threats and attacks as well as provide mechanisms for the mitigation thereof
(see Figure D.1).
• In the Start Phase, we address the following questions. What are the threats
requiring a resilient design? What are the entry points to the vehicle? Who are
the actors, their motivators, and their objectives? The outcome of the Start Phase
is a threat model and high-level goals for the enforcement of security and
safety attributes.
• In the Predict Phase, we address the following question. What are the potential
attacks? The outcome of the Predict Phase is an attack model which contains
relevant attacks categorized and ltered according to a stated criteria.
• In the Mitigate Phase, we address the following question. What are the needed
mechanisms to ensure a resilient design? The outcome of the Mitigate Phase is a
resilient design framework i.e., the Resilient Shield, which provides mechanisms
and goals for detecting, preventing, and responding to security threats and
attacks.
• The Test Phase includes the implementation of the mitigation mechanisms
followed by an execution of dierent security tests, such as fuzz, vulnerability,
and penetration testing. In this paper, we do not perform the Test Phase;
however, we plan to test the identied mitigation mechanisms within an
industrial context in the future.
In the following sections, we perform and provide the outcomes of the rst three
phases of the SPMT methodology (see Figure D.1) that are used to establish the
Resilient Shield.
Figure D.1: The rst three phases of the SPMT methodology
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4 Threat Model
A threat model is created by considering: (i) the target of evaluation (ToE), and
(ii) attackers as well as their motivators and objectives. First, our ToE is stated as the
complete vehicle provided by the manufacturer, where we propose to include the
following assets. As shown in Table D.1, the relevance of these assets is veried by
the mapping to attacks.
• Internal and external communication: Automotive Bus technologies, e.g.,
CAN, FlexRay, LIN, MOST and Ethernet. Connection interfaces, e.g., OBD-II,
USB, debug ports, Wi-Fi and Bluetooth.
• Hardware: ECUs, e.g., sensor signal processing. Sensors, related to speed,
position, temperature, airbag and object detection. Actuators, translate signals
from ECUs into actions, e.g., braking, steering and engine control.
• Soware in transit, rest or running: Software update systems, e.g., over-the-
air or workshop updates. Software installed or running in ECUs.
• Data Storage: Sensitive data, e.g., cryptographic keys, forensics logs and
reports.
Second, we propose a simplication of threat actors (i.e., attackers) inspired by the
work of Karahasanovic et al. [19] in relation to motivators and objectives.
Actors and Motivators. The Financial Actor is driven by nancial gain in relation to
a company (intellectual property), organization or individual. This actor can be the
owner who wants to make unauthorised modications (e.g., chip tuning) or criminals
who install ransomware. The Foreign Country is driven by power through cyber
warfare, with the intent to disable viable assets within infrastructure (e.g., transporta-
tion). The Cyber Terrorist is driven by ideological, political or religious objectives.
The Insider is motivated by retaliation or other personal gains, has knowledge of
sensitive information and may plant malicious code into the vehicle. The Hacktivist is
driven by publicity or adrenaline (i.e., the rush) and can have an agenda for political
or social change. The Script Kiddie has usually no clear objective, possess limited
knowledge and is often using already available tools and scripts. However, the reality
is usually a combinations of the mentioned categories and objectives, and actors can
be black hat, gray hat, or white hat hackers in relation to society’s interpretations of
the hackers’ intentions. White hat, are assumed to be the good guys, black hats are
the bad guys, and grey hat are somewhere in the middle.
Furthermore, in Section 6 we adopt the security and safety attributes used in
SPMT. These attributes are imperative to uphold to ensure a secure and resilient
vehicle. On the other hand, the actors are driven by stated motivators (e.g., nancial,
ideological, publicity) with the goal of compromising these attributes. A discussion
and a brainstorming about fullment of these attributes is part of the Start Phase,
however we have chosen to include it in Section 6 to have all considerations for
mitigation in one section. Stated assets and actors are applied to Table D.1 and used




We perform a qualitative risk assessment of published attacks covered in news media
and research publications by estimating (i) the probability and (ii) the consequences
of the attacks based on the following criteria. As shown in Table D.1, the aected
assets, the threat actors and the STRIDE categories for each attack are considered
during this assessment.
Attack Probability. The rst step in this phase is to dene attack probability where
the three following estimates should be used:
E1: Where, when, and in what situation can the attack be carried out?
E2: What expertise is required of the attacker?
E3: How much time does it take to perform the attack?
The resulting probability is on a scale of 1 to 3, where 3 indicates that an attack is
more probable to take place. The highest value in E1-E3 is chosen.
Attack Consequence. In the second step, the consequences are dened by assessing
the eect of the attack on the operational, safety, privacy, and nancial aspects. The
resulting consequence is on a scale from 1 to 3, where 3 indicates that the consequence
is more severe. The highest value is chosen.
Risk Assessment. Once we get the estimates of the attack probability and conse-
quences, we estimate the overall risk by calculating the product of the probability
and the consequence, which gives a risk value between 1 and 9 (see Figure D.2). To
achieve a realistic balance between the nancial cost for mitigation and its related
complexity versus the risk and asset value, we consider only the most signicant
threats. These threats have a risk value of 6 or 9, which is in line with ISO 26262 and
ASIL [20] and corresponds to high and critical risk.
Figure D.2: Adapted table for the risk calculation from the SPMT methodology.
5.1 Disclosed Aacks
To create the attack model, we follow the SPMT recommendation for search criteria
and query scopus1 and Google scholar for academic work, and common vulnerability
databases (NVD, CVE) with keywords related to vehicle, attack and STRIDE categories
(e.g., spoong) or related terms (e.g., mitm). Moreover, we do query the Google search
1https://www.scopus.com/
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engine for media reports on attacks. Next, we classify the attacks according to STRIDE
categories, followed by some examples. Attacks are considered and analyzed with
respect to probability, consequence and risk within their respective category. Out of
a total of 52 published attacks, we have identied 37 high and critical risk attacks
which are further considered in this work.
1) Spoong Attacks - Authenticity, Freshness [5,21–38] The goal of the attacker
is to intercept, hijack, manipulate or replay the communication with a potential
remote access persistence. Security aws in mobile software, such as demonstrated
in the OwnStar attack [5]. OwnStar intercepts communication after the OnStar
user opens the application, whereas the OwnStar device gains the user’s credentials.
Relay attacks, as in compromise of remote keyless entry systems as well as breaking
poor authentication mechanisms [21–23]. GNSS spoong considers broadcasting
fake signals over authentic in order to to trick a receiver, with the intention to get a
vehicle o course [24]. In-vehicle protocol spoong, can aect safety-critical actuators,
such as brake, steering and engine control. Protocols themselves might lack inherent
mechanisms for security which makes active attacks possible such as malicious drop,
modify, spoof, ood and replay of messages.
2) Tampering Attacks - Integrity [2,4,36,38–41] Vulnerable USB/OBD-II dongles
or compromised in-vehicle devices can potentially enable a hacker to control the
communication. Devices can be compromised in various ways e.g., vulnerabilities in
proprietary authentication mechanisms can enable the right to run sensitive diagnos-
tics commands. Brute-force attacks can be used to retrieve cryptographic keys, with
potential to upload exploits to ECUs. Physical tampering of ECUs or other connected
devices. Manipulated rmware in current ECUs, such as malicious code injection via
rmware update. Replacement of ECUs or new devices to eavesdrop/inject messages
or to manipulate software, modify or compromise vehicle functions. Vulnerable con-
nected devices such as OBD and USB dongles can potentially provide remote access
to individual cars and vehicle eets [40]. Moreover, in [2] rmware was extracted and
reverse engineered, manipulated and injected directly into ECU rmware facilitating
persistent and bridging capabilities for attacks.
3) Repudiation Attacks - Non-repudiation, Freshness An attacker manipulates
or removes forensic in-vehicle data, such as GPS coordinates, speed, acceleration
and brake patterns, with the intention to hide traces of the attack. Despite our best
eort, we did not nd attacks which can be clearly mapped to this category; however,
this type of attacks will likely be more frequent in the future due to both increased
number of attacks and digital forensic investigations.
4) Information Disclosure Attacks - Condentiality, Privacy [7, 38, 39, 42–45]
An attacker may be able to exploit cryptographic keys and consequently decrypt
sensitive data by e.g., reverse engineering software with hard-coded keys. Bad
routines for handling of replaced unit led to leaked sensitive data such as owners
home and work address, calendar and call entries and Wi-Fi passwords [42]. A
mobile application for vehicle control contained hard-coded credentials, thus an
attacker may be able to retrieve sensitive data remotely by recovering the key from
the application [7]. A vulnerability in an OBD-II dongle exposed all transferred
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data to the public [43]. Vulnerabilities in automotive bus technologies make various
attacks possible, such as sning of CAN trac due to its broadcast transmission and
lack of encryption [44].
5) Denial of Service (DoS) Attacks - Availability [34–37,46–49] Many attacks
focus on the in-vehicle network that uses CAN as this technology suers from
fundamental vulnerabilities with respect to security (e.g., broadcast communication,
lack of encryption/authentication). Other attacks range from sending an indenite
amount of data to ECUs to make them unresponsive or crash, exploiting error
handling mechanisms, or ooding the network with high priority messages in order
to block lower priority messages. A vulnerability in the Bluetooth functionality
supported unrestricted pairing without a PIN, thus enabled the potential for sending
remote CAN commands aecting safety-critical assets [48]. The Bus-o attack made
ECUs unresponsive or crash [49]. Murvay et al. [47] managed to disable FlexRay
nodes by exploitation of the bus guardian, power saving functionality and by causing
loss of synchronization.
6) Elevation of Privilege Attacks - Authorization [3, 7, 36, 38, 39, 41, 50–52]
In [36] two Bluetooth vulnerabilities allowed remote code execution with root priv-
ileges. Moreover, manipulation of the rmware of the infotainment unit enabled
injection of arbitrary CAN messages. In [50], they were able to release the airbag by
message injection due to a vulnerable authentication mechanism. Lack of authentica-
tion in the NissanConnect app allowed to retrieve personal data by entering an URL
with the vehicle identication number [52]. The outcome of this phase is applied to
Table D.1 and used in the next phase in the following section.
6 Resilient Shield
In this section we present the Resilient Shield which consists of high-level security
goals emphasizing the overall design requirements resulting from an analysis of the
threat model (Section 4). We further provide in Section 6.2 detailed directives for
fullling the high-level security goals for resilient vehicles which are based on these
goals and the attack model (Section 5). Table D.1 summarizes the Resilient Shield.
We list automotive assets, associate them with high risk attacks, potential threat
actors and STRIDE threat categories, and link these to suitable security and resilience
techniques to show how Resilient Shield can be used to mitigate these attacks.
6.1 High-level Security Goals (SGs)
The following high-level goals are the result of an analysis of the threat model detailed
in Section 4. Each SG is associated with the relevant safety and security attributes
they enforce.
SG.1 Secure Communication. Integrity, authenticity and, in specic cases, con-
dentiality need to be ensured for communication. Integrity and authenticity allow to
verify the origin of the message and protect the message from being altered during
transmission. Condentiality can be achieved through encryption of the message to
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prevent unauthorized read access. Freshness, e.g., via counters or timestamps, can be
used to mitigate replay attacks.
SG.2 Readiness. Availability to authorized entities under normal circumstances as
well as disturbances. Even if an adversary tries to disrupt the information ow, the
integrity and availability of correct information needs to be guaranteed.
SG.3 Separation of Duties is needed to limit access to resources for authorized
entities only. Authorization should be combined with the principle of least privilege
to limit the number of entities having access to a resource to the minimum.
SG.4 Secure Software Techniques need to provide security features to ensure that
the executed software has not been modied by an unauthorized entity (authenticity)
and that the software does not contain disclosed vulnerabilities.
SG.5 Separation/Segmentation on an architectural or process level is necessary
in order to limit access and reduce the severity in case of an intrusion (availability).
Isolation techniques, e.g., process isolation, should be considered where possible.
SG.6 Attack Detection and Mitigation is of utmost importance to enable the
system to react and ideally prevent further damage to the system.
SG.7 State Awareness should be ensured with the ability to switch between various
operational states, thus providing reliability and maintainability.
SG.8 Forensics is necessary for post analysis of detected malicious events and
accordingly updating access control policies and other preventive measures.
Physical security, such as vehicle locks, alarm system, and protecting infrastruc-
ture server rooms should be considered. Components must be extensively tested
against requirements separately and when integrated into the vehicle, such as stated
in the SPMT Test Phase. SPMT suggests to use both a qualitative and quantitative
assessment; however, we focus on the qualitative assessment as the aim of Resilient
Shield is to guide the resilient design of automotive systems. Moreover, a reduc-
tion analysis of attack trees is suggested to nd commonalities in countermeasures;
however this is not considered and is thus left as future work.
6.2 Detailed Directives
In this section, we list detailed techniques and patterns that contribute to the security
and resilience of automotive systems based on the identied security goals, threat
and attack model presented in this paper. First, we incorporate the identied patterns
from the REMIND framework [18] in Resilient Shield and further extend them with
security techniques to provide a comprehensive collection of both, security and
resilience techniques for automotive systems. Second, we further discuss the security
aspects of the identied resilience techniques. Next, we detail these techniques.
Authentication. Message authentication can be achieved through Message Authen-
tication Codes (MACs) or signatures which ensure that the message: (i) is created by
the claimed source and (ii) has not been altered during transmission. The authen-




Encryption. Encryption of data ensures the protection of intellectual property,
makes it more dicult to reverse engineer software, protects cryptographic material
and the privacy of users and forensics data.
Redundancy/Diversity. A voting mechanism is used when comparing the output
of two or more redundant systems or software functions. Redundancy increases
the resilience against anomalies; however, from a security perspective it must be
ensured that the voting process cannot be exploited by an attacker to perform DoS
or spoong attacks.
Access Control. Gateways with rewall capabilities allow ltering of messages
between dierent networks in the vehicle. In addition, host-based rewalls on the
ECUs can limit the exposure of open communication ports. Securing physical debug
ports is vital to protect against unauthorized exploitation. Access control to resources
such as les, computation, and diagnostic commands can be provided by the operating
system or by e.g., challenge-response authentication.
Runtime Enforcement. Runtime verication is combined with reactive measures
when safety properties are violated [18, 53].
Secure Storage. Cryptographic material needs to be protected against unauthorized
modications and read access. Data can be either stored encrypted in the regular le
system or in a protected memory partition.
Secure Boot. A validation of the authenticity and integrity of the rmware to be
loaded during the boot process [54].
Secure Programming. Secure programming guidelines such as MISRA C [55] are
important to avoid common programming errors. Additionally, trusted execution
environments may be necessary for isolating and securing applications.
Secure Software Update. The ability to update software is not only a necessity to
improve and extend functionality, it is also essential for security, e.g., to mitigate
vulnerabilities. In addition, the update process itself needs to be secure [56], during
the distribution and installation process.
Verication & Validation. The Test Phase in SPMT focuses on the need for security
testing and verication of each asset by doing fuzz, vulnerability and penetration
testing. In addition to security testing, the verication and validation of functionality
and safety is required [10, 18].
Separation. Architectural separation can be achieved through physical separation
into smaller networks or through virtualization techniques allowing to allocate
resources to specic functions or systems.
Specication-based Detection. Knowledge about abnormal behavior is used to
detect anomalies and attempts to exploit known vulnerabilities. It also requires
domain knowledge and needs to be updated regularly [18, 57].
Anomaly-based Detection. Is based on dening normal behavior and deviations
trigger alerts and has the potential to detect unknown attacks. Anomaly-based
detection can be categorized in statistical, information-theoretic, machine learning
and localization techniques [18, 57].
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Prediction of Faults/Attacks. Predicting the next step or the ultimate goal of an
ongoing attack.
Adaptive Response. The function response may be temporarily adapted, e.g.,
through a model, while under attack [18].
Reconguration. Graceful degradation can be used to limit the impact of an attack
when preventive measures failed.
Migration. The ability to migrate services to other nodes in order to maintain system
functions when under attack [18].
Checkpoint & Rollback. Used to recover the system to a desired state. The state
needs to be secured, e.g., through secure logging, to defend against possible attacks
that aim at modifying a saved system state [18].
Rollforward Actions. Upon detecting an anomaly or error the system transitions
back to the state immediately before the event happened. Similarly to rollback it
needs to be ensured that this mechanism cannot be exploited [18].
Self-X. The system needs to be aware of its state and able to switch to other states
when anomalies occur [18, 58].
Robustness. Employed mechanisms and functions need to be robust against anom-
alies [18].
Forensics. Secure logging is used to record events, e.g., detection of an ongoing
attack, use of specic services or diagnostics. In addition, events with non-repudiation
claims can be used as evidence of a crime.
Table D.1 presents the Resilient Shield. Assets with high or critical risk threats
are associated with appropriate security and resilience techniques demonstrating
the ability of Resilient Shield to defend against these threats. For example, hacktivists
and insiders are the main threat actors for communication:external:debugport, such as
JTAG, and needs to be protected with authentication mechanisms combined with
access control or, if not possible otherwise, with physical protection (e.g., deactiva-
tion).
7 Conclusion
We have performed a comprehensive threat and risk analysis of published attacks
against vehicles and derived imperative security and resilience mechanisms by ap-
plying the SPMT methodology. A threat model with vital vehicle assets and related
potential threat actors, their motivations and objectives was developed. By an exten-
sive analysis of threats and attacks, further ltered and categorized based on attack
type, probability and consequence criteria, an attack model was developed based on
the remaining high risk attacks. Based on the developed models, a comprehensive
mapping between asset, attack, threat actor, threat category, and defense mechanisms
was performed for all attacks and is presented in Table D.1. Table D.1 summarizes
the outcomes by applying SPMT, i.e. the Resilient Shield, a novel framework both
justifying and dening imperative security and resilient mechanisms needed in a
modern vehicle. Consequently, the Resilient Shield can be used as a vital baseline for





Table D.1: Resilient Shield. A mapping from automotive assets to identied attacks, potential threat actors, STRIDE threat categories and
ultimately to appropriate security and resilience techniques, and Security Goals (SGs).




























































































































































































































































































sensor:camera [34, 35] FC, CT, HA S, D • • • • •
sensor:GNSS [24, 26, 29, 30, 32] FC, CT, HA S • • • • • • •
sensor:lidar [28, 34] FC, CT, HA S, D • • • • •
sensor:ultrasonic [35] FC, CT, HA S, D • • • • •
Communication
internal:can [40, 44, 46, 47, 49] FA, FC, CT, IN, HA S, T, I, D • • • • • • • • • • • • •
internal:exray [37] FA, FC, CT, HA S, D • • • • • • • • •
external:bluetooth [4, 36] FC, CT, HA S, T, D, E • • •
external:usb [4] FC, CT, HA S, T, E • • •
external:keyfob [22, 23] HA, SK S • • • •
external:wi [5, 33] HA, SK S, I • • • • •
external:cellular [3, 4, 41, 45, 51, 52] FC, CT, HA, SK S, T, I, D, E • • •
external:obdII [7, 27, 31, 38, 40, 43, 46, 48] CT, HA S, T, I, D, E • • • • • • • • • •
external:debugport [3, 41] HA, IN I, E • •
Software
running:state [25] FC, CT, HA S, D • • • • • • •
running:rmware [3–5, 33, 36, 39, 41, 45, 51,
52]
FC, CT, HA S, T, E • • • • • • • • • •
instorage:update [4, 36, 41] HA, SK S, T, E • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
instorage:weakcrypto [21, 50, 52] FC, CT, HA, SK S, E • • •
Data Storage
crypto:certicates [41] FC, CT, HA I • • • •
hw:replaced [42] HA, SK I • • •
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D. Resilient Shield: Reinforcing the Resilience of Vehicles Against Security Threats
We believe our work is imperative for facilitating and guiding the design of
resilient automotive systems; however, it still remains to be seen how large the
coverage is in relation to future attacks. Moreover, testing and validation of the
Resilient Shield within an industrial context is left as a future work.
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Abstract. Nowadays vehicles have an internal network consisting ofmore than 100 microcontrollers, so-called Electronic Control Units (ECUs),
which control core functionalities, active safety, diagnostics, comfort and info-
tainment. The Controller Area Network (CAN) bus is one of the most widespread
bus technologies in use, and thus is a primary target for attackers. AUTOSAR,
an open system platform for vehicles, introduced in version 4.3 SecOC Prole
3, a counter-based solution to provide freshness in authenticated messages to
protect the system against replay attacks. In this paper, we analyse and as-
sess this method regarding safety constraints and usability, and discuss design
considerations when implementing such a system. Furthermore, we propose a
novel security prole addressing the identied deciencies which allows faster
resynchronisation when only truncated counter values are transmitted. Finally,
we evaluate our solution in an experimental setup in regard to communication
overhead and time to synchronise the freshness counter.

Extending AUTOSAR’s Counter-based
Solution for Freshness of Authenticated
Messages in Vehicles
1 Introduction
The internal network of modern vehicles consists of more than 100 Electronic Control
Units (ECUs) that communicate via dierent network technologies, such as Controller
Area Network (CAN) and Ethernet. CAN is a relatively old technology developed
by Robert Bosch GmbH in 1983 and later standardised in ISO 11898 [1]. Back then,
securing the CAN bus was not an issue, as listening and transmitting on the bus
required special equipment and physical access to the vehicle. This assumption
changed when vehicles became connected to the outside world, e. g., the internet,
mobile phones, and other vehicles.
Miller and Valasek demonstrated a remote exploitation back in 2015 [2], where
they were able to remotely control a vehicle over the Internet. Given this, and
other successful attacks in more recent years underlines the need for security in the
automotive domain, especially, a secure transmission of data.
AUTOSAR, a system architecture developed by a consortium of vehicle OEMs
and suppliers, denes in Specication of Secure Onboard Communication v4.4.0 [3]
three so-called SecOC Proles, which provide message authentication to ensure that
messages were sent by said origin and have not been altered during transmission.
Messages are authenticated by calculating the corresponding Message Authentication
Code (MAC) and sending it along with the clear text. SecOC Prole 2 veries the
authenticity of messages without an additional counter or timestamp, whereas SecOC
Prole 1 and 3 use a counter-based Freshness Value (FV) in order to prevent replay
attacks. The dierence between the latter two is that SecOC Prole 3 includes a
mechanism to synchronise the FV across senders and receivers. Such a mechanism
to synchronise the FV is required when only a truncated FV is sent along with the
data, for instance, due to the limited payload size and network technology used in
automotive networks.
In this paper, we analyse and assess AUTOSAR’s SecOC Prole 3 in detail, dis-
cuss design aspects and limitations of counter-based freshness solutions, and lastly
propose a new prole that is independent of the underlying network architecture
and addresses the identied issues. Additionally, we evaluate our method in terms of
communication overhead and time to synchronise the FV.
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2 AUTOSAR SecOC Profile 3 (JASPAR)
The AUTOSAR Secure Onboard Communication Specication [3] introduces SecOC
Prole 3, also named JASPAR, a method that guarantees freshness and provides
message authentication. Prole 3 applies CMAC/AES-128 [4] for message authenti-
cation and is used in combination with a master/slave synchronisation of a freshness
counter as explained in [3, Annex A]. Prole 3 also introduces an entity called
Freshness Value Manager (FVM), which is responsible for maintaining the current
FV and synchronising the value between senders and receivers. The FVM can either
run centrally on a dedicated ECU or decentralised in each sending ECU. A method
for a fast synchronisation of the FV between the dierent entities is necessary, as
the senders and receivers normally only store a portion of the FV in Non-Volatile
Memory (NVM). In addition, a watchdog timer reset or other unexpected situations
may occur where an ECU restarts and consequently fails to successfully verify in-
coming Interaction Layer Protocol Data Units (I-PDUs) due to the fact that the FV
has already changed.
In the following sections we describe the FV, the structure of the I-PDUs and
continue with giving details under what circumstances Prole 3 is able to correctly
verify the authenticity of I-PDUs with truncated FVs even when I-PDUs are lost.
2.1 Freshness Value and I-PDU Format
Prole 3 describes two congurations for sending data:
(1) sending the authenticated data, named Authentic I-PDU, and the authentication
information, namely the Cryptographic I-PDU, separately; or
(2) sending the application data and the authentication information in one I-PDU,
a Secured I-PDU, which is only possible if the data to be authenticated is short.
A truncated FV and MAC, which is further called authenticator, may be sent
for each I-PDU since sending these values in full length signicantly increases the
network load. CAN, for instance, is already highly utilised and requires a truncation
as the maximum payload size is 64 bits.
Freshness Value. The FV has a maximum size of 64 bits and consists of three sub-
counters (their maximum size is given in braces): trip counter (24 bits), reset counter
(24 bits) and message counter (48 bits), as shown in Figure E.1a. Note that the length
of the sub-counters must be adjusted individually and may not exceed the maximum
size of the FV (64 bits). The trip counter is increased in units of trips, the reset
counter is incremented periodically dened by a static parameter ResetCycle and the
message counter is increased per message/I-PDU being sent. The reset ag shown in
Figure E.1a contains the n least signicant bits of the reset counter.
Authentic I-PDU. This I-PDU shown in Figure E.1b contains the data that is au-
thenticated by the sender. Depending on the conguration it is sent apart from the
authenticator and FV, or as part of the Secured I-PDU.
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(b) Structure of the Secured I-PDU, i. e., containing





(c) Structure of the Cryptographic I-PDU, i. e., con-
taining only the authentication information.
Trip Counter  Reset Counter  Truncated MAC
LSBMSB
(d) Structure of the Synchronisation Message.
Figure E.1: Structure of the FV and I-PDUs [3, p.138,145].
Secured I-PDU. Is generated when the Authentic I-PDU, the authenticator and
the FV are combined in one I-PDU. It contains an optional header, the data to
be transmitted, the truncated FV and the authenticator, as shown in Figure E.1b.
AUTOSAR recommends to transmit the lower 4 bits of the FV and the upper 28 bits
of the MAC. Note that the authenticator contains the MAC of the plain text (the
message) and the full length FV even in cases when only a truncated FV is transmitted.
Cryptographic I-PDU. Figure E.1c gives details about this I-PDU which is sent
along with the Authentic I-PDU and thus allows, in case of CAN, more bits of the FV
and MAC to be transmitted.
Synchronisation Message. Also named TripResetSyncMsg, is sent periodically
by the FVM when either the trip counter increases or a new ResetCycle starts, for
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instance every second. The synchronisation message, see Figure E.1d, contains the
trip and reset counter in their full length as well as the corresponding authenticator.
The message counter is set to zero when a synchronisation message is received. A
synchronisation message is also sent at startup or after a reset of the FVM. In such a
case the trip counter stored in NVM gets incremented and the reset counter is reset
to 0.
2.2 Reconstruction of the Freshness Value
When transmitting only a truncated FV along with each PDU, situations can occur in
which the receiver will not be able to correctly verify the authenticity of the received
I-PDUs due to a mismatch of the current FV, for example after an ECU reset by a
watchdog timer or woken up after a long sleep. Prole 3 describes in [3, Figure 6-7]
how to reconstruct the counter values when only truncated FVs are transmitted
and the internally stored counters do not result in a successful verication of the
Authentic I-PDU. (1) The receiver then tries to verify the I-PDU with its internally
stored FV+1. (2) If this verication fails, it updates the FV with the truncated value
from the received I-PDU, e. g., lower 2 bits of the reset and message counters. (3) The
internally stored value consisting of the trip counter, reset counter and upper part of
the message counter is incremented by 1 and the verication is retried. An internal
counter, called attempts, is incremented with every repetition of (3) until the allowed
maximum (parameter R can be congured) is reached and the I-PDU will be dropped.
The rest of this section describes two situations where it is not possible to
reconstruct the correct counter value resulting in the ECU being unable to verify the
authenticity of the I-PDU. As the truncated FV contains a few bits of the reset and
message counters, the receiver is able to correctly verify the authenticity of I-PDUs
even if it has missed some I-PDUs. We assume in the rest of this analysis that the
ResetCycle is harmonised with the message counter, meaning that a synchronisation
message is always sent when the message counter overows. The abbreviations
used in the following analysis are as follows:
R The maximum number of verication retries.
m The length of the message counter.
ml The length of the lower part of the message counter.
rf The length of the reset ag.
Clast The message counter value of the last successfully veried message.
T The period in which messages are sent.
2.2.1 Reconstruction of message counter fails
The rst situation in which the receiver is not able to correctly verify the authenticity
of an I-PDU is when it misses too many I-PDUs to be able to correctly reconstruct
the actual message counter assuming that the reset counter did not change. In this
situation, it is possible to reconstruct the message counter as long as no more than
2ml +R · 2ml PDUs are missed. Overall, the SecOC module is able to recover the
correct FV as long as it receives an I-PDU with a message counter C in the range:
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Clast < C ≤min{Clast + 2ml +R · 2ml ,2m − 1} (E.1)
The total waiting time for a synchronisation message since the last successfully
veried I-PDU is
(2m − 1−Clast) · T (E.2)
Example. We analyse a system with an 8 bit message counter m = 8bits; ml =
2bits; Clast = 0; R = 2. AUTOSAR recommends a truncated FV of length 4, which
corresponds to ml = 2bits and rf = 2bits in our example. We chose to illustrate
the worst case scenario, when the last correctly veried counter value is 0, for
illustration purposes, however, the identied interval applies for all counter values.
In this scenario the receiver can reconstruct the correct FV as long as it receives one
of the next consecutive 12 I-PDUs (22 + 2 · 22, see Eqn. E.1). If it misses more than
12 PDUs, respectively the ECU sleeps longer than 240 ms with a message frequency
of 50Hz, the module is unable to recover and has to wait in total 28 − 1− 0 = 255
PDUs (see Eqn. E.2) since the last successfully veried PDU to receive the next
synchronisation message. Figure E.2 illustrates this example when the SecOC module
receives only the truncated FV and MAC with each PDU. The current counter values
in each step are aligned with their corresponding counter and presented in binary
format.
In case that the SecOC module receives a truncated FV (see Figure E.1b) of
0b0000 and the last received message counter was 0, it is still able to correctly verify
the authenticity of the I-PDU when the real message counter value is 0b00001100.
Note that the module will drop the I-PDU as soon as the MAC verication fails
and the number of maximum attempts R is reached. This example shows that it is
not possible (with ml = 2bits) to correctly verify I-PDUs with a message counter
> 0b00001101 as more than two attempts to reconstruct the correct message
counter (R > 2) would be needed.
2.2.2 Reconstruction of the reset counter fails
The second situation occurs when the SecOC module has been inactive for a longer
period and consequently missed at least one synchronisation message. In this situa-
tion, the module is able to recover the correct FV as long as the message counter is
in the range described in Section 2.2.1 and as long as the truncated reset counter, the
reset ag, can be used to correctly restore the FV. For example, a 2-bit reset ag can
be used to correct 22 − 1 reset counter increments. Overall, the interval in which it
is possible to correctly reconstruct the FV with changing reset counter is illustrated
in Figure E.3.
3 Design Considerations and Limitations
In addition to the time span ECUs may be out of sync, non-functioning and waiting
for a synchronisation message, we have identied other potential challenges when
introducing SecOC Prole 3.
141











0000 0000 0000 00 00 00 counter values of last successfullyverified PDU
0000 0000 0000 00 01 00
0000 0000 0000 00 10 00
0000 0000 0000 00 11 00
0000 0000 0000 01 00 00
0000 0000 0000 01 01 00
0000 0000 0000 11 00 00



































𝐶"#$% + 2() + X + 2()
Reset Counter Message Counter
FV can be correctly restored FV cannot be restored using truncated FV
Figure E.3: Example showing the cases when the ECU is able to correctly verify the
I-PDU when the reset counter increases.
Freshness Value Manager (FVM). The FVM may be implemented decentralised,
meaning that each sending ECU has its own instance of the FVM, or centralised,
where there is one FVM for all senders and receivers.
The trip and reset counters are shared between all senders and receivers when
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applying the centralised approach, however, the trip counter is the only counter that
has to be stored in NVM of the FVM. Storing and accessing only a small portion
of the FV in NVM is faster and increases also the lifetime, which is expected to be
at least 10 years, as less space in memory pages has to be written. The reset and
message counters are stored in volatile memory where the message counter is the
only counter maintained individually per I-PDU/message type by the sender and
receivers.
CAN uses so-called CAN-IDs to distinguish between dierent message types. For
this reason, the synchronisation message of each FVM requires its own distinct CAN-
ID. Thus, a centralised approach also reduces the number of required CAN-IDs due to
having one synchronisation message for all senders and receivers. The decentralised
approach on the other hand requires each sender to maintain the current trip counter
in their NVM as this counter is independent of the counters used by other senders.
Having a centralised FVM might bring in challenges regarding the propagation
of synchronisation messages, as gateways cause additional delays. This, however,
depends on the chosen placement of the FVMs, e. g., having one FVM per network
segment or one for the entire internal network of the vehicle.
A centralised FVM also introduces the FVM as a single point of failure and thus
increases the complexity drastically when combined with safety-critical functions.
As an example, a safety-critical system, which is classied as ASIL D, in combination
with Prole 3 would require a redundant FVM with dissimilar software and hardware
redundancy according to ISO 26262 [5], the functional safety standard for road
vehicles. From this perspective, a decentralised FVM is desirable for safety-critical
functions.
Single-I-PDU conguration. Sending data and its authenticator in a single I-PDU
is faster compared to sending them separately for the reason that the data has to
be kept in Random Access Memory (RAM) until the second PDU containing the
corresponding authenticator is received. Heavy duty vehicles have to comply to
SAE J1939 [6], which may require to send the authenticator as a separate frame for
the reason that this standard denes the content of certain CAN frames to provide
interoperability between a variety of equipment for heavy duty vehicles. Thus,
sending data and authenticator separately allows increased security for core functions
developed by the vehicle OEM while third-party modules are still able to receive the
predened messages dened in [6]. Sending two frames also allows the transmission
of longer truncated values when considering the maximum payload size of 64 bits in
CAN.
Complex Structure of the FV. Prole 3 introduces a FV consisting of three counters
(see Figure E.1a). The trip counter is incremented in units of trips, which requires
a global understanding of the unit as it strongly depends on the function of the
ECU. AUTOSAR species that the trip counter shall be incremented when the ECU
running the FVM starts, on wakeup, on reset and when the power status changes
from o to on. ECUs in a heavy duty vehicle might be active for several days, e. g.,
interior light control, whereas others will boot when the ignition is switched on.
Thus, it may happen that ECUs miss the increment of the trip counter and need to
wait for the next synchronisation message. Moreover, the use of the reset counter is
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solely to indicate that a new ResetCycle has started. For this reason, we do not see
an advantage of having the reset counter separated from the message counter.
Reset Counter Overow. There are no means to increase the trip counter when the
reset counter overows. Instead, a synchronisation message with the maximum value
of the reset counter will be sent, meaning that the freshness property of transmitted
messages no longer applies.
Determining the Reset Cycle. The parameter ResetCycle is used to dene the
frequency of synchronisation messages. The ResetCycle should be harmonised with
the maximum value of the message counter in order to achieve the highest utilisation
of the counter space as synchronisation messages reset the message counter.
A centralised FVM introduces additional challenges, as the ResetCycle is dened
globally for all I-PDUs in the vehicle. In this case the counter space as well as
the periodicity of the synchronisation message cannot be eciently adjusted for
individual I-PDU types.
Periodicity of Synchronisation Messages. Since synchronisation messages are
broadcast periodically as dened by the parameter ResetCycle, receiving ECUs will
be in a non-functional state until a synchronisation message is received when they
are out of sync. There is no way for a receiver to notify the FVM that it needs
synchronisation of the FV.
Having means to request synchronisation messages is necessary in order to
provide a fast resynchronisation, such as when starting a vehicle by turning on the
ignition or when an ECU encounters a watchdog timer reset. Most vehicles, including
heavy duty vehicles, have dierent modes of operation, such as run, accessory, parked,
living and crank. RUN indicates that the vehicle is driving and fully operational,
LIVING that ECUs related to the driving functionality are shut o and only comfort
ECUs, such as interior lighting and infotainment, are active. Given these dynamics
of the vehicle modes, it is necessary to have a fast recovery when an ECU loses track
of the current FV.
From a safety perspective it is desirable to have a deterministic, maximum speci-
ed interval for synchronisation messages. In addition, having fast resynchronisation
of non-safety-critical functions may be important for comfort functions to provide a
“premium” feeling when driving a vehicle.
4 Proposed SecOC Profile 4
We address the identied issues in our proposed prole which oers:
• a faster synchronisation of the FV.
• alignment with ISO 26262.
• less bandwidth usage due to the reduced number of control messages needed
to synchronise the FV.
• a simplied structure of the FV.
We propose two modes of operation: Mode 1 similar to Prole 3, however, a new
structure for the FV is used; Mode 2 a more ecient and faster approach that allows
144
4. Proposed SecOC Prole 4
receiving ECUs to request synchronisation messages on demand instead of having to
wait for the next periodic synchronisation message. Figure E.4 provides an overview
of the dierent congurations, modes and message types used. Conguration 1 and 2
describe in which format the data and authenticator are exchanged, either in one
I-PDU or separately. We propose using the same structure as dened in AUTOSAR
for the following I-PDUs: Authentic, Secured and Cryptographic I-PDU. When





































Figure E.4: Overview of conguration and mode options including the involved
messages.
We describe the structure of the FV and the new and modied messages in Sec-
tion 4.1. Sections 4.2 and 4.3 describe the dierent modes of synchronisation followed
by a description of default parameters and recommended values in Section 4.4.
4.1 Freshness Value and I-PDU Format
The structure of the FV and I-PDUs in our proposed method is described in this
section and shown in Figure E.5.
Freshness Value. Figure E.5a depicts the FV, which is reduced to having only two
sub-counters, i. e., a sequence counter and a message counter, which is, similar to
Prole 3, split into an upper and lower part. The sequence counter is maintained by
the FVM and thus needs to be stored in NVM. The scope of the sequence counter can
be dened to be either one per FVM or one counter per message type. Moreover, the
sequence counter may be increased due to a SyncMessage being sent for the reason
that the FVM has been restarted, encountered an error, received an internal trigger
to increase the sequence counter, or has received a SyncRequest.
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(b) Synchronisation Message sent either periodically

















(d) Synchronisation Request (Mode 2).
Figure E.5: Structure of the proposed FV and I-PDUs.
Authentic and Secured I-PDU. The structure is similar to Prole 3 (see Figure E.1b).
Conguration 1 sends the Authentic I-PDU separately or combined with the authen-
ticator when Conguration 2 is enabled.
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Cryptographic I-PDU. Is sent when Conguration 2 is enabled. Figure E.5c ex-
plains how to combine the sequence and message counter when truncated FVs are
transmitted.
SyncMessage. The synchronisation message contains the sequence counter and its
corresponding MAC. As this message is used to synchronise the FV between senders
and receivers, there is, similar to SecOC Prole 3, no possibility to provide freshness
for this message. The nodes, however, must verify that the received sequence counter
is larger than sequence counters previously used to prevent replays of old messages
from an adversary.
SyncRequest. Receivers may send on-demand requests for synchronisation in case
they have no knowledge about the current sequence counter or cannot successfully
verify the received I-PDUs. The Error-Code depicted in Figure E.5d can be used
to signal the FVM why the ECU demands a new SyncMessage, for instance due to
consecutive verication fails or a reboot.
4.2 Sending Periodic SyncMessages (Mode 1)
This conguration is similar to Prole 3, the parameter ResetCycle denes the fre-
quency in which SyncMessages are broadcast and shall be chosen by considering the
maximum time an ECU is allowed to be out of sync without degrading its functional-
ity. We recommend using this conguration only when necessary due to its impact
on the bandwidth of the underlying network.
4.3 On-Demand Request for Synchronisation (Mode 2)
This mode enables the FVM to send SyncMessages when SyncRequests are received.
In situations, such as when multiple receivers wake up, i. e., changing to an active
state or when an ECU being stuck in a bootloop, may occur and result in several
SyncMessages being sent within a short time frame. Given these circumstances, the
FVM is required to handle multiple SyncRequests within a short period of time. A
dynamic parameter, such as SyncMessageSuspend, can be used to dene the time
during which SyncRequests are ignored after a SyncMessage has already been sent.
Therefore situations when a SyncMessage has already been sent by the FVM but not
yet received by the ECU, which sends another SyncRequest when it realises that it is
out of sync, are covered as well.
SyncRequests are, similar to SyncMessages, vulnerable to replay attacks as these
two messages are used to regain synchronisation of the FV. Restricting the number of
SyncRequests in combination with a monotonically increasing FV, however, provide
also security against attackers who inject previously recorded SyncRequests in order
to overow the sequence counter and thus force the FVM to reuse counter values.
Considering the scenario of a 28 bit sequence counter and a limit of 2 SyncRequests
per second would take an attacker 4.2 years until the FV is repeated.
A CAN specic implementation of the SyncRequest may make use of so-called
Remote Frames (RFs) [1]. RFs can be used to request data by sending a frame with the
same CAN-ID as the requested data, where only the Remote Transmission Request
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(RTR) bit changes. This specic solution for CAN has the advantage that no additional
CAN identier for the SyncRequest is needed and thus does not additionally exhaust
the pool of available CAN-IDs. The CAN-ID is also used to prioritise the frames –
the lowest CAN-ID has the highest priority (see arbitration in [1]). Coupling the
priority with the CAN-ID demands further consideration when choosing an ID, as
SyncRequests are event-triggered and not periodic.
4.4 Recommendations and Default Values
We recommend combining both modes, i. e., sending periodic SyncMessages and
allowing ECUs to request them (Mode 1+2), for messages that need be authenticated.
By enabling receivers to request SyncMessages, a larger ResetCycle and thus longer
message counter, which in turn reduces the load on the network, can be used. The
ResetCycle not only depends on the chosen mode, it also strongly depends on the
requirements and for how long an ECU is allowed to be unable to correctly verify
the authenticity of I-PDUs due to being out of sync.
The size of the FV and the authenticator depend on several factors, such as
computational and storage limitations of senders and receivers, the bus technology,
and current network load. Unless compliance to standards, i. e., SAE J1939 for heavy
duty vehicles, is required, it has to be decided whether the data of an existing
CAN frame can be split in two frames to create space for the authenticator and the
truncated FV (conguration 1 in Figure E.4) or if a second frame containing only the
authenticator and the truncated FV (conguration 2) should be used.
Table E.1 lists our recommended parameter values, described in Figures E.4
and E.5, for mode 1 and 2. These values are based on the AUTOSAR SecOC Prole 3
recommendations and should be considered as a base for further adaptation depend-
ing on the requirements. The number of additional attempts for reconstructing the
FV depends strongly on the message frequency of the authenticated data as well as
the computational power of the ECU.
5 Experiments and Evaluation
The experimental setup to validate the functionality of our proposed solution is
shown in Figure E.6 and consists of three nodes, one sender and two receivers,
which were implemented on Freescale MPC 5646C microcontrollers with a compliant
AUTOSAR software using the AUTOSAR 4.3 crypto stack. The FVM is executed on
the sending ECU, as we believe that a decentralised approach is more realistic to be
deployed in a production environment. Furthermore, we chose to send the authentic
data separated from the authentication information (i. e., use conguration 2) as
this setting provides both backward compatibility and compatibility with standards
specifying the frame content.
We have analysed the time a resynchronisation takes when only mode 1 or both
modes were activated using the parameters shown in Table E.2. These parameters
where chosen to highlight the dierences between the two modes, other parameters
such as the length of the authenticator, are not relevant for the following analysis.
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Table E.1: Recommended parameters
Parameter Mode 1 Mode 1+2




FvUpper FvLength – FvMsgCntLower
FvSeqCntLength 28 bits
FvMsgCntLength FvLength – FvSeqCntLength
Conguration 1 Conguration 2
AuthInfoTxLength 28 bits 44 bits
FvTxSeqCntLength 2 bits 4 bits
FvTxMsgCntLength 2 bits 16 bits
Sender
Receiver 1
Receiver 2CAN or Ethernet
FVM
Figure E.6: Experimental setup where sender and receivers either communicate via
CAN or Ethernet.
Figure E.7 shows the calculated times from a scenario where the receiver gets inter-
rupted for 90 ms, e. g., due to a watchdog timer reset or an erroneous event. It shows
the time τ , which is the time measured between receiving the rst I-PDU after the
interruption and the successful resynchronisation of the ECU. Figure E.7a illustrates
the behaviour of periodic SyncMessages; τ decreases with the increasing counter
value Clast , as the next periodic synchronisation message approaches. The large τ
Table E.2: Parameters used for comparing mode 1 and mode 1+2
Parameter Mode 1 Mode 1+2
ResetCycle 5 Hz 1 Hz
Attempts 0 0
FvMsgCntLength 2 bits 2 bits
max. message counter value 10 100
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Mode 1: Periodic SyncMessage only (every 200ms)
Mode 1+2: SyncRequest enabled (SyncMessage every 1s)
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(a) Waiting time for the next SyncMessage when the ECU is interrupted for 90ms.
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(b) SyncMessages being sent.
Figure E.7: Analysis of the waiting time when an ECU is interrupted for 90 ms.
from Clast ≥ 5 is due to the interruption of 90ms, which causes the receiver to miss
the periodic SyncMessage. The blue line shows that enabling requests for synchroni-
sation messages, has a constant time τ since the generation and transmission of the
SyncRequest and SyncMessage have a xed delay. In a real setting, there will be a
variation of τ depending on the bus load and priority of the messages. However, it is
reasonable to assume that even without using very high priorities, these messages
should always be possible to be transmitted within 20 ms. In addition, as shown in
Figure E.7b, enabling SyncRequests provides not only a faster resynchronisation of
the FV, it also makes it possible to reduce the number of periodic SyncMessages.
5.1 CAN Test Bed
In this setting, we rst analyse the processing times and delays of the sending
ECU respectively the FVM. The sender is congured to send a SyncMessage every
200 ms and to accept SyncRequests. These settings were chosen to highlight that
the proposed method is also faster when combined with shorter periods for sending
SyncMessages. Figure E.8 illustrates the frequencies of dierent messages transmitted
on the CAN bus generating in total a bus load of 14%, where messages in cyan colour
are generated background trac. The messages with IDs 8300311 and 8300313 are
the Authentic and Cryptographic I-PDU destined for Receiver 1 with a message
150
5. Experiments and Evaluation
















































































































Last received SyncMessage at 4.99 with value 2573
Sent SyncRequest (ID = 18300315) at 5.002
Next SyncMessage received at 5.019 with value 2574
Time for resync on bus level is 17.83 ms


























s Frequency of SyncMessages over time
SyncMessage sent due to SyncRequest
SyncRequest
SyncMessages
Figure E.8: Results when the receiving ECU gets out of sync and sends a SyncRe-
quest.
frequency of 100 Hz. SyncMessage and SyncRequest were chosen to have a lower
priority (in CAN the lowest ID has the highest priority) than the actual secured
message to show that our approach also works well even when messages with higher
priorities are transmitted on the network. We force the receiving ECU to get out
of sync by triggering the sending ECU/FVM to immediately increase the sequence
counter by 100.
In our measurements it takes the sender 17.8 ms from receiving the SyncRequest
at second 5.00 to sending a SyncMessage, which corresponds to the spike shown in
the chart presenting the time between SyncMessages in Figure E.8.
Overall, it takes the FVM, respectively the sending ECU, in average 18.1 ms
to transmit the SyncRequest, process the request and transmit the corresponding
SyncMessage. Receiver 1 needed in average 25 ms from recognising that it is out of
sync until having a synchronised FV again. Comparing this fast resynchronisation to
sending only periodic SyncMessages as shown in Figure E.7a highlights that not just
the waiting time can be greatly reduced, but also the period in which SyncMessages
are sent can be extended to reduce the bus load of the network. To achieve the same
average for resynchronisation as we have achieved by enabling SyncRequests would
require sending SyncMessages with a frequency of at least 20 Hz.
Other factors such as the bus load and number of receiving ECUs have an impact
on the time a resynchronisation takes when on-demand SyncRequests are enabled.
In most cases it can be assumed that SyncRequests and SyncMessages can be sent
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within the next 20 ms on CAN even with high bus loads when assigning the priorities
properly. Measures to prevent ooding of SyncMessages by many ECUs sending
SyncRequests close after each other may impact the response time of the FVM as
well. Such measures can be implemented on the FVM and may be to limit the number
of SyncRequests within one SyncMessage period (ResetCycle) or to only send one
SyncMessage within a certain time frame.
A case that might require a special handling of SyncRequests is the KeyOn event
and other events where many ECUs are expected to startup simultaneously. In such
scenarios a fast ECU might request and receive a SyncMessage while others are still
booting. One approach is to allow more SyncRequests within one ResetCycle during
startup to allow a fast synchronisation. Another approach to cope with many ECUs
being out of sync is to temporarily set a faster period for sending SyncMessages and
increase the ResetCycle later on. For instance, for the KeyOn scenario one may set
the ResetCycle to 50 ms for two seconds and afterwards increase it to the regular
period of 1 second.
5.2 Ethernet Test Bed
The test bed with the nodes communicating over Ethernet with each other was used
to validate that our implementation, specically the use of our structure of the FV,
works on Ethernet as well. We chose to send the complete FV along with every
message for the reason that the requirement of having a highly limited bandwidth, as
in CAN, does not apply. Thus, there is no need for sending synchronisation messages
or requests. We successfully validated the functionality of our proposed approach
using the structure of the UDP payload shown in Figure E.9.
PDU­ID Data FV MAC
UDP Payload
Figure E.9: Structure of the UDP payload sent over Ethernet (Secured I-PDU).
6 Related Work
Zou et al. [7] identify the challenges of time and counter-based solutions for CAN.
One of the identied challenges for counter-based solutions is the need for ECUs to
be able to request synchronisation messages, however, the authors do not provide
more details.
Gürgens and Zelle [8] present a CAN specic hardware-based solution to provide
counter-based freshness. This method uses one counter per CAN bus where the
counter gets incremented by 1 when a message is sent. The authors also mention
that their proposed solution cannot be implemented in currently available ECUs
as the CAN transceivers require additional functionality. Limiting the scope of the
counter/FV per CAN network segment additionally increases also the delay through
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gateways due to the verication and subsequent generation of a new MAC using the
counter of the network the message is forwarded to.
VulCAN [9] proposes a trusted computing design for message authentication
including software component attestation, but leaves the resynchronisation of the
FV to the underlying protocol being used.
Existing CAN authentication solutions based on industrial criteria have been
evaluated by Nowdehi et al. [10]. According to Nowdehi et al., VatiCAN [11] fulls
the requirements of cost eectiveness, backward compatibility, and repair and mainte-
nance. VatiCAN provides freshness using a nonce, but it requires to be synchronised
periodically (i. e., the authors suggest every 50 ms).
7 Conclusion
Freshness is an important security property that ensures that authenticated messages
have not been replayed by a malicious entity. Counter-based solutions are especially
interesting in the automotive domain, as sensors and other Electronic Control Units
(ECUs) rarely have a globally synchronised clock. AUTOSAR proposed two counter-
based solutions, one using a single counter and another one providing additionally a
master/slave synchronisation of the Freshness Value (FV).
In this paper, we focus on the second solution presented by AUTOSAR, namely
SecOC Prole 3 or JASPAR. We rst provide a detailed analysis of Prole 3 which
shows in which situations the recovery mechanism of the FV succeeds when only
a truncated FV is transmitted. Second, we study the limitations, safety impact and
other design considerations when implementing a counter-based solution to provide
freshness for signals in the in-vehicle network. Third, we propose an extension of
Prole 3 that allows a faster synchronisation of the FV in case senders or receivers
have lost track of the current FV due to, for instance, an unexpected reset, internal
state change or waking up from sleep. We further evaluate our proposed solution on
two test beds each communicating via CAN bus and Ethernet. The experiment shows
that our proposed solution is signicantly faster in synchronising ECUs. Moreover,
the number of necessary control messages used to synchronise is reduced notably
and will have a positive eect on the bus load.
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Abstract. This paper is an experience report of team Halmstad from theparticipation in a competition organised by the i-GAME project, the Grand
Cooperative Driving Challenge 2016. The competition was held in Helmond,
the Netherlands, during the last weekend of May 2016. We give an overview
of our car’s control and communication system that was developed for the
competition following the requirements and specications of the i-GAME project.
In particular, we describe our implementation of cooperative adaptive cruise
control, our solution to the communication and logging requirements, as well as
the high level decision-making support. For the actual competition we did not
manage to completely reach all of the goals set out by the organisers as well as
ourselves. However, this did not prevent us from outperforming the competition.
Moreover, the competition allowed us to collect data for further evaluation of
our solutions to cooperative driving. Thus, we discuss what we believe were
the strong points of our system, and discuss post-competition evaluation of the
developments that were not fully integrated into our system during competition
time.

Team Halmstad Approach to Cooperative
Driving in the Grand Cooperative Driving
Challenge 2016
1 Introduction
In the European Union (EU), road transportation stood for 75% of the inland goods
transportation in 2014. In 2013, passenger cars accounted for 83% of the inland
passenger transport. Combustion of fuel used for transport produced 23% of the
CO2 gas emissions in EU during 2014, and road transport accounted for 25.8% of
the European energy consumption in 2013 [1]. To reduce the environmental impact
and reach the 2°C ceiling target, EU and several governments have clear goals on
how to handle this societal challenge and specically to reduce these emissions, e.g.,
Sweden has an aim to have a fossil fuel independent transportation sector with the
target to reduce fossil fuel consumption by 80% until 2030 [2].
Trac safety is another large societal challenge. In EU, 28,000 fatalities were
reported in 2012 [1] and trac accidents are among the ten most common causes of
deaths according to the World Health Organization1. Worldwide, trac accidents is
the most common cause of death for young people aged 10–24 [3].
Urbanisation and demographical changes are other challenges for the future
transportation system. Denser city population and more elderly drivers will further
strain the transportation system. Moreover, limited space and high building cost make
it dicult to expand roads. Automated and cooperative vehicles are one possible
strategy to overcome all these challenges. The roads can be utilised more eciently,
and the environmental impact can be reduced by being able to drive with shorter
inter-vehicular distance, which reduces air resistance and consequently lower the
energy consumption. Furthermore, by unburdening the drivers with more automated
functions the trac safety will improve.
1.1 Related work within cooperative and automated driving
Early projects within this eld of research are, e.g., PROMETHEUS (Program for
European Trac with Highest Eciency and Unprecedented Safety) [4] that was
running between 1988–1995, with the vision to create intelligent vehicles as a part
of an overall intelligent road trac system. Other European projects are, e.g., the
CVIS2 and the SAFESPOT3 projects. The California PATH (Partners for Advanced
Transportation Technology) was initiated in 1986 and is still on-going. PATH pio-
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1994 with a four-car platoon featuring automated longitudinal control [5].
The Safe Road Trains for the Environment (SARTRE) project, running in 2009–
2012, was co-funded by the European Commission within the 7th Framework Program.
SARTRE aimed at developing strategies and technologies to allow platooning within
regular public highways to create environmental, safety, and comfort benets. The
SARTRE project demonstrated the benets of platooning with reported fuel savings
of up to 20% for the members of the platoon [6]. Another related FP7 project is
AutoNet 2030 [7] which investigated how the heterogeneous eet of vehicles could
cooperate to increase safety and uidity within trac. Consequently, the project
studied both what information should be exchanged between the dierent road users
and how the road users should be organised (centralised or distributed).
In the same way as levels of automation have been dened, for example by SAE4,
three dimensions of cooperation in ITS and driving has been proposed [8]. These
dimensions are (1) individual, local, or global scope; (2) operational, tactical, or
strategical task; and (3) two, three, or more actors. Platooning is an example that
requires cooperative behaviours in the task (operational, tactical, and strategical),
scope (individual, local, and global) and number of actors (2 or more). Cooperative
adaptive cruise control and operation concepts [9] are important parts of platooning
but it does not cover, e.g., the lane change manoeuvres that are needed.
To perform cooperative behaviour related to the formation, joining, or leaving a
platoon on a highway, dierent types of cooperation, coordination, and agreement
protocols have been proposed and evaluated in simulated scenarios [10–12]. There
is also work related to the higher level issues to nd out which vehicles can gain
on forming a platoon, taking into account, e.g., that they have similar goals at the
more strategic task level [13]. To handle advanced cooperative behaviour several
messages need to be exchanged within limited time. This is a serious problem with
Inter Vehicle Communication (IVC) [14] and especially in highly congested trac.
The authors of [15] address these problems by proposing and evaluating a slotted
beaconing protocol as a time organised alternative to the ETSI ITS-G5 proposed
protocols Decentralized Congestion Control [16] and Dynamic Beaconing [17].
1.2 Grand Cooperative Driving Challenge
In 2011, the rst Grand Cooperative Driving Challenge (GCDC 2011) [18] was
arranged. The goal of GCDC 2011 was to accelerate the development, integration,
demonstration, and deployment of cooperative mobility. In GCDC 2011, two scenar-
ios were demonstrated, one highway and one urban scenario. In the urban scenario a
trac light-controlled intersection was used to coordinate two platoons in the same
lane that were instructed to join after each other. In the highway scenario it was
demonstrated how shock waves, that are common on highways, can be attenuated
by using cooperative adaptive cruise control supported by V2V communication, i.e.
making use of position and speed information similar to the content of a Cooperative
Awareness Message (CAM). Furthermore, a dedicated GCDC cooperative interaction




GCDC 2016 organised by the i-GAME (Interoperable GCDC AutoMation Ex-
perience) project dened new competition scenarios, which besides adding lateral
manoeuvres, introduce the most important additional challenge compared to GCDC
2011. That is, to use cooperative lane change messages to handle joint operations
among pairs of vehicles driving in two adjacent platoons. It also includes coordinating
if and when to alter distances between vehicles and when to change lane in a cooper-
ative manner. The iCLCM (i-GAME Cooperative Lane Change Message) and protocol
needed for this were developed by i-GAME before the challenge. Consequently, the
challenge was also an essential eld test of this approach.
The main challenge in GCDC, both 2011 and 2016, is the multi-vendor approach,
where vehicles of dierent size and brand, developed by dierent teams at dierent
locations, are going to collaborate and perform cooperative manoeuvres on a real
highway at a considerably high speed (80 km/h).
1.3 Contribution
This paper summarises the system developed by team Halmstad for the GCDC 2016
competition, which builds on the experiences gained in GCDC 2011 [19], and elabo-
rates on distributed vehicle coordination. The competition consists of three scenarios:
(a) merging of two platoons on a highway; (b) cooperative intersection crossing;
and (c) a demonstration of an intelligent emergency vehicle warning application.
All scenarios are enabled by distributed negotiation where vehicles communicate to
coordinate with each other. A brief description of the GCDC scenarios is given in
Section 2, a more detailed description of the scenarios and GCDC can be found in [20].
In this paper, we describe our implementation of cooperative adaptive cruise control,
our solution to the communication and logging requirements, as well as the high
level decision making support. Due to space restrictions and the intended character
of this paper, the solutions are described with a varying level of detail. Consequently,
our communication and trust system solutions are discussed in greater detail in two
accompanying publications [21, 22].
One of the approaches developing our system for the competition was to use,
where possible, cost ecient hardware. The paper describes the associated challenges,
most vividly in communication, and how they were addressed. In this context, the
competition was a source of real data, which was used to further develop and evaluate
our ideas and solutions.
1.4 Paper Organisation
The rest of the paper is organised as follows; Section 2 gives an overview of the
GCDC 2016 scenarios. Section 3 describes the experimental setup of the vehicle and
the architecture of the developed system. The vehicle control system is presented in
Section 4. Section 5 describes the V2V communication module. Sections 6–8 briey
describe the high-level control, decision making, and the perception and sensor-
fusion module. In Section 9 the preparatory simulations and work are described
whereas in Section 10 results from post-competition analysis are presented. Finally,
Section 11 concludes the paper and suggests directions for future work.
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2 Scenarios
Besides the overall goal of GCDC – to boost the introduction of cooperative and
automated driving – the scenarios in GCDC are designed to also demonstrate the
current development within cooperative intelligent transport systems (C-ITS). The
scenarios are inuenced by suggestions from domain experts as well as proposals
from the participating teams.
The rst scenario, shown in Figure F.1 on the left, is the cooperative platoon
merge. It involves two platoons driving on two adjacent lanes on a highway. The
two platoons must merge into one due to an upcoming construction site where one
lane is closed. A competition zone is dened as a zone where the vehicles’ operations
are judged.
The second scenario, the cooperative intersection shown in Figure F.1 on the
right, considers a common urban trac situation, an uncontrolled T-intersection.
Whereas the rst scenario requires that all vehicles are interacting and communi-
cating, this scenario involves a mixture of non-cooperative (not communicating)
and cooperative vehicles. The scenario involves three cooperative vehicles, one












































Figure F.1: The schematics of the two judged competition scenarios.
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directions. The approaching vehicle transmits its intention, to turn left in the in-
tersection, and the cooperative vehicles on the main road acknowledge its request
and help to facilitate the manoeuvre in an ecient manner, i.e., without coming to a
full stop. Consequently, the vehicles on the main road help to create proper gaps,
allowing a smooth passage for the left-turning vehicle to safely and eciently cross
the intersection. The non-communicating vehicles take only an assumed part in the
scenario, virtually following the communicating vehicles on the main road, i.e., only
the three mentioned communicating vehicles take part in the challenge scenario.
The third scenario demonstrates an emergency vehicle requiring passage along a
highway with congested trac. This scenario is not part of the judging, yet it is used
to demonstrate an everyday trac situation that needs ecient solutions. Emergency
vehicle warning has been considered in the basic set of applications of the C-ITS
standard, see e.g. [23] for further details. Since the current version of the emergency
vehicle warning only provides a warning about an approaching emergency vehicle it
is still confusing for the other road users about where to place their vehicle. With the
proposed amendments in GCDC, the emergency vehicle will be able to inform other
vehicles of its itinerary and how it wants other vehicles to behave, thereby providing
a safe passage.
3 System Architecture
Both on the software and hardware side it was decided to go for a relatively simple
solution, for two reasons. First, the general i-GAME concept is to provide robust
future solutions for the automotive industry and such a solution ts better with these
conceptual demands of the GCDC context. Second, the former Halmstad Team from
GCDC 2011 [19] achieved a very good result with a similar setup, thus it was decided
to work based on their good experiences.
The base vehicle was a production Volvo S60. The additional control, sensor,
communication, and supporting devices mounted in the vehicle (mostly in the trunk)
were the dSpace MicroAutoBox (MAB) real-time controller5, Trimble dierential GPS,
a radio computer (see Section 5), a Nexus 9 tablet, and a router. The only gateway to
the S60 systems was through the dSpace MAB that intercepts car’s CAN bus messages
and is able to inject additional ones. No other devices were used, in particular the
only sensors used in our system were the the radar system of the vehicle monitored
through MAB and the Trimble GPS. Finally, the high-level control and coordination
of the system was done with a regular laptop, see below.
3.1 Power and CAN bus Arrangement
The power supply arrangement is shown in Figure F.2. The main power source was
the car battery of the S60. To operate the 220V equipment a DC to AC inverter was
used and to avoid power failures an UPS (Uninterrupted Power Supply) was installed.
The 12V equipment such as the CAN bus interface and mode signalling roof lights
were powered from the battery. To disconnect the power supply in an unexpected
5https://www.dspace.com/en/pub/home/products/hw/micautob.cfm.
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Figure F.3: CAN bus interface diagram.
situation the main power bus was controlled by a driver-side switch. The Trimble
GPS has its own battery, thus no external power was needed other than periodically
charging the battery.
A custom made CAN bus interface depicted in Figure F.3 was used to switch
between automatic and manual driving mode. The emergency button had the highest
priority on the bus. Automatic to manual mode transition was also controllable from
the MAB, but with lower priority than the button.
Otherwise, all the devices comprising the system were inter-connected through
an Ethernet router with cables, with the exception of the Human-Machine Interface
tablet that was connected to the car network through wireless communication.
3.2 Soware Modules
The software architecture of the system is characterised by its modularity. The
system is split into modules as shown in Figure F.4. Each module can be executed in-
dependently and on dierent hardware units. They communicate using Lightweight
Communications and Marshalling (LCM) [24], which provides a programming lan-
guage agnostic solution to communication that abstracts from the actual media, in
our case UDP packets in the local network.
The communication (COM), data source (DS), high-level control (HLC), and mid-
level control (MLC) modules are implemented as Java applications running on a
regular, non-real time Java Virtual Machine:
• COM implements the ITS-G5 communication stack and services used to send
and receive V2V messages;
• DS performs sensor fusion with the information received from the COM module
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Figure F.4: Software system architecture.
and LLC module (see below) directly from the car and the GPS, and provides
this information to the other modules;
• HLC makes high-level decisions regarding manoeuvres following the competi-
tion interaction protocols;
• MLC calculates parameters for the LLC speed controller.
• LLC is the speed controller, described in the next section.
The low-level control (LLC) is a Simulink model executed on the dSPACE Mi-
croAutoBox connected to the CAN bus of the car. This controller fully replaces
(bypasses) the factory adaptive cruise control system. Finally, the human-machine
interface (HMI) Java application runs on an Android tablet. It collects the driver’s
input regarding conguration for the scenario and asks for conrmation before
performing manoeuvres autonomously. It also provides information regarding the
status of the scenario and the neighbouring vehicles.
4 Cooperative Adaptive Cruise Control
4.1 Controller Design
The proposed control system strives to utilise the full potential of cooperative driving.
It is inspired by the previous Halmstad team solution [19] and [25]. To achieve
robustness and modularity, the controller is divided into two layers, mid-level control
(MLC) and low-level control (LLC). The MLC communicates with all other processes,
determines maximum speed, desired time headway and gathers preceding vehicle
information from the sensor fusion module (DS). The LLC keeps the desired distance
from the preceding vehicle, and maintains all the constraints provided by the MLC.
The LLC strategy is explained below, and its overview is shown in Fig F.5.
The constant time gap (CTG) policy [9] is chosen as the gap regulation policy.
According to [9], the time gap, referred to as a time headway in this paper, is dened
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Figure F.5: Overview of the low-level control (LLC) system. C1(s) is a speed con-
troller, it keeps the speed of the previous vehicle and indirectly regulates
the distance. C2(s) regulates the distance to the vehicle in-front. C3(s)
manipulates the feed-forwarded acceleration Ai−1, from the preceding
vehicle.
as “the time between when the rear bumper of the leading vehicle and the front bumper
of the following vehicle pass a xed location on the roadway (measured in seconds)”.
Therefore, the desired inter-vehicular distance for the ith vehicle in a platoon is
proportional to its speed, plus a xed oset (standstill) distance. The desired distance
is calculated by eq. (F.1):
di,des(t) = dmin + hi · vi(t) (F.1)
where di,des(t) is the desired distance (m), dmin is the standstill distance (m), hi is
the time headway (s), and vi(t) is the vehicle speed (m/s). During GCDC hi was
specied to be 1s and dmin to be 6m.
The proposed system is composed of three main controllers:
• C1, a proportional controller with a lead compensator that acts on speed
error εi ,
• C2, a proportional-integral controller that acts on distance error δi ,
• C3 applies a gain on acceleration from the preceding car as reported through
CAM messages.
Since C1 considers output from C2, let us rst discuss C2. The distance error δi
is dened as:
δi(t) = di,act(t)− di,des(t) (F.2)
δi(t) = Si(t)− Si−1(t)− li−1 − (dmin + hi · vi(t)) (F.3)
where Si represents position of the ith vehicle, and li−1 is the length of the preceding
vehicle. The control law for C2 is:




where vi,des is the desired speed, KP 2 = 2.9497, and KI2 = 4.3615 (the gain para-
meters where chosen experimentally, see below).
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The controller C1 then acts on the speed error, which is:
εi(t) = vi,act(t)− vi,des(t) = vi−1(t)− vi(t)− vi,des(t) (F.5)
where vi,des is calculated in eq. (F.4). C1 is a proportional controller with a lead
compensator given by:




where KP 1 = 0.872 (F.6)
As part of a safety feature, the Obstacle Avoidance (OA) controller with a potential
function according to eq. (F.7) is used to increase deceleration, in case of the preceding
vehicle instantaneously applies high deceleration:
aOA,i =
−β(αdi + 1)e−αdi ai−1 < 0 and di < di,des0 otherwise (F.7)
where β is a gain factor which indicates the maximum eort of the controller when
the distance goes to zero, α is a fall-o rate when the preceding vehicle is getting
away, and di is the distance to the preceding vehicle. This equation is similar to
the OA controller stipulated by the competition organisers [26]. However, apart
from activating when the preceding vehicle is decelerating (as in [26]), an added
condition is when the actual inter vehicular distance is shorter than the desired
distance. Therefore, the OA is applied to facilitate the braking only when these two
conditions are true. Because of this, we also decided to amplify the eort of the OA
once it engages, the particular parameters we used were α = 0.3 and β = 30, while
the organisers proposed β = 3. Figure F.6 shows the comparison of characteristics of
the OA function with our β control parameter and the suggested one. Therefore, the
complete acceleration input to the plant is formulated as:
ai = ai,des + aOA, i +KP 3ai−1 − 2 ≤ ai ≤ 2 (F.8)
where KP 3 = 0.4981, and the nal value ai is bounded by the maximum acceleration
and deceleration, which is −2 to 2m/s2 according to the GCDC rules [27].
4.2 Controller Evaluation
During the development phase of the CACC controller the performance was evaluated
using Matlab simulations according to the following criteria:
• Performance: to what extent the system is capable of keeping the desired
distance to the preceding vehicle and does the system maintain the string
stability condition;
• Safety: the system is considered as safe if the actual distance is larger or equal
to the desired distance:
di,act ≥ di,des safe,
di,act < di,des unsafe,
di,act < dmin risk of collision.
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β = 30 β = 3
Figure F.6: Plot for OA with dierent β with black dotted line showing maximum
(cut-o) deceleration of −2m/s2.
• Comfort: the smoothness of the controller is measured by the jerk eect, which
ideally should be zero: ä(t) = 0.
It was only after the competition that we were able to evaluate the controller in a
realistic setting with the actual competition heats data. This is further discussed in
Section 10.
In theory, according to the nal value theorem, using just the proportional
controllers would be sucient, i.e., the errors are eventually brought down to zero in
steady state conditions. Actual experiments exhibited distance lagging and prompted
the introduction of the integral component in C2 to decrease the reaction time on
δi . A derivative component would dampen the behaviour and provide smoothness,
however, in the rather steady state conditions of GCDC it was not necessary and the
tedious tuning of the derivative gain was avoided.
The controller gain parameters K{P 1,P 2,I2,P 3} were tuned rst approximately with
the SISOTOOL from Matlab, and then by experimentation with the organiser team
during the competition preparation week. The distinguished feature of the proposed
control strategy is the feed forwarding of the acceleration of the preceding vehicle
Ai−1 obtained from the MLC module via CAM messages. This is the point where the
cooperative character of the controller is exhibited. The acceleration is manipulated
with the gain in C3, and feed-forwarded to the vehicle. The controller also has
the option to use intended acceleration of the preceding vehicle (if available) rather
than the actual. During brief GCDC o-line experiments the use of the intended
acceleration was successfully added to the controller. However, during competition
heats the intended acceleration of participants was often either unavailable or faulty,
hence the actual acceleration was used during the competition to achieve robustness.
Our experimentation result from using the intended acceleration as well as a brief
evaluation of the controller are further discussed in Section 10.
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5 Communication and Logging Modules
5.1 Communication
The communication system for V2X is composed of: (a) a radio module to handle
the physical and data link layer of the communication stack; and (b) a computer to
handle the rest of the layers, from network to application layer.
The hardware used for the radio module is a Wistron DCMA82 with an Atheros
AR922X chipset attched to an ALIX 2D13 system board, containing 256 MB of RAM
and a AMD Geode LX800 processor at 500 MHz. The decision to use this partic-
ular board was purely pragmatic – during a communication workshop organised
in Sweden two other teams reported it to be capable of meeting the competition
requirements. These two teams (from Chalmers) were also geographically nearest
which enabled mutual pre-competition testing and support. The computer module
used for the upper layers features 8 Gb of RAM and an Intel Core i5-5300U at 2.3 GHz.
Besides running the communication module, this computer also executes most of
the other components in the system, as illustrated in Figure F.4, and is connected
to the rest of the system via Ethernet, using the User Datagram Protocol (UDP) to
Ethernet conversion daemon (udp2eth)6.
According to the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) model, the physical and
data link layers are implemented as a modication of the ath9k Linux kernel dri-
ver, which can be found on GitHub7. The modied drivers were loaded in Voyage
Linux8, a lightweight Debian-based Linux distribution. The remaining layers (net-
work, transport, session, presentation, and application) are encapsulated in a Java
application. The system uses the GeoNetworking and ASN.1 UPER encoder/decoder
implementation by Alexey Voronov [28].
The communication module works independently and transparently to the rest
of the system. It decodes and relays information to and from the other modules, and
transmits information as V2V messages of the following three types:
• Cooperative Awareness Message (CAM), containing vehicle status information
such as position, movement, and other sensor data [29];
• i-GAME Cooperative Lane Change Message (iCLCM), containing information
required to perform manoeuvres during the competition [30]. Similarly to
CAM, iCLCM-s are sent periodically and contain scenario control ags for the
execution of the competition (e.g., start of scenario), platooning information
(platoon identier, desired acceleration), merge scenario information (merge
requests and conrmations, pairing arrangements), and intersection scenario
information (vehicle identier and intention);
• Decentralised Environmental Notication Message (DENM), used to notify
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The communication module interacts with the system via LCM messages. Two
LCM channels (input and output) are used for each type of V2V message. Whenever
a module wants to transmit a message, it sends the information on the output
LCM channel for that specic message type, CAM, DENM, or iCLCM. Similarly,
if a module wants to obtain the information from a given type of message, it can
listen to the corresponding LCM input channel. The data types used in these LCM
channels contain the same elds and use the same units, as dened in the European
Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) standards for CAM and DENM, and
as dened by the i-GAME project for iCLCM.
A container class with the latest information required to construct CAM and
iCLCM messages is stored in the communication module and updated when new
information is received via LCM. For GCDC 2016, the organisers dened the update
frequency of CAM and iCLCM to be 25 Hz. Therefore, every 40 ms this information
is used to construct the messages, encode them and send them via a Basic Transport
Protocol (BTP) socket. Although CAMs and iCLCMs are sent with the same frequency,
they are generated with an oset of half a period, i.e. 20 ms, in order to spread the
computation load over time and avoid peaks when the messages are generated.
A separate thread receives the messages. Packets are extracted from the BTP
socket, decoded, and equivalent LCM messages are created that are broadcast inside
the system by placing them in the corresponding LCM channel, through which
listening modules receive their own message copies.
No particular signal quality was required by the organisers (e.g., in terms of signal
to noise ratio), apart from the frequencies mentioned above and the bi-directional com-
munication distance of 200m when no obstacles are present [32]. During preparatory
tests with the other teams the communication range was veried to be at just this
distance in plain sight using small antennas. At the competition site, even using
large antennas, the communication was occasionally disrupted at one particular spot
during the merge scenario due to a bridge and by the presence of tall vehicles in
the platoon. However, at that point no ad-hoc solution could be provided by any
of the teams to improve the communication quality, apart from vehicle control fall-
back procedures. As for the throughput, during the competition it was necessary to
process communication from only 10 participating vehicles, hence a simple message
dispatching system based on FIFO queues was sucient to manage the communica-
tion with the required frequency. In a more realistic scenario FIFO processing would
not be sucient and possibly cause message buering congestion, thus after the
competition we developed a message prioritising and ltering system [21], outlined
in Section 10.
In general, the ITS-G5 standard itself does not require packet delivery guarantees,
it is the responsibility of the higher level application (in this case the GCDC iCLCM
interaction protocol [30, 33]) to provide safe communication. In particular, low-level
packets are not acknowledged, thus it is not possible to state how many of our packets
were received by the participants at all times. However, other competition safety
requirements were related to the accuracy and delay of the transmitted positioning
and velocity data, see Section 7.
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5.2 Logging
The logging facility of the system works besides the communication module and is
divided into three parts. The rst part, implemented as a Java application, keeps track
of selected elds from the CAM, DENM, and iCLCM messages. When a message
is received, the elds of interest (ones required by the competition requirements,
e.g., current position, speed, etc.) are written into a Comma Separated Values (CSV)
le. Each line corresponds to one message and it is timestamped with the ETSI
Timestamp [34]. The received and transmitted data were stored in separate les and
conveyed to the GCDC organisers for judging purposes.
The second part of the logging is done by Wireshark, a network protocol
analyser [35] capturing all network trac and saving it in a packet capture (pcap)
le. These les were used after the competition to analyse the performance of the
communication protocol, see Section 10.
The last part of the logging system records the LCM trac, all input and output
LCM messages between the dierent modules of the system are logged. These logs
can be replayed to analyse the behaviour of the system o-line.
6 High-Level System Control
The HLC’s decision making is implemented as a nite state machine (FSM) that
directly follows the GCDC interaction protocol specication predened by the organ-
isers in [33] and [12]. The events for triggering the state transitions of the FSM are
depending on the interaction with the other vehicles, the conrmations via the HMI,
and the internal state of the vehicle control system. Conrmations of the driver have
been included for safety reasons and to increase the driver’s situation awareness in
an automated vehicle. An example of a state transition shown in Figure F.7 is when
the system is in the S1_PA_WAIT_START state – the ready vehicle is waiting at standstill –
and the message with a startScenario is received from the RSU triggering the transition
start_a to launch the vehicle. For safety reasons (the vehicle is about to move by
itself), the system goes into an intermediate conrmation state S1_PA_CONF_START
that sends a request to the HMI and waits for the driver’s response before going into
the actual vehicle platooning state S1_PA_PLATOON_80. The conrmation steps are
skipped for less critical transitions, or when the driver causes an unacceptable delay,
most notably during the execution of the intersection scenario.
The state transition rules are part of the World – a processing context where the
information about the surrounding environment and its state is kept. Information
about every vehicle sending CAM or iCLCM message is put into the World. This data
is fused into one object describing the vehicle within the perception module (within
Data Source – DS, see Figure F.4) that was developed by the team for the competition
to support the HLC. Furthermore, the concept of a Trust System (TS) was developed
to support decision making in an untrusted environment. We describe both in the
following sections.
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Figure F.7: Sample state transitions from [33].
7 Perception and Sensor Fusion
The high-level controller needs the knowledge about the surrounding environment.
The vehicle perceives this environment with the built-in front radar detecting a single
target in front of the vehicle, the RTK-GPS device, and the information provided via
V2V communication. To build the knowledge about the environment two models are
used – vehicle distance model (VDM) and vehicle position model (VPM).
7.1 Vehicle Distance Model
The VDM was designed to describe the relation between the measured radar distance
to the car in front and the calculated distance by using the geographical position
of the ego (from GPS) and the preceding vehicle (from V2V). The model applies a
Kalman Filter, which is proposed in [36], to the distance to the preceding vehicle in
case that both distances match each other given a certain boundary (1m). When the
dierence between these two ranges exceeds the predened threshold, the distance
measured by the radar takes precedence and it is broadcast to the other modules
of the control system. This approach ensures, for safety reasons, that the vehicle’s
controller uses the radar information about the closest physical obstacle in front of
the ego vehicle when wrong information is received via V2V message exchange.
The VDM has been evaluated against the competition requirements by relative
comparison with the organisers’ equipment in their reference vehicles. That is, by
following each other in a platoon, the reported and measured data was veried by
the organisers to stay within pre-dened tolerances [32, 37]: 1m for the position,
0.5m/s for velocity, 0.2m/s2 for acceleration and deceleration, and 200ms for
communication latency (time from data readout to reception by another vehicle). The
accuracy of our own sensors were 1cm for the RTK-GPS when stationary, and 0.25m
for the radar (for the GCDC applicable short range distance of up to 60m). Our VDM
calculations have satised these bounds, however, no precise error measurements
were reported to us to evaluate how well we stayed within these bounds. Lacking
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a ground canonical reference for vehicle positions, this was the only applicable
verication method.
7.2 Vehicle Position Model
The VPM that applies an Extended Kalman Filter (EKF) to the vehicle’s position
and inertial sensor information to improve its geographical position was designed
according to [38]. This position model is also applied to the other vehicles based
on their transmitted information. An EKF is split into two updates, the time update
(prediction) and the measurement update (correction). At rst a state vector, which
consists of the east and north coordinates, heading to the north, velocity, yaw rate,
and acceleration of the vehicle, has been dened. A motion model based on a simple
bicycle model [39] is used to predict the new state during the time update. The
computation of the Kalman gain and the update of the state using new measurements
is performed during the correction phase. The measurement noise covariance matrix
describing the error of the measurements is set depending on the source of the
information, e.g., inertial sensors and GPS position or V2V information. Due to
computational reasons, VPM is applied only to vehicles identied as important, such
as the preceding vehicle. Moreover, the Kalman gain of the VPM has been used as an
indicator for sensor accuracy [38, 39].
The surrounding vehicles are identied according to their relative position, e.g.,
front-left, in front of, or behind the ego vehicle, and put into a map categorised by
these relative positions. An illustration of the map is depicted in Figure F.8. This
map is broadcast to all other control modules. As the perception of the competition
car is limited, in particular in tighter curves, the map is generated by applying
two dierent neighbour identication methods that evaluate the received CAM and
iCLCM messages. The results of both methods are combined in order to provide a
robust identication of the surrounding vehicles.
The rst method sorts the vehicles according to their driving direction and
platoon identier from iCLCM. The relative position category is classied based on
predened angles and the distance to the ego vehicle. The second method discards
the platoon identier and relies only on the relative angles and the distance. The
range of the angles for each category is calculated dynamically for each vehicle









Figure F.8: Illustration of the relative positions in the map.
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Each method puts the vehicle with the shortest distance in each category in
a separate map. When combining the two maps, the rst one where the platoon
identier was used is prioritised, since it is more robust in curves. When there
is no vehicle match for the given category, e.g. front-right, in the rst map, the
vehicle possibly identied using the second method is assigned to this category in
the combined map. Combining the results this way provides a robust identication
of vehicles even if the platoon identier is missing. Admittedly, it is possible for this
procedure to identify one vehicle in two dierent categories, each resulting from the
corresponding map. For example, the rst map identies the vehicle as the in-front
vehicle and the second map identies it as the in the front-left vehicle. This possibility
only occurs when the rst map has no vehicle assigned to the given category, in the
front-left in this case. However, this has no negative impact on the system and it is
safe – it is a clear case of a false positive when an existing vehicle is reported in an
additional position, while a false negative of not reporting an existing vehicle in any
of the positions would be far more dangerous.
The necessity to develop this two-stage identication system became apparent
during testing at the Film and Test Location (FTL GmbH)9 in Aachen, Germany, and
at the Dutch Road Transport Authority (RDW) test track in Lelystad. Both locations
have considerably tighter curves than the competition zone and hence exhibiting
frequent classication errors when using just one method. After introducing the
two-stage method and after these tests we had no more opportunities to verify it
in curvy road conditions, only at the competition zone in Helmond, which was
comparatively straight providing ideal conditions and at which, by visual inspection,
the method provided practical 100% robustness. However, more experimentation
would be required to further evaluate the method and the choice of control parameters
in other conditions.
8 Trust System
The concept of the Trust System (TS) is to evaluate the current situation based on
the ego vehicle’s and the other vehicle’s trust as well as the trust in the environment.
This information is represented as one scalar value, the Trust Index (TI), and can be
used by the decision making algorithm to make more robust decisions. For instance,
the TI can be used by the decision making algorithm to decide on the distance to the
vehicle in front when driving in a platoon.
The TS generates and combines partial TI-s for the sensor quality of the ego
vehicle, the sensor quality and behaviour of the other vehicles, especially the pre-
ceding vehicle and forward partner, and the environment. The quality of a sensor
reects the sensor’s precision and reliability. The TS applies the position model (see
Section 7) to important vehicles and additionally applies the distance model to the
preceding vehicle, for the reason that the location of this vehicle can be veried with
one of the ego vehicles own sensors (the radar).
Further details about the perception module and the TS, including the necessary
formulas and parameters, can be found in [22] and [40]. The concept of the TS as well
9http://ftl-germany.com.
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as a prototype have been used during the GCDC. The nal TS has been evaluated
with the communication data gathered during the GCDC highway scenario heats.
The sensor fusion as well as the TS are executed independently within the DS module
(see Figure F.4). For reasons to be stated in Section 10.3 the TI-s have not been
considered by the HLC during the competition.
9 Preparations and Competition Performance
Despite starting the project early enough (the team was fully formed by the end
of September 2015) and acquiring the competition vehicle (December 2015), large
eorts were put in during several months to enable and stabilise the CAN interface
between the dSPACE MicroAutoBox and the car. In eect, the autonomous control
of the car was only available six weeks before the competition, yet with continuing
stability issues. Furthermore, only two weeks before the competition the interface to
the radar module in the car was functioning. Because of these factors, no attempt
has been made to support automatic lateral control of the vehicle, despite the fact
that the car does oer limited control of the steering from the factory lane-assist
system. Yet, the modularisation of the system allowed us to work on the other parts
of the system in parallel to the car interfacing work. In particular, extensive use of
PreScan simulation software10 [41] enabled testing the system without the car or its
CAN bus interface.
9.1 PreScan Simulations
During development, the complete system was tested by running simulations. PreS-
can was used to generate simulations that could provide realistic car information to
the system, such as GPS position and radar information. UDP sockets were used to
communicate between the simulation environment and the running system. Simula-
tions were useful to test individual modules that use raw information originating
outside of the system, e.g., the communication packets. Similar simulations were
also used to test the interaction among several modules. For example, the use of the
CACC with the processed information provided by the communication module.
Vehicle-in-the-loop tests were executed by using data provided by simulated
vehicles. This method was particularly useful to test and evaluate the CACC con-
troller. Using a simulated vehicle as the preceding vehicle for the CACC evaluation,
eliminated the risk of accident if a real car had been used and a serious error in the
controller had occurred.
Lastly, complex simulations involving several vehicles were executed to test the
interaction protocols for the highway and intersection scenarios. Multiple instances of




F. Team Halmstad Approach to Cooperative Driving in the GCDC
9.2 Competition Time
The system was tested and modied at the Automotive Campus in Helmond during
the competition preparatory week of May 20–27 2016. In particular, we developed the
two-stage vehicle identication on spot, see Section 7. During the actual competition
only minor changes were made. Apart from pre-testing with the Swedish teams
at AstaZero11 in late April 2016, the preparation week was the rst time when the
interaction and communication could be tested against complete systems from other
teams. During that time we could ne tune the CACC controller and x other
encountered issues, however, not all of them, like the communication issues suered
by all teams that were caused by the local surroundings, see Section 5.
10 Post-Competition Evaluation
The main ideas and solutions for the three building blocks of the proposed system
have been developed, evaluated and tested using Matlab and PreScan simulations,
and by single try-outs with other teams during the pre-competition meetings at the
IDIADA testing ground12 in Spain (4 days) or at the AstaZero test track in Sweden
(3 days). During this mutual testing, none of the competing systems were fully
developed. It was only at the actual competition week that enough data was collected
from suciently working systems to evaluate the solutions in a realistic setting.
Concretely, the following evaluation aspects were considered:
• practical performance of the proposed CACC implementation in terms of string
stability, safety, and comfort,
• robustness of the radio communication implementation against the demands
of communicating with 9 other teams without (major) disruptions,
• the Trust Index distribution of TS in a realistic setting.
Apart from collecting the heat logs during the actual competition, the preparatory
week was also used to do trial with other teams for experimentation with new
features. In particular, with the A-Team from Technical University Eindhoven, the
CACC controller was tested based on the intended acceleration as input rather than
the actual acceleration.
10.1 CACC Performance
The main concern in evaluating a speed controller is the string stability [42]. As
noted in [43], due to the number of control parameters, a proper analysis of string
stability for a CACC controller is practically dicult. The particular transfer function









C3(s) · s2 +C1(s) · s+C1(s)C2(s)
s2 + (1 +C2(s)hi)C1(s) · s+C1(s)C2(s)
(F.9)
Thus, similarly to [43], our CACC controller has been evaluated using Matlab simu-
lations where an arbitrary number of vehicles with dierent test parameters could
be tested. With these simulations, our controller already proved to perform slightly
better than the Sliding Mode Algorithm (SMA) [44]. The simulations were performed
against an assumed simple vehicle model which is parametrised by an engine time
constant (vehicle’s reaction time to acceleration and braking) and sensor (communi-
cation) delay, moreover, the obstacle avoidance function was not considered. As an
example, Figure F.9 shows a comparison of distance error propagation between our
controller (top) and an instance of the SMA controller (bottom) under xed headway
time of 1 s, xed sensor delay of 0.1 s, and a varying engine time constant of eight
vehicles between 0.2 and 0.6 s, i.e., in a simplistically heterogeneous platoon. Both
algorithms are string stable in this case (the distance error does not amplify as it
propagates backwards to the following vehicle), however, our controller shows a
signicantly smaller amplitude of the distance error (max. ≈0.2 m) compared to SMA
(max. ≈0.6 m) as well as quicker convergence over time. Considering the communi-
cated acceleration feed-forward capability of our controller that SMA naturally lacks,
this advantage is rather not surprising, moreover, given a simplistic vehicle model
and idealised simulation scenario, hardly conclusive for a realistic setting.
The competition data provided a more realistic evaluation target, however, it was
only possible to evaluate the CACC controller against just one vehicle, the currently
preceding vehicle (most important object – MIO) in the platoon. The fact that the
preceding vehicle is changing during the highway merging scenario from the initially
followed vehicle to the merging one essentially introduces additional dimension to
the test, as eectively the speed to follow momentarily changes in a non-continuous
fashion, while in simulations only an ideal platooning scenario was considered.
Figure F.10 shows the relationship of speeds between three vehicles merging dur-
ing one of the slow-speed heats, with the vehicle arrangement shown in Figure F.11.
The Halmstad vehicle followed the OPC2 (Organiser Pace Vehicle) reference vehicle
(id3) and made gap for OPC1, vehicle (id2), to merge in at around timestamp of 540 to
620 s. The drop in speed of the ego vehicle at ≈500 s is obviously intentional to make
the gap for id2, after which the ego vehicle immediately follows the new vehicle id2.
The corresponding speed error to the preceding vehicle is shown in Figure F.12. Apart
from gap-making, the error never exceeds 1 m/s and stays within 0.5 m/s margin
most of the time, while it is practically at 0 in stable speed conditions. Moreover, the
recorded jerk of the ego vehicle during this heat was within the 0.3 m/s3. Further
details and evaluation of the CACC controller can be found in [45].
Apart from evaluating the base version of the CACC controller with the competi-
tion heats, a brief experimentation with the TU/e’s A-team during the preparatory
week was also performed to preliminarily evaluate the controller that uses the com-
municated intended acceleration from the MIO rather than the actual acceleration.
This was done with the hope that the lag caused by vehicles’ dead time could be
further reduced. That is, in practice the vehicles should be able to synchronise better
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Figure F.9: Distance error propagation comparison to the SMA controller in a het-
erogeneous platoon simulation.
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Figure F.11: Vehicle arrangement during the merging heat.
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Figure F.12: Speed error for the speeds presented in Figure F.10.
on mutual acceleration. Figure F.13 shows a 1 minute snapshot of the resulting accel-
erations of the two vehicles and the recorded distance. This single experiment is not
sucient to evaluate this approach (in particular, w.r.t. string stability), nevertheless,
the graphs further visualise the behaviour of our CACC controller. During the rst
phase while going with equal speeds, the ego vehicle matches the desired distance to
MIO almost perfectly. When the MIO accelerates (timestamp 168 s), the reaction of
the ego vehicle in terms of acceleration is essentially simultaneous and the actual
distance drops below the desired one. This is a safe behaviour when accelerating.
When the acceleration subsides again (timestamp 183–200 s), the distance error drops.
During the braking that follows (timestamp 202 s onwards), the obstacle avoidance
function contributes to the deceleration, resulting in the ego acceleration to stay
slightly below the MIO acceleration. This allows to increase the gap between the
cars and progressively reach the state when the actual distance is above the desired
one (from timestamp 208 s on).
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Figure F.13: CACC vehicle accelerations and distance with intended acceleration as
input.
10.2 Communication Robustness
The communication module was the rst thing developed during the project and it
performed very well during the competition and also already during the IDIADA
tests in April 2016. In fact, our immediate belief after receiving the nal results from
the organisers was that the communication robustness, together with complete and
requirements compliant logs, were two major contributing factors to our success.
Despite the satisfactory performance of the system during the competition, the
communication module has been further developed after GCDC within an MSc
project [46]. The main idea is to provide an ecient solution for Vehicular Ad-hoc
Networks (VANET) applicable beyond the GCDC setting. The competition scenario
involved only 10 vehicles, while a realistic VANET application may involve many
more and thus signicantly higher communication load. Keeping up with the 25 Hz
communication frequency in such a setting becomes a challenge [30].
To this end a packet prioritising and ltering system based on priority queues
called Stream-wise Accumulating Priority Queue (SAPQ) has been developed. In
short, the streams are identied by the message type (iCLCM, CAM, or DENM) and
origin (vehicle identier), and each message in the stream has a dynamic accumulating
factor bc based on the message type, physical distance of the message origin, taking
into account predicted position due to the processing time overhead and the speed of
the sending vehicle. Then, the instantaneous priority qs of the message in the stream
s at time t can be given with the following accumulating priority queue formula [47]
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qs(t) = (t − ts) · bc, where ts is the arrival time of the rst message received in the
stream since the last time it was served. Then, in each stream fresher massages
override the older messages, which are simply dropped. Out of all streams, the
message with the highest priority is served rst. This substantially improves message
waiting times for the most important messages and prevents message congestion.
To give an idea of the improvement that SAPQ provides, Figure F.14 shows a
comparison of the progression of packet waiting times under high system load (300
vehicles) during a simulation. While the simple FIFO implementation constantly
increases the waiting time for all of the packets, the SAPQ implementation suers
only from a temporary increase of waiting times during a simulated DENM message
outburst, yet with Class 1 packets not exceeding the waiting time of 380 ms. Under low
system load (100 vehicles), the waiting times of high priority packets are considerably
lower in the SAPQ implementation compared to an average time for unclassied
FIFO, see Figure F.15. Finally, Figure F.16 shows the waiting times of the actual
communication messages collected during the competition in an otherwise simulated
high load setting. Further technical details and analysis of the SAPQ solution can be
found in [46] and a companion paper [21].
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Figure F.14: FIFO (left) vs. SAPQ (right) packet waiting times (high load).
10.3 Trust Index Visualisation
The TS and TI calculation to support decision making described in Sects. 6–8 have
been developed for GCDC, but the TIs have not been used to support decision making
during the competition for two reasons: (a) due to limited testing possibilities, no
prior experimentation data was available to properly weight the decision making
based on TIs, the competition data from the fully running systems was the rst data
available; (b) according to the competition requirements, most decisions had to be
driver-conrmed, eectively taking full automation, for which TS would be crucial,
out of the scope. In other words, regardless of the calculations a very low trust in the
surrounding environment was assumed due to experimental context. Nevertheless,
the TS building blocks, in particular the vehicle distance and vehicle position model
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Figure F.15: FIFO (left) vs. SAPQ (right) packet waiting times (low load).































Figure F.16: SAPQ GCDC packet waiting times (high load).
for sensor data fusion, have been implemented and were running live in the system
which produced the necessary data for further evaluation of the TS results.
Figure F.17 shows the TI distribution from two highway heats. In the rst heat
the vehicle was merging from the left platoon, in the second one the vehicle was on
the right making a gap. In the rst case TIMIO is degrading due to losing the MIO out
of sight. After the merge (342 s) the TIMIO re-establishes itself at ≈0.9 level when the
system identies a new MIO. In the second case TIMIO is initially similar to the rst
case, while it drops after the merge is completed. In this particular case the new MIO
did not provide correct position through V2V, only occasionally which is represented
by the spikes in the graph. In eect, the global TI is smaller by ≈0.1 compared to
the rst case indicating overall lower situation awareness. TS information could be,
e.g., used to decrease the headway time to the MIO following the high trust in the
reliability of its data. Further technical details about the TS can be found in [40] and
a companion paper [22].
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Figure F.17: Trust Index distribution during two merge scenario heats.
11 Conclusions
We have presented the general design and functioning of the team Halmstad system
for cooperative driving that was eld-tested during GCDC. Apart from successfully
competing and winning GCDC 2016, the competition was used as a site for collecting
data, which assisted further development, and evaluation of our system during and
after the competition. The major contributions and outcomes from the project as
a whole are (a) result from the eld functioning of the CACC controller and an
experiment using intended acceleration for forward feedback in our controller; (b)
a priority queue based message dispatching system in the communication module,
which substantially improves the communication throughput (further described
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in [21]); and (c) the trust system, that was evaluated with realistic data (further
described in [22]).
The goal of the i-GAME project that organised the GCDC competition is to
address and advance research in intelligent transportation systems keeping the
societal challenges in mind. For the Halmstad GCDC student team the main challenge
and focus were in the robustness of the system and developing the system in a timely
fashion. For these reasons optional functionality was not implemented, in particular
the system had no support for lateral control of the vehicle. However, to follow the
modern publicity and dissemination trends, two short lms advertising the team’s
eorts were made and published on YouTube13, one at the preparatory stage of the
project, and one after the competition.
An ideal follow-up of the team’s eort would be to complete the prototype system
with the optional functionalities and continue with the evaluation and development
of the single modules to reach production grade quality and applicability in a real
trac environment.
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Chapter G
Modelling the Level of Trust in
a Cooperative Automated Ve-
hicle Control System
Adapted version that appeared in T-ITS 2018
T. Rosenstaer, C. Englund
Abstract. Vehicle-to-vehicle communication is a key technology for achiev-ing increased perception for automated vehicles, where the communication
enables virtual sensing by means of sensors in other vehicles. In addition, this
technology also allows detection and recognition of objects that are out-of-sight.
This paper presents a trust system that allows a cooperative and automated
vehicle to make more reliable and safe decisions. The system evaluates the
current situation and generates a trust index indicating the level of trust in the
environment, the ego vehicle, and the surrounding vehicles. This research goes
beyond secure communication and concerns the verication of the received
data on a system level. The results show that the proposed method is capable of
correctly identifying various trac situations and how the trust index is used
while manoeuvring in a platoon merge scenario.

Modelling the Level of Trust in a
Cooperative Automated Vehicle Control
System
1 Introduction
Yearly more than 1.2 million fatalities occur on our roads worldwide making trac
accidents to one of the globally leading causes of death [1]. The increasing number
of vehicles on public roads and the goal to reduce the environmental impact and
improve trac safety combined with the technological progress leads to research
and development in the area of autonomous and cooperative driving. Davila et al. [2]
published results from the SARTRE project where they investigated the benets
of platooning systems. Their conclusion was that platooning is safer than manual
driving since the vehicle control system and the vehicle dynamics are fully automated.
In addition, autonomous vehicles have the potential to increase the comfort for the
passengers.
To bring automated vehicles to the market we face considerable safety challenges
that may only be overcome by compound research within local awareness, perception
and driver support enabled by intelligent vehicular systems [3].
Consequently, software has become the major area of innovation within a vehicle,
more than 80 percent of the novelty is achieved by computer systems and their
software [4]. The telematics systems of e.g. Daimler and Kia use the Internet for
exchanging vehicle status information and calls automatically to the emergency
service number in case of an accident [5]. Publicly known projects, such as the
self-driving car project1 from Google, demonstrate the technological progress over
the past years.
Automated driving aims to perceive the environment with the on-board vehicle
sensors, e. g., Global Navigation Satellite System2 (GNSS), radar, lidar, and camera
systems. Due to the high cost of long range and wide angle sensors and the lim-
itation of the proximity sensors to only being able to detect line-of-sight objects,
cooperative driving has turned out to be a reasonable complement. Instead of using
expensive high delity sensors, cooperative information has the advantage of also
perceiving out-of-sight objects via wireless exchange of local information [6]. Con-
sequently, cooperative driving can be the key technology to increase trac safety
and eciency [7].
One popular application based on Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) communication is
platooning, or cooperative adaptive cruise control. For instance, an adaptive cruise
control is only following the vehicle in front by measuring the speed of the vehicle
and distance to it with the ego (own) vehicle’s sensors. It does not signicantly
1https://www.google.com/selfdrivingcar/
2Includes the satellite localization systems GPS, Galileo and GLONASS
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increase the eciency of the entire platoon. With the use of wireless communication
to exchange sensor information, e. g., the intended acceleration of the vehicle in
front, or the speed, position, and acceleration of the platoon leader, time gaps of less
than one second can be achieved [8]. Another eld of application is a cooperative
interaction to safely cross an intersection [9].
While driving in automated mode the vehicle fully trusts its own sensors. A
combination of several sensors in a Sensor Fusion (SF) module [10–12] gives an
accurate representation of the local proximity. In a cooperative system where sensor
readings from other vehicles are being shared, the vehicles will require methods to
incorporate those signals in their own control system. This paper introduces a Trust
System (TS) that evaluates the current trac situation based on the sensor readings
from both the on-board vehicle sensors and the surrounding vehicles to support
decision making in the cooperative and automated vehicle.
The TS creates a Trust Index (TI) by considering the quality of the sensor infor-
mation provided by the own vehicle and other trac participants describing their
behaviour as well as the environment itself. The proposed system is inspired by
Aramrattana et al. [13] where dimensions of cooperative driving, ITS and automa-
tion are described. The proposed TS is designed to handle the surrounding vehicles
(number of actors) the environment (individual, local or global scope) and the type
of driving task (operational, tactical or strategical). The use of this TS allows the
decision-making controller to make reliable and safe decisions when interacting with
a specic vehicle or operating in a particular environment. Moreover, a prototype of
the TS has been tested and evaluated in a Volvo S60 during the Grand Cooperative
Driving Challenge (GCDC)3 2016 in Helmond, the Netherlands.
Securing the communication between the vehicles and infrastructure, within
the vehicle as well as other security mechanisms are inevitable for future vehicles.
This approach has to be considered as a model on the system level that supports the
decision making module by indicating the trust in the perceived situation.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses current
research relevant for the proposed model. Section 3 presents the proposed approach.
Section 4 describes how the results have been achieved. In Section 5, the results of
the experiment using the proposed TS are discussed. Finally, Section 6 concludes the
paper and presents directions of future work.
2 Related Work
Recent research within this eld has focused on how to establish trust between agents
or vehicles within a Vehicular Ad-Hoc Network (VANET). The authentication of
nodes is essential for Vehicle-2-Everything (V2X) communication as well as being able
to take counter actions to malicious events and actions. The setup of a trustworthy
connection between the nodes at the communication level is the base for further
security related applications, such as a TS that evaluates the sensor accuracy and
the behaviour of the vehicles. The dierent types of trust establishing techniques




entity-oriented (e.g. [16] by Minhas et al.), data-oriented (e.g. [17] by Raya et al.),
and combined trust models (e.g. VARS in [18]). However, none of these methods
deal with the sensor quality, nor the behaviour of the vehicles or nodes. They are
focusing on evaluating if nodes communicate the correct events, e. g., slippery road
or trac jam. Models for distributing the trust values between the vehicles are
discussed by Agarwal et al. in [19]. Considering the V2V information as a new
virtual sensor and estimating a higher accuracy using SF is described in [12]. The
result was only veried within a simulation environment. Moreover, Bhargava et al.
proposed in [20] a Kalman Filter for calculating a predicted trust. The results show
that the computation of the future trust using a Kalman Filter has a problem with
time varying trust values. For instance, a constant decrease of the trust value leads
to an increasing error of the estimation.
Trust is a common measure in decentralised systems, such as Multi-Agent Systems
(MAS). Aras et al. discuss in [21] the relation between trust and uncertainty. The
identied sources for uncertainty in MAS are among others, the uncertainty in the
observation and the uncertainty when using second-hand information. The authors
propose that the trust representation has to reect the uncertainty and it should allow
the use for decision making. One open question is whether it should be represented
by a scalar value or be composed of a more complex representation [21].
The contribution of this paper is a model on how to present trust in the own
vehicle, the other vehicles, as well as in the environment. Additionally, this model
has been tested in an environment with other cooperative vehicles.
3 Proposed Approach
The proposed TS evaluates the current trac situation by considering dierent
factors, each represented as a partial TI, which are combined into one of the TIs
presented in this work, namely the TI about the ego vehicle, surrounding vehicles,
and the environment. The generated TIs are broadcasted to all modules of the
vehicle’s system, which allows, for instance, the decision making module to include
this information when making decisions. This section gives an overview of the
vehicle system and data acquisition, followed by the identied factors that inuence
the decision making and the calculation of the TIs.
3.1 System Overview
The results of the TS are evaluated using team Halmstad’s GCDC competition car,
which provides data from the radar, inertial sensor data, and V2X communication for
perceiving the environment. The GeoNetworking protocol dened by ETSI [22] is
used for communication. The transmission on the physical layer is established using
the standard for wireless vehicular communication, IEEE 802.11p [23] and Coopera-
tive Awareness Messages (CAMs) are used to exchange the sensor information of
the vehicle between each other [24].
The on-board sensors of the vehicle establish the base for the situation awareness
of the ego (own) vehicle. To calculate the relative position to other vehicles, it is
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necessary to use a positioning system via satellites such as GPS (Global Positioning
System) or Galileo. Many GPS devices provide additional information about the
measured position, the dimensionless Dilution of Precision (DOP) values. Accuracy
describes the absolute position error, whereas the location error is expressed by pre-
cision. Horizontal DOP (HDOP) and Vertical DOP (VDOP) characterise the precision
of the horizontal or vertical position solution. Milbert discusses in [25] the behaviour
of these DOP values [26, 27].
Table G.1 lists the variables including their resolution used in the proposed TS.
For a more detailed description of the exchanged information see the ETSI and the
i-GAME specications [28, 29]. HDOP and VDOP values are not included in the
afore-mentioned specications and are thus the only measurements in Table G.1 that
are not being exchanged. To perform cooperative manoeuvres the ego vehicle needs
to interact with the surrounding vehicles. The most relevant vehicle is the preceding
one, which will be named Most Important Object (MIO), according to [29].
Providing other vehicles information about oneself enables the design of more
ecient manoeuvres, for example a cooperative adaptive cruise controller that reacts
smoother to speed changes using the desired acceleration of the MIO [8].
In this work, a vehicle distance model (VDM) is used that describes how the
Kalman Filter, presented by R. E. Kalman in [30], is used. The distance to the preceding
vehicle can be obtained by two sensors, the vehicle’s front radar and the distance
between two geographic positions. Consequently, the distance represented by the two
Table G.1: Relevant variables in a VANET environment.
Type Measurement Resolution
On-board speed over ground 0.01 m/s
longitudinal acceleration 0.1 m/s2
desired long. acceleration 0.01 m/s2
lateral acceleration 0.1 m/s2
yaw rate 0.01 deg /s
Geographical latitude 0.1 µdeg




With respect bearing 0.002 rad
to preced- range 0.01 m
ing vehicle range rate 0.01 m/s
time headway 0.01 s
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measurements is linear Gaussian distributed and a Kalman Filter can be used for fusing
this data. Delays and latency of the two observations can be considered by adapting
the variance according to the delay. The relation between speed, acceleration, yaw
rate, heading, and position is non-linear. Thus, it is necessary to create a model that
represents the relation between these measurements. Here, a vehicle position model
(VPM), based on an extended Kalman Filter (EKF), is used for sensor fusion.
3.2 Vehicle Distance Model (VDM)
The VDM combines the distance to the vehicle in front measured by the radar with
the distance using the reported geographical position. This model includes safety
mechanisms to provide correct, or at least safe, information to the vehicle’s control
system. Figure G.1 illustrates the model for fusing the distance to the vehicle in
front given two dierent sources. The geographical position can be the raw data
provided by the GPS device or an already ltered signal. The Distance Calculation
block calculates the ellipsoidal distance using the geographical positions of both
vehicles and their length. The position of the vehicle is dened as the geometrical
centre of the vehicle.
Sensor data from one of the sensors may be absent due to e.g. environmental
changes such as driving in a tunnel or on a curvy road, therefore it is important
to choose a proper variance for the data and select the distance to the preceding
vehicle with respect to these circumstances. This procedure is performed by the Data























Figure G.1: Vehicle Distance Model – linear sensor fusion.
The Data Selection chooses the measurement(s), adapts the variance, and gives
this information to the KF module, which acts as a one dimensional lter [31]. Thus,
use cases like driving in a tunnel or losing the radar target on a curve are safely
considered. Assuming that the distance calculated using the geographical position is
above or below a certain threshold compared to the radar information, the system
will consider only the radar distance. This procedure ensures that the vehicle does
not crash with the car in front when receiving an incorrect position from the MIO.
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3.3 Vehicle Position Model (VPM)
The non-linear model, VPM, is applied to both, the ego vehicle’s sensor data as well
as the sensor data provided via V2V communication by the surrounding vehicles.
This model uses the EKF proposed in [32]. However, it has to be highlighted, that
the sensor data from the surrounding vehicles cannot be veried with sensors of the
ego vehicle.
3.4 Potential Factors Influencing the Decision Making
Automated and cooperative vehicles are introduced to improve trac safety and
eciency [2], and to reduce greenhouse gases as well as reducing air pollution.
However, using other vehicles’ information as a basis for decision making in a safety-
critical system also brings safety and security concerns with it. In an operational
environment, all vehicles might not provide equally reliable information and thus, a
system that evaluates the received information is necessary.
The vehicular control system needs to adapt to changing situations as well as the
environment. It is therefore desirable that the system can rely on the information
provided by the surrounding vehicles, in order to make reliable and safe decisions.
The factors that may inuence the vehicle’s driving behaviour or decision making
are described below.
Sensor Quality The knowledge about the precision and accuracy of the surrounding
vehicles is important to make profound decisions based on this information. Sensor
quality is essential when it comes to the data from other vehicles since the ego vehicle
may not be able to verify this information with its own sensors. The CAM contains
elds describing the accuracy of the measurements, but it might be the case that the
sensor, such as the GPS position, is highly dependent on the environment and thus
the message eld might not be suciently updated.
Static Environment Most of the environment along our roads does not change
frequently, e. g., tunnels, bridges, and guard rails are considered as static. The envi-
ronment has a strong impact on our sensors. As an example, the satellite connection
of the GPS device is dependent on the environment, due to the reection of electro-
magnetic waves between tall buildings within cities.
Dynamic Environment Loss of messages can be an indicator of an environmental
change. Other trac, for example other temporal objects, such as vehicles can
inuence the radio communication. During tests with a vehicle able to use V2X
communication, it was experienced that trucks can block the communication between
the preceding vehicle of the truck and the vehicle in the back, due to the physical
properties of a truck. Identifying that there is a temporary communication loss
caused by another vehicle is necessary in order to be aware of the current situation.
Behaviour The longitudinal and lateral controller design depends on the manufac-
turer or even on the model of the vehicle. For that reason, it has to be considered
how the vehicle behaves or reacts to certain situations and events. For example, a
vehicle following another vehicle that has a high velocity uctuation should be able
to compensate these uctuations to maintain string stability. One more indicator of
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the behaviour is the observation of the vehicles while they are interacting with each
other.
The TS takes the aforementioned factors into account and provides the software
modules of the ego vehicle with a TI and a map of the surrounding vehicles. The
identication of the surrounding vehicles, especially the MIO, is needed to interact
with each other.
3.5 Trust Index
The TI is designed for a cooperative automated vehicle control system and is a scalar
value that indicates the current overall trust. It combines the trust in the environment,
in the vehicle itself, and the trust in the surrounding vehicles. An absolute TI was
chosen for the reason that such an index is easier to exchange with other vehicles in
case of using a distributed database providing TIs of other vehicles.
To combine dierent TIs into one integrated index that describes the overall
trust in both the environment and the vehicles, a weighted average is proposed. The
formula for estimating the weighted average TI is described in Equation G.1.
T I =
∑N




T I is the combined TI,
N is the total number of TIs,
wn is the weight for that specic TI, and
T In is the index of a certain TI.
The proposed four TIs are T Iego , T Imio , T Ienv , and T Ivi . T Iego describes the trust
in the ego vehicle according to sensor quality gathered from the VPM, including the
knowledge about the DOP values gathered from the GPS device. T Imio represents
the trust in the preceding vehicle by combining the sensor quality and the behaviour
of the vehicle. The trust in the environment is represented by T Ienv and the trust
in the vehicle i is described by T Ivi . Figure G.2 illustrates the partial TIs and their
sources that are combined into one index.
3.5.1 Trust Index T Iego
This TI indicates the trust of the ego vehicle based on its own sensor data. Validating
the own trust in the sensor quality is essential in order to create reliable awareness.
If the system is not able to trust its own sensor data, the system will not be able
to perceive the environment correctly and thus the passenger’s safety of the ego
and the surrounding vehicles would be at risk. The EKF of the VPM provides the
Kalman gain Kk at each time step and reects how much “trust” it puts into both
the predicted state and the new measurement. The DOP values provided by the GPS
device indicate the precision of the position.
Figure G.3 illustrates the process of computing T Iego . The rst step is to compute
a partial TI that contains the quality of the measured position according to the
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Figure G.3: Composition of T Iego.
previously mentioned DOP values. These dimensionless values can be innitely
large [33]. Consequently, it is necessary to set a limit that indicates a highly imprecise
measurement. This limit is set by the constant C, since a reliable geographical
position is a prerequisite for cooperative driving. The limit of C = 25 is based
on an experiment with disadvantageous weather conditions, namely intense rain
and clouded sky, where platooning was still possible. This condition was set to
T Igps = 0.5. The Position DOP (PDOP) value is a combination of the former DOP
values and used for further computation [33]. Equation G.2 provides the formulas for
calculating T Iego . The rst step is to compute the PDOP value and normalise it with
a maximum value, constant C. Next, the Kalman gain is evaluated by calculating the
mean of the diagonal ofKk , which contains the factor of “trust” for each measurement.
The overall TI of the ego vehicle representing the quality of the sensors is achieved by
applying a weighted average of the indices describing the EKF and the GPS quality.
Each measurement described by the VPM has the same weight for calculating
T IV PM described in Equation G.2c. A higher weight for the position accuracy is not
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HDOP2 + VDOP2 (G.2a)
T Igps =
{









wgps · T Igps +wVPM · T IVPM
wgps +wVPM
(G.2d)
3.5.2 Trust Index T Imio
T Imio and T Ivi are both combining trust in the measurement quality and trust in
the behaviour of the other vehicles. A denition of correct or wrong behaviour is
highly complex since one can consider many factors that help to dene behaviour. A
survey of the factors expressing the behaviour of a vehicle is shown in this section.
Vehicle behaviour can be described through observing historical data generated
by the vehicle while driving. Figure G.4 illustrates the identied factors that help to
conclude about the vehicular behaviour. The current velocity provides information
about the cautiousness of the driver or automated system.
Speed according to road limit and condition





Figure G.4: Factors describing the behaviour of a vehicle.
The system of other vehicles might do something wrong or unexpected due to
lack of perception. Vehicles have to react properly even if other road users make
mistakes. The interaction with the surrounding trac is important for cooperative
driving. The main requirement for cooperative driving is using a common interaction
protocol.
Speed Fluctuation. The stability of the speed of the MIO can be considered by
analysing the speed prole. A condition for using the velocity prole of the MIO is
a second sensor that is able to measure the speed of the preceding vehicle. A front
radar is able to detect the distance and calculate the range rate to any obstacles in
front. The range rate is dened in [34] as the rate of the change of the distance to
the obstacle as dened in Equation G.3a.
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vmio = vego + Ṙ, (G.3b)
where
R is range or distance to the detected obstacle,
Ṙ is range rate, and
v is the velocity of the MIO or ego vehicle.
Equation G.3b shows the calculation of the preceding vehicle’s speed considering
the speed of the ego vehicle and the range rate Ṙ of the MIO. The range rate in m/s
provides information about the change of the distance in metres. The formula is only
valid if the preceding vehicle is moving in the same direction as the ego vehicle. This
requirement is fullled while the vehicles are driving on a straight road however it
might be invalid in curves.
Interaction. This TI is GCDC specic, but can be applied to other interaction
protocols as well. The communication between the vehicles during a scenario can be
observed as long as they are within communication range of the ego vehicle. The
highway scenario, scenario 1, of GCDC 2016 relies on the correct pairing of the
vehicles in order to perform a safe merge from one lane to the other. The pairing
procedure is described in the i-GAME deliverable 3.2 [29] and in [35]. The lack of
interoperability can be a cause for wrong interactions. Observing a wrong pairing of
the MIO, or another vehicle around the ego vehicle, can be used for consideration in
both T Imio and T Ivi .
Another measure to validate the correct implementation of the interaction pro-
tocol is the observation of the Safe-to-Merge (STOM) message. Vehicles that have
paired up correctly are making a gap relative to their pairing partner. As soon as
the vehicle that is making a gap for a merging vehicle decides that the gap is large
enough to merge, it sends out a STOM message. Observing the created gap when the
STOM message is sent can be used to verify the trust in the vehicle when interacting
with other vehicles. Future scenarios for cooperative and automated driving may
provide more accurate measures to be considered in a TI.
Recommended Speed. The speed of the preceding vehicle indicates how safe it is
driving. Considering the weather and the road conditions in combination with the
knowledge about the current speed limit allows to conclude a recommended speed
for safe driving.
Reaction to misbehaving vehicles. The reliability of the vehicle’s control system
is important and should be considered in the TI computation for each vehicle. The
ego vehicle has to know, if the vehicle is not able to react to misbehaving vehicles
properly, because the safety of the passengers in the vehicle itself and the surrounding
vehicles might be at risk. Analysing the behaviour of all vehicles and evaluating
the reaction of the surrounding vehicles needs signicant computational power and
dierent types of sensors are required.
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Composition of T Imio. Figure G.5 illustrates the measures that can be considered in
T Imio . Interaction can be used to signal how well the vehicle cooperates with others,
e. g., if it pairs and sends STOMs correctly. The degree of the speed uctuation is
mapped using a predened table and represented as the factor Speed Fluctuation.
Taking into account the factors weather, road condition, and current speed limit,
allows the computation of the recommended speed using inference. A comparison of
this recommendation and the actual speed of the preceding vehicle is mapped to the
partial TI Speed. The VDM and VPM described in Sections 3.2 and 3.3 provide infor-
mation about the sensor quality of the vehicle in front. The reaction to misbehaving
vehicles is expressed as the sixth factor to be considered for T Imio.
Figure G.4 illustrates the factors that potentially inuence the TI. Moreover,
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Figure G.5: Composition of T Imio.
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perceive all the mentioned measures, such as the current speed limit, road condition,
and the observation of the reaction to misbehaving vehicles, this work focuses on
the following four factors: the result of the VDM and VPM using an EKF, the speed
uctuation, and the performance when interacting with other vehicles.
3.5.3 Trust Index T Ienv
The environment is categorised into static and dynamic. Roads, tunnels, bridges and
the information about rural or urban areas are considered as static. Changes in the
dynamic environment may be communication disturbances due to vehicles that block
the radio waves e. g., a truck. Research about algorithms deciding what should be
forwarded by the truck in order to enable the communication for all vehicles within a
certain range is ongoing. Larsson proposes in [36] a performance centric forwarding
algorithm.
Deciding whether being in an urban or rural environment can be made using
several dierent methods. One method is to use a map of a navigation software.
Another approach is using the PDOP value which is provided by the GPS device. By
considering this precision information, it can be deduced if the vehicle is driving in a
city, tunnel, under a bridge or on a highway. A less precise geographic position is
common in cities, due to the reection of the electromagnetic waves by buildings.
An indicator that the vehicle is driving in a tunnel is the lack of position updates and
high HDOP and VDOP values.
The knowledge of the environment, such as the information that the vehicle is
in a city, is important. The situation awareness has to be increased when driving in
cities, due to dense trac, bicyclists, pedestrians and other vulnerable road users.
T Ienv considers the PDOP value for indicating the trust in the environment.
Moreover, T Ienv is being stored in a database for prospective use. The mapping of
a T Ienv perceived in the past is accomplished using circles of a certain size, e. g.,
5 metres.
3.5.4 Trust Index T Ivi
This TI is similar to T Imio. A system with enough resources for computation can
observe and evaluate the interaction of the surrounding vehicles with each other.
Moreover, more sensors and dierent types of sensors are needed in order to evaluate
the precision of the other vehicle’s information.
Another challenge is the calculation of a TI considering observations made by
other vehicles. More sensors can increase the perception of the ego vehicle, but
they can only be used to a certain extent. The system has to rely on the V2V
information in case a vehicle cannot be perceived with the own sensors. For example,
the distance between two vehicles can be compared with the calculated distance




The perception range of the vehicle is strongly dependent on its level of automation. A
fully autonomous vehicle has to make all decisions on its own as the driver is not in the
control loop anymore. Thus, it needs to detect obstacles, other vehicles, pedestrians,
trac lights, speed limits, lanes markings and road conditions. The system used to
evaluate the proposed concept has a limited perception and a longitudinal controller
whereas the lateral control is performed manually. This restriction decreases the
number of sensors needed to be able to drive automatically.
A map of the surrounding vehicles is essential for fullling the interaction of the
scenarios described in [29]. The system needs to identify the vehicle in the front
right/left as well as the vehicle behind on the right lane. To generate a map that fulls
this requirement with the available sensors, the system has to rely on the reported
vehicle position provided via V2V communication, because only the position of the
vehicle in front can be veried with the built-in radar. This approach has been chosen
for the reason that the ego vehicle used for the TS has a limited perception. Vehicles
with a more advanced perception should rely on their own sensors and consider
the correctness of the information provided via V2V communication in the vehicle
specic TI, T Ivi .
The identication of the surrounding vehicle’s position can be determined by
considering the lane in which the vehicle is currently driving in or by computing
the relative angles to the vehicles with the shortest distance. Both approaches are
computed and further on combined with each other in order to achieve a more robust
identication of the vehicle’s relative position.
Lane. The CAM as well as the i-GAME Cooperative Lane Change messages (iCLCMs)
contain a eld describing the lane in which the vehicle is currently driving. The
CAM lane is an integer in the range of −1 to 14. −1 refers to a position outside of
the road, 0 is the hard shoulder and 1 is the outermost driving lane [28]. By taking
the lane position of the vehicle into account, the algorithm is more robust against
misidentied vehicles.
Angles. Considering only the relative angles of the vehicles and their distance
provides a more robust identication of vehicles that are sending an incorrect or
no lane ID. The downside of only using this algorithm for identifying the relative
position of the surrounding vehicles is the risk of misclassication of vehicles when
driving in a curve.
A method that combines both proposed algorithms takes the advantages of
both. Vehicles in the GCDC 2016 mostly sent the correct lane ID and therefore, this
algorithm is used as a base. In case a vehicle is identied at another position by the
map that considers only the angles and the distance, this eld is also updated in the
overall map. This approach allows false positives, as it possible that one vehicle is
identied at two places, for instance front-left and front.
Figure G.6 illustrates the ego vehicle and the relative position description of the
surrounding vehicles. The rst letter contains the information if the car is in the
front of the vehicle or behind it, while the other letter indicates left or right. The
blue areas indicate the angle range that is used for classifying the position of the
vehicles.
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Figure G.6: Illustration of the map and the classication of the surrounding vehicles.
4 Experimental Investigations
The developed TS is evaluated with data from the highway scenario of the GCDC,
because this scenario relies the most on the interaction with other vehicles via V2V
communication. This section introduces the car, the GCDC highway scenario, and
the parameters used for this experiment.
4.1 Car Setup
The proposed system has been implemented in a Volvo S60 provided by Volvo Car
Corporation and tested and evaluated during and after the GCDC 2016. Java4 was
chosen as the primary programming language for realising the dierent function-
alities of the car from team Halmstad. The communication between the modules
of the system was achieved with Lightweight Communications and Marshalling
(LCM)5. The benet of using LCM is the ease of replaying log data and the real time
observation of the exchanged data.
The competition car was equipped with antennas for the dierential GPS and
for the wireless communication. In addition to the antennas, there were two lights
indicating whether the vehicle is in automated (green light) or manual (red light)
mode.
The power is provided via a 12 V to 220 V power converter which is attached
to an uninterruptible power supply. The communication between the devices is
established with a wireless router. The V2X communication with the other vehicles
and infrastructure is provided by the Alix System Board alix2d36. To ensure a certain
accuracy of the geographical position in the range of +/ − 10 cm in standstill, a
dierential GPS device is needed. The dSPACE MicroAutoBox, provided by Fengco
Real Time Control AB, is used as the interface between the system and the car.






system of the competition vehicle is executed on a computer, which is located in the
front passenger seat.
4.2 Highway scenario
The highway scenario took place on the highway A270 between Eindhoven and
Helmond in the Netherlands. Due to speed limitations of some participating vehicles,
this scenario was split into two heats, one high speed and one low speed. In the
high speed heat, the vehicles in the right lane, lane B, were driving with a speed
of 60 km/h and the vehicles on the left lane, lane A, were driving at 80 km/h. In
the low-speed heats the speed of the vehicles in lane A was 45 km/h and in lane B
40 km/h.
The highway scenario is split into four phases, pace making, parallel pairing,
sequential pairing, and the merging phase. Figure G.7 illustrates phase III of the
highway scenario, when the pairing between the vehicles is completed [29, 35].
I: Pace Making. At the beginning, the OPCs are bringing the vehicles into the right
position. As soon as the vehicles are correctly positioned, a roadwork message is
sent to all participants. The roadwork message implies a roadwork on a certain lane
(lane A) and the reduction of all vehicles’ speed to 40 km/h.
II: Parallel Pairing. A merge request triggers the so-called B2A pairing, which
means that the vehicles on the right lane are setting their forward pair, the vehicle
on the front-left, in the iCLCM message. This pairing is performed in parallel by all
vehicles. Additionally, their forward partner acknowledges the pairing by setting
them as its backward pair. When the B2A pairing is done, the vehicles in lane B
create a gap so that their forward partner can merge in front of it.
III: Sequential Pairing. After a certain time, the lead vehicle on the left lane pairs
up with the vehicle on the front-right and creates a gap. The front-right vehicle is
identied as the MIO of the backward pair. As soon as the gap is large enough, the
backward pair of the lead vehicle sends out a STOM message indicating that the gap
is large enough for the lead vehicle to merge.
IV: Merging done. After merging, the lead vehicle adapts its parameters to the right












Figure G.7: Phase III of the GCDC highway scenario (reproduced from [29, p. 8]).
During the competition, one case was experienced, where the communication to all
vehicles in front of two trucks driving next to each other on two adjacent lanes was
blocked due to their physical properties. The only available information about the
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vehicles in front is the MIO information transmitted by the trucks via the iCLCM
message. With this information, the system of the vehicle has the knowledge that
another vehicle is in front of its MIO with a certain distance. Other information,
such as the preceding vehicle of the MIO of the truck cannot be gathered and thus an
increased situation awareness is necessary for a correct evaluation of the situation.
4.3 Parameter Seings
The data gathered during the competition has been logged according to the require-
ments of the competition shown in [37] and with the use of lcm-log. The generated
LCM logs can be played with the lcm-logplayer. Moreover, the logs were created for
each module individually as a separate le containing only the received or transmit-
ted data. Thus, it is possible to playback the log of the TS containing all information
that the TS received. The use of recorded data was chosen for the reason that it is
data from a real situation, which includes the interaction with other vehicles, sensor
inaccuracies, and communication delays.
The weights of the TIs were chosen manually to demonstrate the general idea
of the TS. All TIs, except T Iego, have the same weight. T Iego has a higher weight
because it describes the trust in the ego vehicle. Equation G.4 shows the specic
weights. It should be noted that the only appearance of T Ivi is T If wd and has thus
been weighted with the same weight as T Imio.
wmio = wvi = wenv = 3; wego = 5; (G.4)
Moreover, the adjusted weights for T Iego described in Section 3.5.1 are listed in
Equation G.5.
wgps = 0.25; wVPM = 0.75; (G.5)
5 Results
The results are shown as graphs illustrating the TI during dierent heats and dierent
placements of the vehicle within the two platoons. The partial TIs are depicted in the
same plots to show the composition and highlight the inuences of each component.
The generation of the TI has been simplied due to the limited performance of the
system of the competition car. To ease visibility in the plots, the TIs have been
ltered with a moving average lter with a twelve second window, which has been
experimentally selected.
5.1 Vehicle merges into right lane
Figure G.8a illustrates the TI and the speed prole of the test vehicle during a low-
speed heat. The speed prole is shown for the sake of completeness and omitted in
further gures. The behaviour of T Iego is stable with a value at around 0.84 until
the vehicle merges. A level between 0.8 and 0.9 indicates for the decision making
algorithm that the information of the ego, the other vehicles, and the environment is
reliable and that the vehicle can decrease or keep its distance to the MIO. Whenever
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(a) TI and speed prole.




















(b) TI during the merge.
Figure G.8: Experiment I: Highway scenario starting from the left lane.
the TS does not have the necessary information to calculate a partial TI, it will omit it
in the TI calculation. In a future implementation one may mark certain information
sources as mandatory or optional. This way, the lack of information would be also
considered in the TIs.
T Iego decreases as soon as the TS has more information about its geographic
position, which is shown by the appearance of T Ienv that considers also the precision
information (PDOP value) gathered from the GPS device. The late appearance of the
PDOP value is caused by the GPS device that never provided this information in this
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area (until t = 340 in Figure G.8a). It shows the inuence of the knowledge about
the environment on T Ienv and T Iego . T Ienv is calculated by using the current PDOP
value or a T Ienv from the area close to the vehicle that was perceived in the past.
Moreover, T Ienv decreases at second 460 due to a change in the environment – trees
covered the road and caused a decrease of the GPS precision.
Comparing T Imio before and after the merge shows that there are dierent
vehicles in front of the ego vehicle. It also indicates that the MIO after the merge
is more reliable compared to the preceding vehicle before the merge. The vertical
blue line indicates the time when the merge to the right lane has nished. It can also
be seen that T Imio is decreasing while the merge is being performed because the
system cannot detect the correct MIO during that phase and thus the radar match is
negative.
The forward partner is only set within the B2A and the merging phase. T If wd
describes the trust in the forward partner and is thus only calculated within these
phases. This TI originates from T Ivi . An extract of the TI during the merge from
second 250 to 380 can be found in Figure G.8b. It shows T If wd in more detail and it
also illustrates the behaviour of T Imio during the merge.
The decreased TI during the merge can be used to inform the decision making
module that it has to decrease its trust into the current situation. However, the lane
change has to be treated as a special case, since the car has to keep its speed in order
to not interfere with the interaction protocol. Furthermore, the trust in the new
preceding vehicle is stable with a value of around 0.9, because the match between
radar distance and geographical position is more accurate than with the previous
MIO. This information can be used to maintain safety while decreasing the time
headway or the distance to the preceding vehicle when this vehicle provides reliable
data, i.e. has a high TI.
5.2 Making gap for vehicle to merge
In the highway scenario, when the vehicle starts in the right lane, it does not need to
change the lane. It creates a gap with respect to its forward partner on the left lane
and sends out a STOM message as soon as the gap is large enough for the forward
partner to merge.
Figure G.9 depicts the composition and behaviour of the TI and T Imio. T Iego
shown in Figure G.9a is also stable and changes when the PDOP value occurs. The
behaviour of T If wd is similar to the one presented in Figure G.8a. First, T If wd is
lower and increases with the experience gathered about the vehicle. It shows also the
same behaviour during the merge. As soon as the vehicle, in this case the forward
partner, changes the lane, T Imio is decreasing signicantly due to the change of the
ego vehicle’s preceding car. Furthermore, the new MIO has a lower TI compared
to the previous one. This is caused by a continuous misidentication of the MIO.
Due to this misidentication, the observed values with the radar and the reported
data via V2V communication do not match, the TI decreases. The reason for this
continuous misidentication is a low accuracy of the received geographical position.
It was experienced that the new preceding vehicle had provided delayed position
data and thus the system could not identify it correctly.
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(a) Behaviour of the TI



















(b) Composition of T Imio.
Figure G.9: Experiment II: Highway scenario starting from right lane.
Figure G.9b depicts the partial TIs used to calculate T Imio . For a better illustration
of the TIs, the same moving average lter has been applied. This lter is the reason
why the TI of the radar is not binary. The forward partner becomes the new MIO after
the merge. Since T If wd only uses the VPM for calculating this index, T Imio does
not necessarily match with T If wd . The behaviour of T Imio is strongly inuenced
by the result of the radar match. After the merge, from second 300 to 510, the
measured radar distance diers from the distance using the geographical position.
The evaluation of the radar match is performed within the VDM of the system of the
car as described in Section 3.2.
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The identication of measurement mismatches by comparing the own sensor
data of the ego vehicle with the reported data is important for situation awareness.
The implemented controller did not have any problems with following this vehicle
in a platoon because the system relies, for safety reasons, in such cases on the radar
information. The decreased T Imio tells the other modules of the system that the
reported data can not be fully trusted.
The graph shows that the trust in the new MIO after the merge is about 0.6.
Comparing the overall TI of the system highlights that the situation awareness has to
be increased. A possible reaction to this behaviour can be an increased time headway
or distance to the preceding vehicle. An overall TI of less than 0.5 means that the TS
has evidence for not trusting this vehicle and the gap to the preceding vehicle has to
be increased.
5.3 Unreliable Geographical Position
The proposed system has to rely to a certain extent on the geographical position
provided by the other vehicles because the system is only able to verify the position
of the preceding vehicle and the VPM is not capable of improving the position of
highly inaccurate position data or unreliable data. One case was experienced in the
course of the GCDC where the intended forward partner provided unreliable position
information.
The introduced TS is able to improve the geographical position of a vehicle by
considering the inertial sensor information, but it cannot improve the position of
highly inaccurate measurements that provide changes in the position from +/ − 80
metres. Figure G.10 illustrates such a situation. The position of the competition car
is plotted in blue as a reference. The red curve shows the position of the forward
partner. As can be seen, the geographical position of the other participant’s vehicle
is uctuating to a large extent. Unfortunately the source of the disturbance is not
known and could not be investigated. From experience the characteristics of the
disturbance indicate that it may be caused by synchronization problems with the
Real Time Kinematic (RTK) base station.
Vehicles which provide such an unreliable position cannot be identied with the
current implementation of the proposed TS. This is caused by the competition car’s
limited perception with its own sensors. For computational reasons, only vehicles
that behave properly to a certain extent are monitored, i.e. vehicles with large
uctuations in position can not be followed with the use of the VDM.
6 Conclusion
This paper presents a Trust System (TS) capable of perceiving the local environment
and generate a Trust Index (TI) describing the overall reliability of both the on-board
vehicle sensor data as well as the data received through V2V communication. The TS
perceives the vehicle’s local environment and generates a TI indicating the system’s
level of trust in the sensor readings and their reliability at any given time instant.
The TI is within the range 0 to 1, and takes several factors into account e.g. the
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Figure G.10: Example of a vehicle reporting an unreliable/inaccurate geographical
position.
environment itself, the ego vehicle, the other vehicles, and in particular the preceding
vehicle. The TI is broadcasted to the modules of the vehicle’s system to inform them
about the current situation and allow them to consider it when taking actions.
The evaluation of the sensor accuracy of the ego vehicle and the other vehicles is
performed with the vehicle distance model (VDM) and the vehicle position model
(VPM). The VDM describes the relation between the distance measured with a radar
and the distance based on the provided geographical position. A kinematic model of
the vehicle in combination with an EKF has been implemented in the VPM. The TS
generates the TI based on various factors that can inuence the situation awareness.
The results of the TS are illustrated and discussed. The behaviour of the TI in
various situations shows the correct identication of situations, where the preceding
vehicle has a lower reliability and thus a lower TI is assigned to the vehicle. A
discussion about the possible inuences of the proposed TS in decision making is also
given and indicates that, to maintain safety while the TI is low, the TS can suggest
to increase the time headway to the preceding vehicle or reduce the own vehicle’s
speed. The overall TI consists of several partial TIs, future work may include adaptive
weighing of these TIs in dierent situations. This can be achieved through further
testing in various situations.
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Framework for Automotive
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T. Rosenstaer, T. Olovsson, M. Almgren
Abstract. Vehicles have become connected in many ways. They commu-nicate with the cloud and will use Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) commu-
nication to exchange warning messages and perform cooperative actions such
as platooning. Vehicles have already been attacked and will become even more
attractive targets due to their increasing connectivity, the amount of data they
produce and their importance to our society. It is therefore crucial to provide
cyber security measures to prevent and limit the impact of attacks.
As it is problematic for a vehicle to reliably assess its own state when it is com-
promised, we investigate how vehicle trust can be used to identify compromised
vehicles and how eet-wide attacks can be detected at an early stage using
cloud data. In our proposed V2C Anomaly Detection framework, peer vehicles
assess each other based on their perceived behavior in trac and V2X-enabled
interactions, and upload these assessments to the cloud for analysis. This frame-
work consists of four modules. For each module we dene functional demands,
interfaces and evaluate solutions proposed in literature allowing manufacturers
and eet owners to choose appropriate techniques. We detail attack scenarios
where this type of framework is particularly useful in detecting and identifying
potential attacks and failing software and hardware. Furthermore, we describe
what basic vehicle data the cloud analysis can be based upon.

V2C: A Trust-Based Vehicle to Cloud
Anomaly Detection Framework for
Automotive Systems
1 Introduction
To increase trac safety and eciency, Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) and Vehicle-to-
Infrastructure (V2I) communication is needed to enable the sensing of objects and
entities that are out of the vehicle’s sight; to allow cooperation between vehicles
to increase eciency such as in platooning [1] and to receive warnings about road
conditions, e. g., slippery roads, trac accidents and road works ahead. In addition,
most vehicles also have cellular access to the Internet to provide comfort functions
such as remote unlock/lock and to receive essential software updates over the air.
The feasibility of cyber attacks against vehicles that can potentially lead to
catastrophic events was demonstrated already in 2011. Checkoway et al. [2] analyzed
a modern vehicle for security vulnerabilities and identied several potential attacks
requiring physical access, but also attacks possible through short-range wireless
connectivity, e. g., Bluetooth, and long-range wireless connectivity such as cellular
networks. In 2015 Miller and Valasek [3] demonstrated a remote exploit through the
cellular network allowing them to remotely control a vehicle including safety-critical
functions. A more recent report from 2020 revealed several vulnerabilities allowing
remote control of Mercedes-Benz vehicles [4]. Remote attacks pose a signicantly
higher risk to the safety of road users as they do not require physical access to
vehicles and can be performed from anywhere without leaving signicant traces.
Security measures have been investigated and proposed for various parts of the
automotive system, ranging from intrusion detection for the in-vehicle network
(e. g., [5, 6]), secure communication for all networked communications and secure
boot for Electronic Control Units, ECUs (e. g., [7]). These methods are important
to protect and secure an individual vehicle and its occupants, however, they are not
foolproof nor enough to identify wide-spread attacks and anomalies on a eet level.
Motivation. Analyzing all available data in the cloud when an event from a single
vehicle is received is not feasible due to the potentially large number of vehicles in the
eet and the associated computational costs. In general, it is also problematic for a
system, i.e., the vehicle such as a passenger car, truck or bus, to reliably assess its own
state when it is compromised. Therefore, a framework that allows nding anomalies
and intrusions in automotive systems in its entirety is needed. The establishment of
trust between vehicles interacting via V2V communication is of particular interest as
it enables the assessment of a vehicle’s behavior, especially in safety-critical situations,
not just by the vehicle itself but also by the surrounding vehicles.
Contributions. In this paper, we present V2C Anomaly Detection, an overall frame-
work that combines the detection of anomalies by evaluating V2V interactions using
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trust scores with the analysis in the cloud. We divide this framework in modules and
for each module, we survey existing solutions, investigate how to implement them,
propose modications when necessary and evaluate them. During the design we
put special focus on scalability of the framework and the feasibility to detect attacks
and abnormal behavior. We further argue that a framework like V2C Anomaly Detec-
tion is necessary and complements existing security controls and internal Intrusion
Detection Systems (IDSs), as it is based on vehicles independently evaluating each
other rather than only evaluating their own internal state.
After giving an overview of the system design and attacks in Section 2, we present
related work in Section 3, review existing methods for each module in Section 4, and
evaluate suitable methods and, when necessary, suggest modications in Section 5.
Ultimately, we show how to apply and discuss the V2C Anomaly Detection framework
based on a detailed use case in Section 6 and then conclude the paper in Section 7.
2 Overview
Our goal is to utilize techniques in both individual vehicles and in the cloud in order
to identify compromised vehicles. Security systems inside these compromised or
malfunctioning vehicles may not be able to detect the misbehavior themselves and
therefore a peer evaluation of independent systems is necessary. In addition, the
analysis in the cloud with access to data about each vehicle in a eet allows an early
detection of large-scale attacks.
We rst discuss the security threats and attack scenarios that the proposed
framework should be able to detect in Section 2.1. An overview of the structure and
the modules of the V2C Anomaly Detection framework using V2V and cloud data
is presented in Section 2.2. Thereafter, an adversary model and assumptions are
presented in Section 2.3.
2.1 Aack Scenarios
The following three attack scenarios highlight the need for trust-based anomaly
detection in the cloud: (1) when rmware is successfully modied without triggering
an alert from other monitoring software in the vehicle; (2) when hardware/software
failures occur that cause an incorrect perception or behavior; and (3) when failed
updates or faulty software cause functional disturbances. These scenarios and the
examples listed in Table H.1 emphasize that the V2C Anomaly Detection framework
focuses not only on detecting intrusions caused by unauthorized entities, it also
aims at detecting behavioral changes caused by intentional and unintentional, yet
authorized, modications as well as random faults. These scenarios will be further
used in Section 5.1 to evaluate the applicability of proposed trust and reputation
models.
Scenario 1 – Unauthorized Firmware manipulation. Someone such as the owner, an
employee at a workshop or a remote attacker, performs unauthorized modications
of the rmware in order to (i) suppress relaying of messages in the Vehicular Ad-hoc
NETwork, VANET (blackhole attack), (ii) modify or falsify warning messages for
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Table H.1: Examples for the identied scenarios.
Ex. # Description
Scenario 1 – Unauthorized rmware manipulation
Ex.1 Manipulation of the rmware such that the owner is able to send trac
congestion warning messages at will to reduce trac on a desired road
segment.
Ex.2 Manipulation of the rmware such that the automated vehicle drives
faster than the current speed limit.
Ex.3 Manipulation of the rmware such that an attacker can disrupt trac
by suppressing relaying of messages, spoong warning messages or
ooding the Vehicular Ad-hoc NETwork (VANET) with erroneous mes-
sages.
Scenario 2 – HW/SW failures
Ex.4 A lidar sensor or camera is experiencing a fault and the vehicle is thus
not able to perceive its environment properly.
Scenario 3 – Legitimate SW/HW updates
Ex.5 After a legitimate rmware update, the automated vehicle drives too
fast in certain road conditions, e. g., when the road is slippery, since the
vehicle perceives the current driving conditions incorrectly.
Ex.6 A defect hardware component is replaced in an authorized workshop
and causes compatibility problems resulting in a misbehavior while
driving.
Ex.7 The machine learning algorithm for identifying trac signs has been
updated and now causes a misclassication of speed limit signs. The
possibility of attacks exploiting machine learning algorithms for the
identication of trac signs has also been demonstrated by Sitawarin
et al. [8]. Thus, an update of such systems may even open new attack
vectors.
events such as trac accidents, trac jams and other road conditions (masquerading
attack) or (iii) interact with other vehicles during cooperative scenarios, e. g., pla-
tooning, in a selsh or malicious way to cause disruption of the trac ow or even
an accident.
Scenario 2 – HW/SW failures. Hardware or software faults occur and cause the
vehicle to react improperly to the situation.
Scenario 3 – Legitimate SW/HWupdates. The vehicle manufacturer pushes an over-
the-air update for one of the computing units, ECUs, in a vehicle or an authorized
workshop replaces hardware and causes a degraded or unintended functionality due
to the complexity of an automotive system and lack of sucient testing. Examples of
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such unintended functionality are inaccurate or wrong sensor readings and changes
in the behavior when interacting with other vehicles.
2.2 System Design
The goal of our V2C Anomaly Detection framework is to identify anomalous and
malicious behavior in a eet by having vehicles evaluate each other. As a result, we
identied four tasks: (i) individually assess vehicle trust which consequently has to
indicate anomalous behavior; (ii) combine these trust evaluations; (iii) detect a change
in the combined trust evaluations showing that the vehicle’s behavior negatively
changed; and (iv) analyzing cloud data to identify similar patterns in the eet. Each
task is assigned to a module as shown in Figure H.1. Module 1 evaluates its own and
the behavior of other vehicles based on V2V data and the cooperation with them.
Each vehicle performs this individual peer evaluation which results in a trust score
and uploads the average of the trust scores for a certain period, e. g., per day, for each
evaluated vehicle to the cloud. These trust scores reported by the vehicle eet are
combined to one trust score per vehicle in module 2. Combining the trust scores in the
cloud has the advantages that no additional computation for combining trust scores
is required by the vehicles and that no additional messages need to be exchanged in
the VANET. Module 3 observes the trust scores over time and raises an alert when
the trust score of a specic vehicle decreases, indicating that the behavior of the
vehicle has negatively changed. Module 4 then analyzes the available data about the














Figure H.1: Structure of V2C Anomaly Detection.
Since this is a framework providing exibility for selecting and adapting suitable
techniques for each module, we provide examples and show how the V2C Anomaly
Detection framework can be used. Figure H.2 shows the required information as
input, the output each module produces and links to the respective sections where





Module 1: Trust evaluation (Section 5.1)
T Ij,j , T Ii,j , Ci,j
Trust score and condence value of
vehicle j experienced by vehicle i
Module 2: Combining trust scores (Section 5.2)
T Ij aggregation of trust scores T Ii,j
T Ij,j own perceived score by vehicle j
Module 3: Detecting change in the behavior (Section 5.3)
alert(Vj ) Cloud data
(Section 5.5)
Module 4: Data Analysis in the cloud (Section 5.4)
Identication of anomalies
in the eet
Figure H.2: Modules of the V2C Anomaly Detection framework including their inputs
and outputs they produce.
2.3 Adversary Model and Assumptions
Attackers may gain complete control of a vehicle, e. g., through attack scenarios de-
scribed in [9], allowing them to remotely control it or alter the rmware of important
ECUs to perform attacks as mentioned in Section 2.1. It is reasonable to assume that
many attacks can be perform stealthy and will only be detected through the behavior
of the vehicle.
We assume that the majority of vehicles are honest and report correct trust scores,
however, a minority of compromised vehicles may collude. The trust score calculated
from the data and behavior involving V2V communication can also be correlated to
the data about the vehicles located in the cloud.
3 Related Work
In this section we list related work in regards to this framework, while Section 4
reviews individual methods for each module. The introduction of VANETs and
subsequent applications introduce additional security and safety challenges. Crypto-
graphic solutions build the base for secure communication to provide condentiality,
integrity and availability. Nevertheless, dishonest or compromised vehicles need to
be considered as well. VANET-specic attacks include spoong locations of vehicles,
sending altered or dropping warning messages and dropping all messages.
Trust and reputation models for evaluating vehicles based on V2V interactions
have been proposed in literature [10] to identify vehicles that provide false or incor-
rect information to others and thus risking the safety of the passengers. Proposed
solutions focus on how to evaluate the correctness of reported events, how to verify
the correctness of sensor data, how to assess the interaction during cooperative
223
H. A Trust-Based Vehicle to Cloud Anomaly Detection Framework
events such as platooning and/or how to distribute this knowledge between the
vehicles. The resulting evaluation, a trust or reputation score, is used for decision-
making by the automated vehicle. Examples are decisions about whether to trust
reported warnings, e. g., road accident ahead, received from a particular vehicle. Guo
et al. [11] propose an approach that veries information received via V2V in form of
an IDS whose results are further used for decision-making. Other solutions on col-
laborative intrusion detection [12, 13] consider only packet headers and parameters,
such as packet drop rate and transfer delay, and investigate ways to exchange this
information between neighboring vehicles.
To the best of our knowledge there is no similar work to the V2C Anomaly
Detection framework, which deals with how trust scores can be utilized in a more
holistic setting in order to detect large-scale attacks and anomalies by uploading and
performing cloud-based analyses.
4 Existing Methods
The following sections survey existing methods relevant for each module. In Section 5
we discuss why and how these methods can be applied and motivations when
modications are necessary.
4.1 Trust and Reputation Models
The main task for module 1 is to evaluate vehicle behavior based on V2V data received
and ways to assess cooperative tasks performed together. We use a recent survey on
trust solutions for VANETs, namely Hussain et al. [10], as a base and further perform
a search on Google Scholar to nd additional trust and reputation-based models. We
briey present a diverse set of solutions to give an overview of methods found in
literature, but refer to Hussain et al. [10] for a more complete overview of solutions
dealing with trust or reputation in VANETs.
The reputation model presented by Engoulou et al. [14] veries the vehicle id,
width and length of the vehicle, driving direction, location, speed, acceleration,
transmission rate and message frequency. Each of these parameters is either correct
(1) or false (0) and the resulting sum is the proposed reputation score. This model
lacks the evaluation of the other vehicles’ cooperative behavior, for example, if the
vehicles provide correct warning messages and how they behave during cooperative
scenarios such as platooning.
Soleymani et al. [15] make use of fuzzy logic to model trust. Three modules,
such as an experience module which evaluates the interactions, a plausibility module
which veries the location of the sender, and an accuracy level module, result in one
of the three levels: high, medium or low. A fuzzy inference engine further denes the
combinations in which the trust level is acceptable and not-acceptable. The approach
of using fuzzy logic is interesting, however, for our proposed anomaly detection
framework we require a more detailed representation of trust/reputation.
A trust system focusing on modeling the trust in the surrounding vehicles as well
as the ego vehicle is presented by Rosenstatter and Englund [16]. The authors identify
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trust evaluation criteria for the own (ego) vehicle, all surrounding vehicles including
more specic criteria for the vehicle in front, as this vehicle can be additionally
veried with the vehicle’s front sensors. Unlike other proposed solutions, this system
has been evaluated with data from a real environment consisting of several Vehicle-to-
Everything (V2X)-enabled vehicles. In addition, the presented trust model is exible
for adaptations, which is also shown by the authors’ detailed discussions of factors
that can be considered for evaluating the behavior of a vehicle.
Bißmeyer et al. [17] propose a trust score based on plausibility checks, e. g.,
reported location, using particle lters. An aging factor is introduced to dene ratio
of the impact of a new trust score compared to the past trust scores. The authors
also propose to apply an additional particle lter to the ego vehicle to verify the trust
in the own system as the ego vehicle acts as the reference for evaluating the other
vehicles. An extension of the proposed model would be necessary to cover also an
evaluation of the behavior of other vehicles during cooperative scenarios such as
platooning.
In Section 5.1 we return to trust models and give more details on the demands
on the trust models and how they can be applied in the context of the V2C Anomaly
Detection framework.
4.2 Combining Trust Scores
The combination of knowledge, i. e., the trust scores T Ii,j , reported by individual
vehicles can be carried out in various ways by module 2. Overall, there are two
distinct concepts for combining trust scores, (i) calculating the mean, e. g., weighted,
arithmetic or geometric, and (ii) using Dempster-Shafer theory (DST) of evidence [18],
more specically, Dempster’s rule of combination.
Arithmetic and Geometric Mean. The trust scores reported by each vehicle
need to be combined in such a way that it compensates for a minority of dishonest
vehicles. The arithmetic mean is generally used for data with no signicant outliers
whereas the geometric mean is used when the dierence between the data points is
logarithmic.
The arithmetic mean, for instance, is used by Engoulou et al. [14] to calculate
the indirect trust, an aggregation of the trust scores of vehicle j received from other
vehicles. Furthermore, the authors use a weighted average for combining the local
trust, calculated by the own system for vehicle j and the indirect trust. Rosenstatter
and Englund [16] also use the weighted average for the calculation of the combined
trust score reecting the current situation.
Halabi and Zulkernine [19] propose a cooperative game model for preventing
malicious vehicles from entering a vehicle coalition. The authors argue for using the
product of the trust scores (T Ii,j ) when computing the trust in a vehicle group to
increase the impact of low trust scores. A model using the geometric mean is also
presented by Kerrache et al. [20]. The described trust model evaluates only binary
events and combines the received trust ratings using geometric mean, however, the
authors do not provide any reasoning for choosing the geometric mean over the
arithmetic mean.
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Dempster-Shafer Theory. DST is used in situations which require the combi-
nation of evidence reported by several (unreliable) observers. Chen and Venkatara-
manan [21] present how DST can be applied in the context of intrusion detection in
VANETs. The authors argue that Bayesian inference is less suited for such a use as it
requires the complete knowledge of prior probabilities, which often need to be esti-
mated in practice. DST, however, handles the lack of a complete probabilistic model
by introducing belief and plausibility instead of probabilities. Chen and Venkatara-
manan highlight the dierence with the following example: Node A is trustworthy
with a probability of 0.8 respectively untrustworthy with probability 0.2 and reports
that node S is trustworthy. In the event that A is indeed trustworthy, the claim that S
is trustworthy is accurate, but A being not trustworthy, does not automatically imply
that A is inaccurate – it says that the claim of A has 0.8 degrees of belief for S being
trustworthy and 0 (not 0.2) degrees of belief that S is untrustworthy [21].
Combining trust or reputation scores reported by several vehicles using DST has
been proposed in several models. For instance, Zhang et al. [22] use the computed
reputation value per vehicle as degree of belief for either trusting or distrusting
a vehicle. A unit in the cloud, a so-called trust authority, combines these reports
according to Dempster’s rule of combination.
A similar approach as proposed by Chen and Venkataramanan, and Zhang et
al. can potentially be applied to the trust score. The trust score could be used as
evidence for vehicle j being either trustworthy or untrustworthy. In this example the
number of elements is limited to three, trustworthy, untrustworthy and uncertain
(either trustworthy or untrustworthy), where each element is associated with a belief
mass value.
4.3 Detecting Change in Behavior
The combined trust score about vehicle j , i. e., T Ij , is continuously monitored in the
cloud and a suitable technique is needed in module 3 to detect changes in T Ij . The
most basic detection technique would be to trigger an alert when a certain threshold,
for example T Ij below 0.4, is reached. Naturally, this approach does not provide
the exibility of nding more subtle changes in a vehicles’ behavior. Observing the
mean and raising an alert as soon as the mean deviates from a given threshold on
the other hand would be very slow and may not detect slow but steady changes.
Aminikhanghahi and Cook [23] provide a survey of change detection techniques
for time series data including machine learning algorithms. They categorize existing
work in unsupervised and supervised methods that are further split in more detailed
categories. For this framework we require an unsupervised method that does not
require training with labeled data. Hence, we investigate the use of two unsupervised
methods, namely CUSUM and one Bayesian detection approach.
Cumulative Sum (CUSUM) was originally proposed by Page [24] and has been
adapted over the years to, for instance, support online detection [23,25]. This method
is able to detect small and steady changes, as the cumulative sum of the deviations
from a target value is calculated [25]. Granjon [26] describes the CUSUM algorithm,
discusses practical considerations, such as choosing the detection threshold, and
refers to other proposed variations of CUSUM.
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Bayesian approaches for change point detection have, compared to CUSUM, the
advantage of being faster; they require fewer samples for detecting change and have
a lower computational cost [23]. In Section 5.3 we give more details and compare an
implementation of CUSUM and Bayesian change detection.
4.4 Data Analysis in the Cloud
First, the data needs to be analyzed in order to design and apply appropriate anomaly
detection techniques. Knowledge Discovery in Databases (KDD) [27] is a process
for gathering new knowledge from data. This process consists of several steps
starting from understanding the area of application to interpreting and evaluating
patterns found in the data, thus gaining new knowledge. Data mining is one step in
this process and supports the developer in identifying new patterns in the data by
applying specic algorithms [27, 28].
Hemdan and Manjaiah [29] provide an overview of the principles of digital
forensics, intrusion detection and suitable types of data science methods in the context
of Internet of Things. The authors list prediction, classication, clustering and relation
rule techniques as appropriate techniques for intrusion detection. Torres et al. [30]
review machine learning techniques in the context of cyber security. They provide
more detail and discussions on relevant techniques, such as self-organizing maps
(SOM) and random forest. Kang [31] focuses on anomaly detection techniques for
monitoring a product’s health, however, the overview of machine learning techniques
and discussions about the advantages and disadvantages of each category of machine
learning techniques is still relevant for identifying techniques for module 4.
5 V2C Anomaly Detection Framework
We present a detailed description of each module and discuss the applicability of
methods identied in Section 4 in the following subsections. Moreover, we propose
how the selected methods can be adapted when necessary.
5.1 Trust Evaluation
Inmodule 1, a trust score, often a value between 0 and 1, for each vehicle is computed
every time a vehicle interacts or receives V2V messages, e. g., Cooperative Awareness
Messages (CAM) [32]. The trust score needs to reect the cooperativeness when
performing cooperative actions, such as platooning, lane change and crossing an
intersection. In addition, vehicles should also be evaluated based on the accuracy of
the information they provide, e. g., speed, geographical position, driving intentions
as well as correctness of warning messages. Such an evaluation of each vehicle’s
behavior and accuracy is typically performed using a trust or reputation model (see
Section 4.1). The trust model should also be applied on the own vehicle’s system, the
ego vehicle.
Below, we discuss how trust models for calculating the trust scores of the ego
vehicle and surrounding vehicles can be applied for the purpose of the V2C Anomaly
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Detection framework. For instance, vehicle i should calculate its own trust score T Ii,i
and the trust score for vehicles it interacted with, i. e., T Ii,j . These trust scores are
updated over a specied period and maintained in the vehicle’s own database along
with a condence value indicating the level of condence for each specic trust score.
After the specied period, the computed trust scores and corresponding condence
values are uploaded to the cloud for further analysis.
Trust Model. The trust models in [17] and [16] both include an evaluation of the
vehicle’s own performance with respect to trust. Compared to Bißmeyer et al. [17],
Rosenstatter and Englund [16] also provide a detailed discussion about the relevant
behavior specic to the vehicle in front, surrounding vehicles it interacts with and
the ego vehicle.
The trust score presented in [16] is considered by the ego vehicle for decision-
making and comprises four trust scores with range [0,1] that are combined using
a weighted average: (1) ego vehicle; (2) vehicle in front; (3) interacting vehicles;
(4) environment. The authors dierentiate between the vehicle in front and other
vehicles it interacts with as the vehicle in front is most important from a safety per-
spective and since it can be easily evaluated with its own sensors like the front radar.
Moreover, the authors have shown in real scenarios with sensor noises how such a
trust score can represent the current situation respectively trust in the surrounding
other vehicles.
In our V2C Anomaly Detection framework, the trust scores of the vehicles should
be evaluated based on all available knowledge of the ego vehicle, similar to [16], and
split into two distinct and one combined trust score:
T Ii,j Trust score of vehicle j computed by vehicle i.
T Ii,i/T Ij,j Own perceived trust score of vehicle i/j .
T Ij Combined trust score of vehicle j (see Section 5.2).
Anomaly Identication. The selected trust model needs to be able to identify
the attacks and anomaly types dened in the scenarios in Section 2.1. To further
clarify situations where trust scores and the consequent analysis in the cloud are
extremely useful, we will give one practical example for each scenario in Table H.2.
Update Frequency. The trust scores should ideally be calculated and updated
upon receipt of new messages from relevant vehicles within the VANET. However,
due to limited computational resources or the high number of vehicles identied
as relevant, it might be necessary to reduce the computation of trust scores to a
lower frequency. Relevant vehicles are dened as those in direct proximity of the ego
vehicle, but also other vehicles it interacts with, such as vehicles farther away that
send a warning message, vehicles participating in a platoon or vehicles cooperating
to eciently pass an intersection.
The trust score needs to be updated as the vehicles are periodically re-evaluated.
This can be achieved by computing the moving average respectively the weighted
moving average when new trust evaluations for a vehicle are computed in order to
maintain a single trust score T Ii,j per vehicle per evaluation period, e. g., per day.
Condence Ci,j . Due to the fact that interactions with a specic vehicle can last
from a few seconds to several hours when considering platooning, we propose to
include a condence value or counter (Ci,j ) to each T Ii,j to indicate the condence in
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Table H.2: Examples of how a trust model can identify attacks and anomalies.
Anomaly/Attack Identication
Unauthorized Firmware Manipulation
The attacker, such as the owner, upgrades the
ECU rmware to let the automated vehicle
(vehicle j) drive faster than the speed limit.
Surrounding vehicles are able to observe
the speed of the aected vehicle using their
own sensors, e. g., radar, and therefore re-
duce T Ii,j .
HW/SW failures
The camera provides noisy images and there-
fore the vehicle’s lane keeping assistant is
misbehaving and causes the vehicle to bounce
within the lane.
Surrounding vehicles observe the behavior
(lateral movement within the lane) and there-
fore reduce T Ii,j . This behavior can be also
detected by the vehicle itself.
Legitimate SW/HW update
A legitimate update causes the vehicle to mis-
interpret the current road conditions, e. g., icy
roads, and drives too fast.
Surrounding vehicles observe the higher
speed and therefore reduce T Ii,j .
Cooperative Driving
To disrupt trac an attacker performs an
unauthorized rmware modication so that
the vehicle prevents other vehicles from per-
forming a cooperative merge into one lane
(i. e., does not allow vehicles to merge in
front).
This behavior is mainly identied by vehi-
cles that experience the denial of entering the
lane in front of vehicle j , but also by other
surrounding vehicles.
the calculated trust score per vehicle. This way, individual vehicles can also use this
condence value to decide whether they should keep (and store) the trust score and
report it to the cloud in cases when the maximum capacity of the allocated memory
for the trust scores is reached.
Kerrache et al. [20] include a factor that considers the number of veried le-
gal/correct actions within their calculation of the direct trust score (corresponds
to T Ii,j ). We suggest to upload a condence value, such as the total number of
interactions, together with the trust scores in order to indicate the quality of the
calculated trust score T Ii,j .
Role of T Ii,i . Continuously evaluating a vehicle’s own reliability and perfor-
mance is important as the own system acts as the reference (its own sensors and
knowledge about the environment) when evaluating other vehicles. When a vehicle,
for instance, experiences a sudden drop in its own trust score while interacting with
other vehicles or driving autonomously it can automatically enable logging of the
most recent events. Logs can be uploaded to the cloud along with the trust scores of
the other vehicles it interacted with recently. Including evidence of such a situation
is crucial for further investigations, when, for instance, other vehicles also report a
lower trust score for this vehicle.
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Role of T Ii,j . The assessment of the other vehicles can be split in two dier-
ent categories: (i) verication of reported sensor information, e. g., position, speed,
acceleration, lane; and (ii) behavior, e. g., correctly reporting warning messages, inter-
action/cooperation with other vehicles, speed according to laws and road conditions.
Evaluating not only the trust when interacting with other vehicles is important
from a safety perspective as vehicles will rely on sensor information received from
other vehicles during platooning and other cooperative scenarios.
Reporting Trust Scores. Each vehicle maintains its own database of trust scores.
The database maintains a trust score per vehicle per dened period, e. g., per day,
comprising of 4 columns: (1) vehicle ID, (2) date, (3) trust score (T Ii,i or T Ii,j ), and
(4) condence value (Ci,j ).
This data is uploaded to the cloud periodically, e. g., on a daily basis. By including
Ci,j , it is possible to further lter trust scores and consider whether this specic trust
score should be considered in the aggregated trust score per vehicle or not.
Recommendation.Adapting the selected trust model (e. g., [16]) to detect the attack
examples shown in Tables H.1 and H.2 with a signicant change in the trust score is
essential for this framework. In Table H.2 we showed how it is possible to identify
such attacks. Moreover, we propose and discuss the types of trust scores, and how
often they, including a condence value, should be uploaded to the cloud.
5.2 Combining Trust Scores
Module 2 of the V2C Anomaly Detection framework is located in the cloud and re-
ceives trust scores (T Ii,j ) from other vehicles about vehicle j periodically. Section 4.2
provides an overview of approaches to combine this knowledge, namely aggregation
using mean and the use of Dempster’s rule of combination.
Comparing the uses of arithmetic and geometric mean and considering the use
case for this work as well as the range of the trust score, [0,1], we see the arithmetic
mean to be more applicable since the expected data does not vary logarithmically.
The strength of DST and Dempster’s rule of combination is to combine knowledge
provided by dierent observers without the need of having complete knowledge of
the prior probabilities. The methods discussed in Section 4.2 highlight when DST is
applicable in the context of VANETs: When modeling and combining the uncertainty
about whether to trust or not trust a specic node or information received, e. g., a warning
message.
Use Case. Consider a case when vehicles report contradicting trust scores about
vehicle j . These vehicles can either be honest and report a high trust score (0.9),
or dishonest or incorrect and report a low trust score (0.2). Table H.3 shows the
results with varying ratios of honest and dishonest vehicles. Comparing arithmetic
and geometric mean shows that the geometric mean is more pessimistic and that a
minority of dishonest or disagreeing vehicles have a higher impact on the combined
trust score. As the V2C Anomaly Detection framework aims at identifying anomalies
by observing the aggregated trust score reported by a majority of honest vehicles, it
is desirable to use the arithmetic mean.
For the DST-based approach, we adapt Chen and Venkataramanan [21] and dene
three elements: Trust, Distrust, and Uncertainty. If a vehicle trusts vehicle j with
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Table H.3: Comparison of the mean and DST with a varying ratio of honest









0.9 0.2 m(t) m(d)
100% 0% 0.90 0.90 1.00 0.00
80% 20% 0.76 0.67 1.00 0.00
60% 40% 0.62 0.49 1.00 0.00
50% 50% 0.55 0.42 0.97 0.03
40% 60% 0.48 0.37 0.39 0.61
20% 80% 0.34 0.27 0.00 1.00
0% 100% 0.20 0.20 0.00 1.00
*Dempster-Shafer theory: degree of belief; trust m(t) and distrust m(d)
probability of α it results in the following basic belief masses: m(t) = α; m(d) = 0;
m(u) = 1 − α; If a vehicle distrusts vehicle j it results in: m(t) = 0; m(d) = α;
m(u) = 1−α. In addition, we dene that a T Ii,j below 0.5 equals to distrust with a
probability of 1−T Ii,j , e. g., T Ii,j = 0.2 in Table H.3 indicates a distrust ofm(d) = 0.8
and uncertainty of m(u) = 0.2. The results when applying a DST approach similar
to the one we described shows that DST does not provide a sucient level of detail.
For instance, when the belief is high in both cases, honest m(t) = 0.9 and dishonest
m(d) = 0.8 vehicle, the uncertainty is still smaller than 10−2.
Recommendation.Considering the behavior of these three dierent approaches
we suggest applying the arithmetic mean for trust scores with a suciently high
condence value. For specic cases where the majority of vehicles report a low
condence value Ci,j , it can be tested whether a weighted average yields a better
result when the change detection (module 3) is applied.
5.3 Detecting Change in Behavior
The observation of the historic development of the trust score is essential for this
framework as an alert from module 3 triggers further investigations. Section 5.1
denes the factors and means for computing a trust score reecting other vehicles’
and the own vehicle’s behavior to identify anomalies in the scenarios described
in Section 2.1. The combined trust score T Ij described in Section 5.2 is a one-
dimensional time series with a new data point added each evaluation period, e. g., each
day.
A variety of change point detection techniques are applicable for this kind of
data (see Section 4.3). Figure H.3 shows a simulation of the aggregated trust score
T Ij of vehicle j reported daily using the arithmetic mean over a period of one year
with three dierent types of changes injected: (i) an immediate drop of 0.1 on day
28; (ii) an immediate increase of 0.2 on day 112; and (iii) a slow decrease of T Ij
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Figure H.3: Comparison of detection techniques applied to the trust score T Ij when
3 dierent types of changes occur.
where each day one more out of the 9 vehicles reports a decrease of the trust score
of 0.05 starting from day 262.
We used the CUSUM detector implementation from Duarte [33] and modied it
according to [25, p.40] describing the two-sided CUSUM algorithm. The Bayesian
online change detection implementation from Kulick [34] following Adams and
MacKay [35] was chosen as a second candidate.
Figure H.3 shows that both detection techniques were able to detect the changes
of the trust score. For these specic injected changes CUSUM was 5 days respectively
2 days slower in detecting the changes (i) and (ii). Change (iii) is already detected
by the Bayesian detection after 3 out of the 9 vehicles reported a T Ii,j decreased by
0.05 whereas the CUSUM detected the change once T Ij stabilized.
Recommendation.The comparison of both techniques shows that the Bayesian
change detection [34] outperforms the two-sided CUSUM detection [25, p.40]. This
behavior is also conrmed by Aminikhanghahi and Cook [23], as they state that
Bayesian approaches require less samples for detecting change and have a lower
computational cost.
5.4 Data Analysis in the Cloud
An alert triggers module 4 when a change in the trust score of individual vehicles
in module 3 is detected. The trust scores (T Ii,j ) reported by the aected vehicle will
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be temporarily excluded in the computation of T Ij in module 2 to avoid including
possibly wrong or forged trust scores. The cloud data is utilized by module 4 to
investigate the cause of the anomaly and help to identify whether more vehicles
in the eet are aected. This cloud analysis can be split in two parts: (i) manual
investigations; and (ii) automated anomaly & intrusion detection.
Manual Investigations. Initial manual investigations are necessary in order to
identify and apply appropriate techniques for anomaly detection. Thus, it is important
to follow a structured approach such as the Knowledge Discovery in Databases (KDD)
process [27] which denes the steps for analyzing data. This process includes data
mining as one step for applying statistics and machine learning techniques on the
pre-processed data with the aim to discover new patterns and gain knowledge. As
the type and the amount of data diers between the dierent entities, it is needed to
follow such a process to being able to automate this analysis.
Anomaly and Intrusion Detection. Anomalies can be detected by deploying
IDSs in the cloud. IDSs can be designed to detect misuse (knowledge-based [36]),
i. e., signatures of known attacks, or to detect a change in behavior or specica-
tion (anomaly-based [36]).
A majority of anomalies and intrusions can be detected with specication-based
techniques, such as specications about the dened protocol handshakes, network
protocol specics and conformity to the application protocol. Other parameters
that can be validated with such specications are the location and the IP address
from which the requests were sent and the exact time a workshop claimed to have
performed an update.
Anomaly detection techniques based on articial intelligence need to be adjusted
for the dataset, thus it is important to follow a process such as KDD. In Section 4.4
we refer to publications that identify and categorize relevant machine learning
techniques for anomaly detection. An example of a relevant solution is a method
based on Isolation Forest [37] presented by Siddiqui et al. [38]. The introduced
anomaly detection system produces not only an anomaly score, but also generates
explanations for detected anomalies for the analysts and additionally includes a
feedback loop to increase the detection performance. Another technique to consider
are self-organizing maps (SOM). Qu et al. [39], for instance, explore SOM-based
clustering techniques used for intrusion detection.
Recommendation.Considering the fact that vehicle manufacturers may have to
monitor a eet of more than a million vehicles and that many detection techniques
have a high time complexity (see [28]), it may not be feasible to perform an on-line
analysis of the entire data available in the cloud. Therefore, a scalable solution is
required. The V2C Anomaly Detection framework reduces the computational costs by
only triggering a search for anomalies in the cloud when an anomaly of the trust
score, reported by several independent vehicles, is detected. Moreover, we suggest
the following two steps:
1. Upon receiving an alert from module 3 the cloud data relevant to vehicle j
needs to be analyzed in order to nd more information about the anomaly and
its cause.
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2. Once patterns of anomaly or intrusion in the cloud data specic to the alert
about vehicle j have been identied, the entire vehicle eet or a subset, such
as vehicles within a specic region, can be analyzed.
5.5 Vehicle Data in the Cloud
In this section we explore the types and variety of data available in the cloud. The
type of data strongly depends on the actor performing the analysis and their terms of
agreement with their customers. The actor is not limited to the vehicle manufacturer,
but it may also be the owner of a vehicle eet, e. g., logistics company, or an authority.
We therefore identify and describe the type of data that should be considered for the
analysis in module 4.
Data uploaded to the cloud can be split in four categories: (1) trust scores; (2) appli-
cation data from services using the server back end; (3) diagnostic events, e. g., update
events, negative response codes (NRCs) according to ISO 14229 [40]; (4) in-vehicle
IDS alerts. Figure H.4 provides an overview and examples of these categories.
(1) Trust Scores 𝑇𝐼!,! , 𝑇𝐼!,# and Confidence Value 𝐶!,#
(2) Vehicle Services: remote unlock, emergency call,
trip information, third-party services, etc.
(3) Diagnostic Events: firmware updates, 
errors/unsuccessful update attempts, negative 
response codes, etc. 
(4) In-vehicle Alerts: network related events (e.g., DoS, port access), 
authentication errors,  alert from behavior-based IDS, etc.
Figure H.4: Data accessible in the cloud
Vehicle Services. Many vehicle services, such as remote unlock, emergency call
and smartphone application, require communication to the server back end. The data
of these services can contain status updates from the vehicle, for instance, location,
trac and road conditions, and trip statistics. The information shared depends on the
services the customer subscribes to as well as the user agreement for using private
sensitive data for security analysis. Metadata from the communication between the
vehicle and the server, and data from the application protocol and possible deviations
from it can be additional evidence of an anomaly or intrusion.
Events and service information performed by an authorized workshop are also up-
loaded to the cloud in order to keep track of the modications and repairs performed
on the individual vehicles. Such data includes information about the workshop, time
and location as well as which vehicle unit was upgraded, defect and replaced, and
rmware versions of each vehicle unit.
In addition, third-party service providers may choose to share the identity or
more information about anomalously behaving vehicles.
Diagnostic Events. Vehicles not only need to report that rmware updates
have been performed, they also need to provide information about when and how,
e. g., over-the-air or manually at the workshop, the new rmware was downloaded.
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Furthermore, OEMs need to know whether the rmware update was successful
and if it took more than one attempt to upgrade. This information can be used, for
instance, to identify whether vehicles were subject to a possible intrusion attempt.
ISO 14229 [40], Road Vehicles – Unied Diagnostic Services (UDS), is widely used and
also incorporated in the AUTOSAR system architecture.1 From a security perspective
UDS events are of high interest as these services are used to modify rmware and
for short-term controls, e. g., triggering ECU restarts. Appendix A.1 of ISO 14229 [40,
Part 1] lists the dened Negative Response Codes (NRCs). An example when such
NRCs are sent is an event that the limit of failed authentication attempts has been
reached or the attempt of sending specic UDS commands while the vehicle was
driving faster than the specied limit.
In-vehicle IDS Alerts. In-vehicle IDSs are essential for detecting and subse-
quently preventing a large number of attacks. This need is also reected in the ENISA
Good Practices for Security of Smart Cars [9]. The detail of information when IDS
alerts are received depends on the type of IDS. Thus, the information from alerts
can range from detailed information about which attack has been recognized, to
only an alert indicating that behavior outside the modeled normal behavior has been
detected.
6 Discussion
To highlight the benets of the V2C Anomaly Detection framework, we will discuss
a use case similar to change (iii) in Section 5.3 to detail the tasks and discuss the
challenges for each module. The introduced change causes the combined trust score
T Ij to continuously drop as more vehicles report a lower trust score for vehicle j .
Possible causes for this change could be either a malicious actor who performed
an illegal modication of the rmware (scenario 1 in Section 2.1) or a legitimate
rmware update (scenario 3).
(1) Trust Evaluation. Each day more vehicles observe an undesired behavior of
the automated vehicle j , such as speeding or driving faster than what the current
road condition allows. Therefore, the vehicles lower the individually perceived trust
score T Ii,j according to the trust model and report it together with their own trust
score T Ii,i and Ci,j to the vehicle manufacturers’ cloud.
Opening such a peer evaluation between vehicles to a group of vehicle manu-
facturers would naturally lead to more independent evaluations by other vehicles
encountered on the roads and thus more data. However, the trust models need to
be similar in terms of evaluation criteria in order to avoid biases of dierent imple-
mentations. Another challenge is the identication of vehicles when pseudonym
certicates are used to hide the true identities of vehicles in the VANET. In this case
the corresponding entity, i. e., certicate authority, needs to be involved in order to
correlate the trust score to the correct vehicles.
(2) Combining Trust Scores. Module 2 combines the trust scores T Ii,j with a
suciently high condence value Ci,j in form of T Ij . In the beginning only a few
1https://www.autosar.org
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vehicles may experience a change in the behavior as example 5 in scenario 3, for
instance, is only perceived when the road is slippery or icy, e. g., in the mornings and
evenings, however, over time more vehicles report a lowered T Ii,j causing the overall
trust score to drop more signicantly. The trust score perceived by the vehicle itself,
i. e., T Ij,j , may stay stable as the vehicle itself perceives the environment incorrectly
due to the rmware update. For this reason, we suggest to monitor T Ij,j separate
from T Ij .
(3) Detecting Change in Behavior. With the T Ij degrading each day, module 3
detects the change and raises an alert once a certain threshold is reached. Sections 4.3
and 5.3 show that there are many suitable algorithms for detecting change in one-
dimensional time series data. In this work we explored two techniques in more detail,
namely CUSUM and Bayesian online detection. The comparison in Figure H.3 shows
that the Bayesian online detection is faster compared to CUSUM as it detects the
change already while the change is progressing. This characteristic is also described
in the comparison of both techniques [23].
(4) Cloud Analysis. As soon as the observation of the combined trust score per
vehicle T Ij triggers an alert raised by module 3, the anomaly detection dened
in module 4 gets activated. In the rst step, the anomaly detection performs an
analysis of data related to vehicle j . In this context, a specication-based IDS may
detect an unusually high number of unsuccessful rmware update attempts, possibly
caused by an attacker, followed by a successful upgrade within a specied period.
Another analysis can inspect whether the vehicle was recently in a workshop or if
the rmware was upgraded. Based on these anomalies, the system can further search
for vehicles with similar patterns in the database.
In addition to specication and rule-based intrusion detection mechanisms, ma-
chine learning techniques, such as classication and clustering techniques are ap-
propriate candidates for this type of data. Nevertheless, it is necessary to follow an
approach such as KDD to explore the data, nd new patterns and consequently adapt
existing detection techniques.
Evaluation.Representing undesired and malicious behavior in form of trust scores is
essential for detecting anomalies using this framework. Existing trust models [16,17]
show how data plausibility checks and misbehavior detection can be used as a base for
making decisions in automated vehicles. In Section 5.1, we describe the requirements
for such trust models and specics on how to use them including detailed examples
highlighting what kinds of anomalies a trust model needs to be able to identify to
signicantly reduce the trust score. Moreover, we evaluated the modules on their
own with initial experiments and discussions considering also the practicality of
each module. A sophisticated prototype covering individual vehicles including the
cloud data they produce is planned in future work.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we present the V2C Anomaly Detection framework, which is a novel
framework combining the assessment of Vehicle-to-Vehicle communication and
the perceived quality of cooperative interactions between vehicles resulting in a
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trust score, with vehicle data in the cloud. The peer evaluation of vehicle behavior
allows identication of local anomalies and attacks even when important security
controls such as in-vehicle IDSs fail to detect them, for example due to an attacker
exploiting a vulnerability, an insider or a rmware upgrade causing unintended
behavior. Furthermore, the analysis of cloud data makes it possible to detect and
identify patterns of anomalies and intrusions on a wider scale such as on a eet level.
Ultimately, the advantage of the V2C Anomaly Detection framework lies in the fact
that it is designed to reduce the computational costs in the cloud by triggering a
cloud analysis once the combined trust evaluation performed by independent vehicles
shows a signicant change, i. e., a changed behavior resulting in a decline of the trust
score.
We have provided scenarios focusing on persistent threats to explain the re-
quirements for each module of the V2C Anomaly Detection framework in terms of
functionality, inputs and outputs. We also provide an initial identication and de-
tailed discussions to aid in choosing or adapting techniques for each module so that
a vehicle manufacturer, eet owner or other actor in the cloud is able to select and
adapt relevant techniques depending on the available data.
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